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Foreword
For nearly 50 years the unemployment insurance program 
has functioned as a unique and largely successful in 
tergovernmental effort. From its inception, federal and state 
governments have each had principal jurisdiction over par 
ticular aspects of the program and both have shared respon 
sibilities for others. The distribution of authority and 
responsibilities has provided a balance of power which, in 
the author©s view, accounts for the vitality of the program 
and its responsiveness to new problems over the years.
Rubin©s concern is that recent economic developments and 
political shifts are producing an increasing federal 
dominance and a departure from long-standing program 
goals. From his analysis of the qualities and dynamics which 
have contributed to the UI program©s past success, he con 
cludes that the future of the program requires a return to the 
traditional federal-state balance of power.
Facts and observations presented in this study are the sole 
responsibility of the author. His viewpoints do not necessari 
ly represent the positions of the W. E. Upjohn Institute for 
Employment Research.
Jack R. Woods 
Acting Director
July 1983
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degrees at Rutgers University and later pursued graduate 
studies in political science at Ohio State University. In 1960 
he joined the staff of the Unemployment Insurance Service 
of the Labor Department©s former Bureau of Employment 
Security, where he specialized in state and federal UI legisla 
tion. As chief of the Division of Program Policy and Legisla 
tion, he was responsible for review of state UI legislation for 
conformity with federal law, preparation of draft legislation 
to assist states, negotiation with state officials on issues of 
nonconformity, and development of federal UI legislative 
programs. He retired from the Department after 29 years of 
government service. In 1979 he was appointed Consultant 
for Legislative Studies for the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation, where he prepared reports 
on a number of major UI issues. Since then he has con 
tracted with both governmental and private organizations as 
a consultant on unemployment insurance.
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Preface
This monograph reflects my association for almost 20 
years with thousands of individuals in the state and federal 
employment security field. The accomplishments of 
unemployment insurance, this unique experiment in in 
tergovernmental relations, are due in large measure to the 
skills and personal commitment of many of these public ser 
vants.
This monograph is dedicated to the memory of my first 
supervisor in the Unemployment Insurance Service, Philip 
Booth, who died in 1981. He is most representative, in my 
mind, of the "old guard," a diminishing group of outstand 
ing federal and state civil servants who established the 
guiding principles of this program, and whose dedication 
served it so well for 50 years.
I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Saul Blaustein 
of the Upjohn Institute for his early support and continuing 
encouragement. This monograph has been much improved 
because of his many suggestions and careful editing. I am in 
debted also to my wife, whose patience, personal experience 
with the program, and typing skills helped see us through 
several drafts of this monograph. Errors and other limita 
tions are solely my responsibility.
Murray Rubin 
April 1983
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Introduction
The unemployment insurance program has been successful 
by any reasonable measure throughout its nearly 50 years of 
existence. It has provided hope and help to millions of 
workers at critical times in their lives. Money for necessary 
expenses has been paid to qualified unemployed workers 
quickly, in an impartial manner, without a means or needs 
test and with relatively little fraud or scandal. Unlike 
welfare, which is based on a demonstration of need, 
unemployment insurance has not cost workers their self- 
respect. Its cost to employers, who finance the program, has 
not been negligible, but neither has it been excessive, given 
the value provided. The dollars pumped by the program into 
failing economies have helped workers and employers by 
forestalling potential economic disasters at both local and 
national levels.
These accomplishments have been made despite two ap 
parent obstacles that seem serious enough to defeat any 
public program. While it is now accepted that insurance 
against unemployment is a legitimate governmental respon 
sibility, the degree of protection to be provided is the subject 
of unremitting controversy, primarily between those anxious 
to ensure a high level of adequacy of protection and those 
for whom program costs, employer tax rates, and potential 
work disincentives are important concerns. This debate sur 
faces at least once every two years in the legislatures of all 50 
States, Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin
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Islands, and not infrequently at the federal legislative level. 
Since each element of unemployment insurance qualifying 
requirements, benefit amounts, benefit duration, eligibility 
and disqualification provisions, tax rates and financing pro 
visions has cost implications, proposed amendments to any 
and all such elements may provoke controversy. Over 2,000 
unemployment insurance-related proposals are introduced 
each year in the states© legislatures. Not all are contentious, 
and not all controversy involves program adequacy versus 
program costs. However, those considerations underlie 
debate on most of the significant amendments.
But rather than being an obstacle, the cost-adequacy con 
troversy has made unemployment insurance (UI) a dynamic 
program, responsive to economic and social change. When 
opposing views have been reasonably balanced, controversy 
and ensuing debate have usually resulted either in enactment 
of carefully considered legislation, or at least defeat of pro 
posals that would weaken the program©s effectiveness. When 
debate has been absent because of the dominance of either 
labor or management, the program has suffered distortions.
The second apparent obstacle also involves controversy. It 
arises from the fact that responsibilities for unemployment 
insurance are shared between two levels of government with 
different perspectives.
Each of the states and three other jurisdictions (called 
"states" for UI purposes) provides for its own complete, 
self-contained unemployment insurance program, ad 
ministered by state employees. The states are responsible for 
all substantive matters: qualifying requirements; benefit 
levels; disqualification provisions; eligibility conditions; and 
tax structure. The federal government©s responsibilities in 
clude maintaining nationwide standards which often include 
program matters. Friction results from state resentment of 
federal encroachments into state jurisdiction. It results also
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when state enactments or practices appear to federal officials 
to violate national standards. These issues of conformity 
with federal requirements are usually settled through 
peaceful negotiation, but occasionally they provoke heated 
confrontations. What makes conformity with federal stan 
dards compelling is the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 
which provides for a payroll tax on virtually all employers. It 
allows employers to credit against most of the federal tax the 
taxes they pay under a state unemployment insurance pro 
gram if that program conforms with federal standards. If a 
state UI law does not conform, employers receive no credit 
and are liable for the full federal tax, which may be con 
siderably more than the taxes many employers pay under the 
state law. None of federal taxes thus payable would be used 
for unemployment benefits. Payment of both the full federal 
tax and state unemployment taxes could be prohibitive. Ac 
cordingly, the state would probably be forced either to aban 
don its nonconforming unemployment insurance program or 
find alternative financing. In most cases, denial of tax credit 
would be tantamount to elimination of the state©s program.
Similarly, although the states are responsible for the ad 
ministration of their programs, the responsibility for the 
design and nature of that administration is shared, since 
financing of UI administrative costs comes from federal 
funds. (A portion of the federal unemployment tax, which 
cannot be offset by state UI taxes paid, provides the source 
of funds for program administration.) Thus, state laws and 
practice also conform with additional federal controls (ad 
ministrative standards and directives), if the state is to 
qualify for the funds necessary to run its program.
As indicated above, the result of this division of respon 
sibilities is continual discord. The states seek independence 
from federal supervision over administrative matters and 
from federal intrusion into program matters. Federal ad 
ministrations seek greater authority to establish priorities,
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ensure economical operations and exert more influence over 
program matters.
The intergovernmental conflicts, like the program 
adequacy-program costs controversy, have provided a "bet 
ter product" but only as long as the powers on each side 
have been reasonably balanced. Until recent years, statutory 
and practical restraints on the authority of both levels of 
government have helped preserve the balance by keeping 
each from usurping the powers of the other. These restraints 
and the resulting balance of state and federal authority have 
produced conflict, but more important, they have generated 
the high degree of intergovernmental cooperation that is 
necessary in order for either partner to operate effectively. 
This cooperation has been the key to the program©s success.
For example, neither the federal nor any state govern 
ment, given the awesome sanctions available, has any in 
terest in provoking a conformity confrontation that could 
jeopardize the continued existence of a state©s program. The 
result has been the resolution, through negotiation, of all but 
a handful of issues. Thus, despite an average of about 20 
potential conformity issues being raised each year since the 
program began, there have been fewer than 30 formal con 
formity hearings actually undertaken over the first 45 years.
Another practical limitation on federal officials that en 
courages cooperation is their accountability to Congress. 
Amendments restricting the authority of the Secretary of 
Labor have followed past federal administrative actions con 
sidered arbitrary by a state-oriented Congress. That ex 
perience has been an inhibiting factor even during periods 
when administrations have been popular with Congress.
The states also face practical limitations on their authority 
that encourage cooperation and restraint. For example, cer 
tain past state enactments have been considered so arbitrary 
or discriminatory as to provoke congressional adoption of
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new federal standards. Each standard diminishes all states© 
authority.
The restraints on federal authority have allowed the wide 
discretion states have to tailor their programs to local condi 
tions and preferences. This freedom has made possible the 
conflict and debate within state legislatures that have made 
state programs dynamic and responsive. The restraints on 
state authority have helped control state excesses and unwise 
legislation. The division of responsibilities and the restraints 
on both levels of government have necessitated the coopera 
tion that has produced sound programs and effective ad 
ministration.
It may be that other structural arrangements would have 
been as successful. A wholly state UI system would produce 
even greater diversity. However, without at least minimum 
federal responsibility, it seems likely that pressures of in 
terstate competition ultimately would lead to serious inade 
quacies and inequities. A wholly federal system would have 
the advantage of greater efficiency that uniformity offers, 
but also the potential of sterility. Indeed, most of the innova 
tions that have kept the unemployment insurance program 
current and dynamic have originated in the states, not from 
Washington, because of the opportunity for experimentation 
that the federal-state system encourages.
The balance of power produced by the division of respon 
sibilities and the system of checks has always been fragile, 
dependent as it is on voluntary as well as statutory restraints. 
It has been seriously threatened in recent years. Increasingly, 
the federal government has tightened control over ad 
ministration of the states© programs. More federal standards 
concerning substantive program matters, originally the 
states© jurisdiction, have been enacted since 1970 than during 
the first 35 years of the system©s existence. Recent federal re 
quirements concerning extended benefit duration have
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dominated that aspect of unemployment insurance and in 
fluenced regular program changes. Federal loans to 
bankrupt state UI funds and federally imposed conditions 
for repayment since 1974 have produced new federal in 
fluence over state UI tax matters.
There are as many reasons for the new federal dominance 
over the unemployment insurance system as there are 
manifestations of federal control. Preservation of the 
balance of power has been dependent on the states meeting 
their obligations and the federal government exercising 
restraint. Failures of the states to keep their programs cur 
rent, adequate and solvent have contributed much to the re 
cent federal invasion into matters ordinarily outside its 
jurisdiction. Currently (early 1983), insolvency is the most 
serious problem, with about half the states© UI funds in debt 
because of severe recessions, and more borrowers on the 
horizon. Federal restraint has been undermined not only by 
state failures, but also by inclusion in the federal unified 
budget of the Unemployment Trust Fund, through which all 
UI moneys flow, and the system©s consequent vulnerability 
to national cost-cutting pressures.
The upset of the federal-state balance of power that has 
lasted nearly 50 years threatens the breakup of an in 
tergovernmental relationship that has been both unique and 
highly successful. The full consequences of this trend are not 
yet clear.
The following chapters discuss first the original reasoning 
for the federal-state distribution of responsibilities and the 
provisions originally adopted to implement the system. They 
next describe later federal standards and their impact on the 
balance of power. The administration of the federal laws is 
explored, as well as the process of resolving conflicts. Final 
ly, an assessment is attempted on the value of the balance to 
the system and the prospects for its preservation.
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The intent of these chapters is to describe the federal-state 
division of responsibilities; to identify how the restraints on 
each partner©s authority actually operated; to determine how 
and why they have been weakened; and finally, to evaluate 
the implications of increasing federal dominance. This effort 
seeks to examine the extent to which the federal-state balance 
of power has been important to the success of the American 
system of unemployment insurance.
Any light shed on this question should not only add to the 
understanding of the UI system, but also may have implica 
tions for other federal-state programs. In a period when new 
approaches to federalism are being explored, an understand 
ing of the reasons for at least one federal-state program©s 
success should be useful.

Chapter 1
Conceptual Framework 
for a Cooperative System
Aside from those directly employed in it, few people are 
aware that unemployment insurance is a federal-state pro 
gram. Even fewer have a clear idea of how responsibilities 
are actually shared. Nor is there much overt evidence 
anywhere of the division of authority. For example, when a 
laid off worker files a claim for unemployment insurance at 
the local claims office in Elizabeth, New Jersey (or any of the 
other approximately 2,000 local offices in this country) his 
interest is likely to focus only on whether he qualifies, how 
soon he can collect, the size of his check, and for how long 
he can draw. The worker may know that those objects of his 
concern have been subjects of debate in the New Jersey 
legislature. It©s unlikely that he would know that these ques 
tions are also the subjects of an on-going federal-state tug of 
war that began in 1935.
From all he can observe, the Elizabeth claimant will 
assume that unemployment insurance is solely a matter be 
tween him and the State of New Jersey. The local office is a 
state-owned building. The claimstaker and all other UI and 
employment service personnel the claimant sees are state 
employees. The requirements the worker must satisfy are all 
spelled out in the New Jersey Unemployment Compensation 
Law. So too are the formulas from which the amount of his 
benefits is computed, the work-search and other tests of
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availability he must pass, and the disqualifications that may 
be imposed on him. The unemployment check is signed by 
state officials and drawn from the New Jersey unemploy 
ment insurance fund, which is financed by UI taxes paid by 
New Jersey employers and workers. Not a whisper of federal 
influence appears to exist.
A federal worker employed by the U.S. Department of 
Labor©s (DOL) Unemployment Insurance Service to review 
state UI laws for their conformity with federal requirements 
would see the program from a different perspective. She will 
know that New Jersey would probably not have enacted an 
unemployment insurance law as early as 1936, if at all, if the 
Social Security Act had not been adopted a year earlier. She 
will also know that the source of most major provisions of 
the New Jersey law, as well as the other states© laws, is 
legislative language suggested by the Social Security Board 
and later by the DOL. The local office operation in Elizabeth 
is paid for entirely with federal funds, including the salary of 
the claimstaker; federal funds finance, as well, the salaries of 
all other UI personnel in New Jersey and elsewhere.
Registration, reporting and claim filing requirements the 
claimant in Elizabeth must meet are governed by federal 
standards. A federal standard also applies to the time it takes 
the state to send the claimant his first check. If benefits are 
denied for any reason, the claimant is entitled to an appeal, 
as required by federal law, and the time within which a deci 
sion on the appeal can reasonably be expected is governed by 
a federal standard. If unemployment conditions are bad in 
New Jersey, the claimant may be entitled to as much as a 
13-week extension of benefits, again because of federal law. 
From the federal employee©s perspective, virtually every 
significant aspect of unemployment insurance is directly or 
indirectly controlled by federal law.
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This example shows how thoroughly responsibilities are 
divided. It is hard to find another public program with 
authority so intertwined between two separate governments. 
The general lack of awareness of the existence of the partner 
ship is perhaps a reflection of how smoothly it has operated.
Origins and Rationale
This chapter describes some of the thinking that led to the 
allocation of the basic responsibilities for the UI program 
between the federal government and the states. The division 
of responsibilities was incorporated into the original UI pro 
visions of the Social Security Act which continue to dictate 
the structural framework of the American system of 
unemployment insurance. The most authoritative discussion 
of the reasoning for the federal-state division of respon 
sibilities is contained in the 1935 Report to the President of 
President Roosevelt©s Committee on Economic Security. 1
The Committee recommended federal legislation to 
establish a federal-state system of unemployment insurance. 
Evidently, it did not consider seriously two other possible 
options. The first was retention of the status quo, which 
meant leaving total responsibility for unemployment in 
surance to state initiative. The failure of this approach was a 
principal reason the President believed federal action was 
needed in the UI area. As late as 1934, only Wisconsin had 
enacted a UI law. Even less realistic was another op 
tion leaving unemployment insurance to individual 
employer initiative. Private unemployment benefit plans had 
developed very slowly, were quite limited, and many did not 
survive the early 1930s. 2
The Committee considered a wholly federal UI program 
but rejected it in favor of a federal-state system for a number 
of reasons, not the least compelling of which was the fact
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that President Roosevelt favored such a hybrid approach. 
The Unemployment Insurance Subcommittee of the 
Technical Board (created to advise the Committee on 
Economic Security) decided at one of its first meetings to 
recommend a federal system. Its members, however, could 
not agree on specific provisions. The Subcommittee (and the 
Committee on Economic Security) ended by unanimously 
recommending a federal-state system. 3 In addition to the 
President©s known preference for a hybrid system, the case 
for a wholly federal approach was weakened also because the 
constitutionality of any federal invasion into social and 
economic matters was still questionable, given the composi 
tion and tenor of the Supreme Court. It was reasoned that if 
unemployment insurance was structured as a federal-state 
program, the chances would be greater of its surviving the 
constitutional challenge. Finally, a wholly federal approach 
to cope directly with a problem such as unemployment was 
simply not consonant with American political tradition at 
that point and it would not be easy to break tradition. Not 
only was a state-oriented Congress unlikely to relinquish all 
state authority over the issue, but also the founders and sup 
porters of the Wisconsin unemployment insurance program 
had both considerable influence and interest in continuing 
what they had begun in 1932.
Although rejecting the wholly federal approach, the Com 
mittee still felt compelled to acknowledge the possibility that 
a future Congress may well find it desirable to abandon the 
dual government system entirely, "should those fears ex 
pressed by the champions of a federally administered system 
prove true. . . ." 4 Indeed, to remove possible roadblocks to 
future federalization should Congress follow that path, it 
recommended that the federal act require all states to pro 
hibit provisions that would create vested interests in the cur 
rent system and thereby tend to hinder modification or 
repeal of state UI laws if a wholly federal system was later
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enacted. Accordingly, as a condition for approval of tax 
credits, each state law must provide:
... all the rights, privileges, or immunities confer 
red by such law or by acts done pursuant thereto 
shall exist subject to the power of the legislature to 
amend or repeal such law at any time. 5
According to the Committee, with such a provision in place,
... the Congress can at any time increase the re 
quirements which State laws must fulfill and may, 
if it sees fit, at some future time, substitute a 
federally administered system for the cooperative 
Federal-State system we recommend. 6
The Committee recognized that responsibility for the na 
tion©s system of unemployment insurance would remain 
shared only as long as Congress continued to be convinced 
that the advantages of a federal-state balance of authority 
outweigh its drawbacks. An important advantage of a dual 
system was that it permitted wide latitude for experimenta 
tion by the states, needed because of the nation©s lack of ex 
perience with unemployment insurance at that time. In the 
process, mistakes made by individual states could be confin 
ed within the boundaries of those states, while successful 
measures could be adopted and shared elsewhere.
The most serious disadvantage was that workers exposed 
to the same risk of unemployment would be treated dif 
ferently from state to state, and the level of protection was 
likely to be wholly inadequate in some.
As noted elsewhere, recognition by both levels of govern 
ment that Congress could alter the entire structure of the 
system at any time has been an important deterrent to abuse 
of authority, adoption of extreme provisions, and in 
temperate actions. Neither federal nor state officials have
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been anxious to jeopardize a partnership that has been suc 
cessful by any reasonable measure.
As to the actual division of responsibilities, neither the 
Committee Report nor the Social Security Act systematically 
spells out federal and state duties in any detail. Instead, the 
Report contains general recommendations for five categories 
of responsibilities: providing an incentive for states to enact 
UI laws; adopting minimum standards for state programs; 
controlling reserve funds; establishing substantive program 
provisions; providing effective administration. In most 
cases, although certain functions were assigned either to the 
states or the federal government, the actual carrying out of 
the responsibilities proved to be a shared, not an exclusive, 
responsibility. Indeed, the single most pervasive theme of the 
Committee©s Report is the expectation that the states and the 
federal government will find ways of accomplishing most 
unemployment insurance responsibilities through 
cooperative effort.
Providing an Incentive
The compelling need in 1935 was to provide an effective 
stimulus for state action:
So long as there is danger that business in some 
States will gain a competitive advantage through 
failure of the State to enact an unemployment com 
pensation law, few such laws will be enacted. This 
obstacle to State action can be removed only 
through the imposition by the Federal Government 
of a uniform tax (rate of contribution) on all 
employers throughout the country, so that no State 
will have an unfair advantage. 7
The tax offset approach, by which credit for state UI taxes 
paid is allowable against the federal tax for employers in 
states with approved UI laws, proved to be an effective in-
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ducement. Prior to 1935, only Wisconsin had adopted a UI 
law. By the close of 1936, all but Illinois and Missouri had 
passed such laws and those two did so within the following 
six months. No state has ever voluntarily dropped out of the 
system by reason of not having an unemployment insurance 
law.
Tax offset is quite different from the more common grant- 
in-aid approaches that characterize many federal programs. 
The latter provide localities with an incentive to build airport 
facilities, for example, by providing funds either on a match 
ing or other basis if the locality agrees and itself makes some 
effort. The tax offset approach acts less as a carrot than a 
stick since the main incentive it provides a state is an oppor 
tunity to avoid having the state©s employers lose credit 
against the federal tax without any gain to the state.
According to the Committee, there was another reason 
why the tax credit approach was preferred over an approach 
under which the tax was wholly collected by the federal 
government and then remitted as grants-in-aid to the states. 
Under the latter system, the states would not have self- 
supporting laws of their own, "and as with all compensation 
having its source in federal grants, there would be great and 
constant pressure for larger grants exceeding the money rais 
ed by the tax, with a consequent confusion of compensation 
and relief." 8
The federal law allows employers credit of up to 2.7 per 
cent (90 percent of the original 3.0 percent federal payroll 
tax) for UI taxes they paid under a state law, provided that 
the state law satisfies certain federal requirements. The 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) tax rate, as of 
1983, is 3.5 percent of the first $7,000 in wages paid by an 
employer to an employee in a calendar year. Employers sub 
ject to an approved state law continue to receive a maximum 
credit of 2.7 percent of the same wage base for state taxes
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paid. The maximum credit involves both normal and addi 
tional credit. Normal tax credit is credit employers receive 
against the federal tax for taxes they actually pay under a 
state law. An employer whose state tax was 1.0 percent of 
taxable wages would, therefore, receive normal credit of 1.0 
percent. Additional tax credit (allowable only if the state law 
meets federal experience-rating requirements) is credit for 
the difference between what the employer actually paid and 
2.7 percent. In the example above, additional credit would 
be 1.7 percent. Denial of both normal and additional credit 
means, of course, payment of 2.7 percent to the federal 
government in addition to the 0.8 percent balance already re 
quired. 9 The 0.8 percent balance collected by the federal 
government finances federal and state administrative costs, 
the 50 percent federal share of the cost of extended benefits, 
and a loan fund available to individual states with depleted 
unemployment funds. 10
The tax offset approach provides a persuasive incentive 
not only for states to adopt UI laws that conform with 
federal requirements but also to cover every employer sub 
ject to the FUTA, and to establish their taxable wage base at 
least as high as the federal base. The reason for this is not 
because either is required for conformity. They are not. 
Aside from nonprofit organizations and state and local 
governments, which are not subject to the federal tax but 
which state laws must cover to be approved for tax credit, no 
issue of nonconformity with federal provisions is raised or 
sanction threatened if a state wishes to exclude certain 
employers in the private sector, or to exempt certain 
remuneration from its definition of taxable wages. But a 
state does neither employers nor workers any favor by ex 
cluding them from state law coverage or by reducing its tax 
base below that of the federal base. Since the employers are 
liable under the federal law for the FUTA tax, their exclu 
sion under state law would result in denying them credit
Conceptual Framework 17
against the tax. In other words, the excluded employer would 
pay no state UI tax, but would become liable for the full 
federal tax (instead of the net 0.8 percent tax); the state fund 
would receive no revenue from the exempt employer; his 
workers would receive no benefits if they become 
unemployed.
For these reasons, there exists almost a complete overlap 
between federal and state coverage, and no state has a tax 
able wage base lower than the federal base. 11 Indeed, to 
avoid any inadvertent gap in coverage or tax base, DOL has 
recommended (and most states have adopted) provisions 
automatically requiring liability under the state law for any 
employer, employment or wages also liable under the FUTA 
or that the FUTA requires to be covered by the state as a 
condition for tax credit (as in the case of nonprofit organiza 
tions and state and local governments). Also for these 
reasons, coverage expansion and taxable wage base increases 
have occurred nationwide by reason of amendments first to 
federal law. Some states have always had broader coverage 
than the federal law and some have had higher tax bases. But 
most states usually have not acted independently in these 
areas. Without the powerful federal incentive, it is not likely 
that coverage would have extended to virtually all employees 
as it does today.
Shortly after enactment of the Social Security Act, the 
question was raised in the courts as to whether so persuasive 
an incentive as the tax offset credit approach constituted 
federal coercion. This challenge as well as other constitu 
tional questions were resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court in 
1937. Justice Cardozo, writing for the majority, rejected the 
allegation of coercion. A state has a choice:
The State does not bind itself to keep the law in 
force. It does not even bind itself that the moneys 
paid into the federal fund will be kept there in-
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definitely or for any stated time. On the contrary, 
the Secretary of the Treasury will honor a requisi 
tion for the whole or any part of the deposit in the 
fund whenever one is made by the appropriate of 
ficials. The only consequence of the repeal or ex 
cessive amendment of the statute, or the expen 
diture of the money, when requisitioned, for other 
than compensation uses or administrative expenses, 
is that approval of the law will end, and with it the 
allowances of a credit, upon notice to the state 
agency and an opportunity for hearing. 12
In reality, when a state either enacts an amendment that 
puts it out of conformity with federal law or fails to enact a 
provision necessary for conformity, it jeopardizes the con 
tinued existence of its unemployment insurance program. If 
grants or tax credits were withheld, the results would be 
calamitous for the state©s employers, workers, and probably 
the political leaders responsible. Thus, whether a state, as a 
practical matter, can choose to accept or reject the federal 
conditions for administrative grants or tax credits is certainly 
arguable. Yet legally, the states have a choice. State confor 
mity is voluntary. Failure to meet a federal standard incurs 
no administrative or criminal penalty. The standards are not 
legally binding, and neither DOL, the courts, nor any other 
authority can coerce a state to comply. The distinction be 
tween practical and legal existence of a choice is important. 
As indicated above, the federal and state unemployment in 
surance laws survived their major constitutional challenges 
in 1937 on the grounds that the federal conditions were not 
mandatory. Over 40 years later, the constitutionality of the 
1976 amendments to the federal law was sustained on the 
same basis. 13
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Adopting Minimum Program Standards: 
Federal Role, State Influence
If the first federal responsibility, according to the Com 
mittee on Economic Security, was to provide an incentive for 
all states to adopt unemployment insurance laws, the second 
was to provide certain minimum requirements where 
"uniformity is absolutely essential." The same tax offset 
credit approach that persuaded all states to adopt unemploy 
ment insurance laws also compels them to conform to the 
many federal requirements enacted and developed over the 
years. Thus for any employer to receive credit against the 
federal tax, his state unemployment insurance law must be 
certified each year as conforming to over 25 standards in the 
Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA) which is part of the 
Internal Revenue Code. As explained below, for the state to 
receive funds necessary to administer the state program, the 
state law and its administration must also meet about a 
dozen additional federal standards in the Social Security 
Act.
All standards, many of which are cast in general terms, 
have been subject to interpretation. As a result, federal re 
quirements including interpretative directives actually 
number many times the number of statutory standards. Any 
conformity with the standards must be absolute. A state may 
not, for example, meet the standard requiring coverage of 
state and local government workers by excluding temporary 
or part-time employees. It must cover all. 14 Failure, for ex 
ample, of the Idaho legislature to cover members of the 
public Boise Symphony Orchestra created a conformity 
issue, not resolved until the state was persuaded to close the 
coverage gap.
Failure to conform with Federal Unemployment Tax Act 
standards means denial of tax credit. Failure to meet Social
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Security Act standards means denial of administrative 
grants.
The federal government has authority, of course, not only 
to enforce existing standards, but also to adopt new stan 
dards as needed. The Committee on Economic Security 
recommended that federal standards cover only matters on 
which uniformity is absolutely essential. Congress has not 
followed that recommendation. The current variety of 
federal program standards, discussed in chapter 3, suggests 
the lack of any consistent guiding principle.
The Committee had recommended that the establishment 
of standards be a shared responsibility: "Some standardiza 
tion is desirable, but we believe that this should not be a mat 
ter of Federal control, but of cooperative action." The 
statutory authority of the federal government to establish 
standards either by legislation or interpretation is un 
qualified, but in practice the states play an active role in in 
fluencing the fate of proposals that may affect them. Most 
standards have originated as federal administration pro 
posals, and for most past administrations, no proposed stan 
dard was introduced without prior consultation with state 
officials and other interest groups that may be affected. 
Allowing states the opportunity to be heard did not always 
mean dropping proposals for standards to which they ob 
jected, but it did often result in improvements in the pro 
posals, and this was a major reason why it was done.
In addition, state agencies are not without influence in 
Congress. The Interstate Conference of Employment Securi 
ty Administrators follows closely all federal legislative pro 
posals affecting the employment service and unemployment 
insurance programs. Administrators are polled on pending 
bills and their views are presented to Congress in testimony 
delivered during hearings on the bills by the Conference 
leadership. Individual state administrators have been known
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to lobby with their Congressmen on behalf of or in opposi 
tion to proposed legislation. In one way or another, Con 
gressional delegations of states that would be either helped 
or disadvantaged are invariably prepared to react to propos 
ed new federal unemployment insurance standards.
Controlling Reserve Funds: 
Federal Role
The President©s Committee on Economic Security placed 
great importance in the "intelligent and unified handling of 
reserve funds":
Intelligently handled, unemployment reserve funds 
can be made an important factor in preventing a 
depression; but utilization for this purpose is possi 
ble only if their investment and liquidation is within 
control of the United States Treasury. We deem 
this an absolute essential if unemployment compen 
sation is to accomplish the purposes for which it is 
designed. 15
The Social Security Act provides for the establishment of 
an Unemployment Trust Fund in the U.S. Treasury; authori 
ty of the Secretary of the Treasury to invest amounts 
deposited in the fund in interest bearing obligations of the 
United States or obligations guaranteed by the United States; 
the maintaining of a separate bookkeeping account for each 
state agency; and authorization to pay out of the fund to any 
state agency such amount as it shall requisition. The provi 
sion is supplemented by sections of the Social Security Act 
and FUTA requiring deposit of all money received in the 
state©s unemployment fund (except for certain refunds) im 
mediately to the Secretary of the Treasury to the credit of the 
Unemployment Trust Fund. The establishment of the cen 
tralized fund and the requirement for immediate depositing 
into that fund by the states of all contributions would still
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not accomplish the Committee©s objective if the moneys 
could be withdrawn by the states for any purpose. Accord 
ingly, both the Social Security Act and FUTA prohibit ex 
penditure of any money withdrawn from the fund for any 
purpose other than unemployment compensation (with cer 
tain minor exceptions).
The intent of these provisions was to avoid the funds being 
so invested or otherwise expended by the states as to jeopar 
dize their availability for benefits when needed, or diminish 
their effectiveness as counter-cyclical measures. They con 
stitute basic elements of the current federal-state system.
Federal safeguarding of the funds has not been seriously 
challenged in principle, but it has been a source of federal- 
state conflict, as described in chapter 2.
Establishing Sound Program Provisions: 
State Role, Federal Influence
According to the Committee on Economic Security:
The plan for unemployment compensation that we 
suggest contemplates that the States shall have 
broad freedom to set up the type of unemployment 
compensation they wish. We believe that all mat 
ters in which uniformity is not absolutely essential 
should be left to the States. 16
This suggests that the Committee envisioned the states as 
having very broad authority over program matters. The prin 
cipal federal objective was to
. . . stimulate the passage of complete and self- 
sustaining unemployment compensation laws in the 
States, by allowing a credit against the Federal tax 
for contributions paid under State laws. 17
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State independence was to be limited only in the few areas 
where "uniformity is absolutely essential."
The states never enjoyed quite the autonomy suggested by 
the Committee. Their "broad freedom to set up the type of 
unemployment compensation they wish" was circumscribed 
at the outset by federal law indirectly governing state 
minimum coverage and taxable wage base provisions and 
directly governing deposit and expenditure of reserves. 
Moreover, as indicated above, Congress never confined the 
adoption of federal standards over the program area to mat 
ters in which "uniformity is absolutely essential."
Still, the states had wide discretion over most substantive 
program matters: qualifying requirements; benefit and dura 
tion levels; eligibility and disqualification provisions; and tax 
schedules and rates. However, this discretion was of no im 
mediate advantage. In 1935 there was an almost universal 
lack of knowledge about unemployment insurance. Very lit 
tle was known at the state level about what was required to 
meet conditions for credit against the federal tax and what 
requirements must be satisfied to qualify for administrative 
grants. Under these circumstances, although a few states 
took independent action, most relied upon guidance from 
the federal government.
The Report of the Committee on Economic Security con 
tained several suggestions for state legislation, later 
translated into a complete "draft bill." The Social Security 
Board prepared Draft Bills for State Unemployment Com 
pensation of Pooled Fund and Employer Reserve Account 
Types which "meets the minimum standards set forth in the 
Social Security Act for State unemployment compensation 
laws." The Board emphasized, however,
This draft is merely suggestive and is intended to 
present some of the various alternatives that may
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be considered in the drafting of State unemploy 
ment compensation acts. Therefore, it cannot 
properly be termed a ©model© bill or even a ©recom 
mended© bill. This is in keeping with the policy of 
the Social Security Board of recognizing that it is 
the final responsibility and the right of each State 
to determine for itself just what type of legislation 
it desires and how it shall be drafted. 18
Despite the disclaimer, most states had no realistic choice but 
to adopt large parts of the draft bills verbatim, with one state 
actually adopting all the alternative as well as the regular 
provisions offered. As a result, the original state unemploy 
ment insurance laws were quite similar. As Congress enacted 
amendments to the federal laws, the Social Security Board 
and later the Department of Labor issued new draft bills, 
now called Manual of State Employment Security Legisla 
tion, containing suggested draft language implementing the 
new requirements, as well as running commentary explaining 
the background and implications of alternative provisions. 
The draft bills and Manual are not confined to conformity 
matters. Neither the Social Security Board nor DOL has 
been inhibited in making recommendations to the state for 
adopting what they consider sound program provisions.
What differences existed among the early state laws were 
due largely to changes in successive versions of the Manual 
and in states selecting somewhat different nonrequired op 
tions offered in those documents. 19 A revised Manual was 
prepared usually every two years, with the last complete 
document issued in 1950. Since 1950, DOL has not issued a 
comprehensive Manual covering all aspects of a state law, 
but only suggested draft language designed to conform state 
laws to specific changes in or additions to the federal re 
quirements.
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Many years later, state UI laws are still more alike than 
different in basic structure and required provisions. Most 
contain identical language for provisions necessary for con 
formity, and there are now more required provisions than 
ever. But in nonrequired areas, there are now significant dif 
ferences. These include provisions for qualifying re 
quirements, weeky benefit amounts, benefit duration, 
eligibility and disqualifications. A review of several selected 
1978 provisions of 13 representative states shows some of the 
more extreme differences. 20 A few examples of such dif 
ferences, based on more recent data, include:
  A claimant with only about 5 weeks of work could 
qualify for 28 weeks of benefits in West Virginia in 
1982, if his average weekly wage was as high as the 
average wage for all workers in the state for 1981 (about 
$277). In contrast, a claimant with only five weeks of 
work would not qualify for any benefits in most states. 
In Florida, at the other extreme, no claimant can qualify 
for as many as 26 weeks (the maximum) no matter how 
high his former wages unless he had 52 weeks of work in 
his base period.
  Two claimants with identical work experience can 
qualify for substantially different benefits. A claimant 
with six months© work at the 1981 U.S. average wage of 
$255 for production workers in private nonagricultural 
employment would qualify in 1982 for total benefits of 
$1,365 in Florida ($105 per week for 13 weeks) and 
almost three times that amount, or $4,050, in Penn 
sylvania ($135 per week for 30 weeks).
  Disqualification provisions also vary widely among the 
states. For example, in Kansas as of 1982, benefits were 
postponed a maximum of seven weeks for claimants 
who quit work without good cause. At the other ex 
treme, the penalty for voluntarily quitting work could
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be as high as 25 weeks of benefit postponement in Col 
orado, with weeks of benefits reduced by the number of 
weeks of disqualification.
These wide differences suggest that the federal partner has 
been increasingly less persuasive in areas where it has no 
authority to insist. This is not entirely true. The DOL has 
been successful when it has been able to show the ad 
ministrative or cost advantages of certain provisions over 
others (e.g., simplified benefit formulas), or when it has 
demonstrated clearly that some provisions are either 
substantially more equitable than others or more adequate in 
light of program objectives (e.g., indexing benefit ceilings to 
average wage levels; individual rather than uniform base 
periods and benefit years; reduction of waiting periods to no 
more than one week; increase of regular duration ceilings to 
26 weeks). This is not to say that federal influence alone is 
responsible for the widespread adoption of these provisions. 
Certainly, the action and experience of other, particularly 
neighboring, states generally are more persuasive. It suggests 
only that positive and soundly presented federal advocacy at 
least provokes thinking about certain provisions and 
sometimes enhances their acceptability.
Achieving Sound Administration: 
Shared Responsibilities
The Committee on Economic Security intended for the 
states to have "primary responsibility for administration." 
However,
To encourage efficient administration, without 
which unemployment insurance will fail to ac 
complish its purpose, we believe that the Federal 
Government should aid the States by granting them 
sufficient money for proper administration, under 
conditions designed to insure competence and pro 
bity. 21
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The states indeed have primary responsibility for ad 
ministration. The program is administered at the state level, 
wholly through state employees, and with state facilities. The 
states even share in the development of federal ad 
ministrative standards. In the past, DOL has actively sought 
advice and recommendations from state agency officials on 
proposed operations or performance standards. Many of 
these standards are the products of task forces and special 
work groups composed primarily of state officials. In 
developing these standards, usually DOL started with a com 
mitment to the need for a standard and some idea of an ac 
ceptable level of state performance. Subject to DOL ap 
proval, the work groups developed such details as measure 
ment periods, timetables, exceptions and penalties for failure 
to meet the performance goals.
Although the states may have primary responsibility for 
administration, and although states may sometimes be in 
vited to share in the development of administrative stan 
dards, the federal partner has authority to control state ad 
ministrative practices. The source of this authority is the 
federal control over the distribution of administrative grants 
and the power to establish standards "designed to insure 
competence and probity."
Under the Social Security Act, administrative grants are 
permitted only if the state law provides "such methods of 
administration as are found by the Secretary (of Labor) to be 
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of compensa 
tion when due." A second provision permits expenditure of 
administrative grants by a state only in the amounts and for 
the purposes found necessary by the Secretary for proper 
and efficient administration.
The virtually unqualified authority of DOL to allocate ad 
ministrative grants22 regularly collides with the states© 
responsibilities to administer their own laws. Control over 
allocation has translated into federal dictation of priorities,
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limitations on state flexibility, friction, and cooperation. 
The conflicts have produced state recommendations either 
for some share of the authority over allocations or for in 
dependent sources of administrative funds, without federal 
control.
There is some appeal to the states© claim for some control 
of that portion of the money from the net federal tax that 
has been earmarked since 1960 for administrative costs. This 
portion of the tax is collected from the employers in the 
state, transferred to Washington and then allocated back 
among the states. The result is less money for several states 
than would have been available if they had collected and re 
tained the tax as state money, an approach advocated by 
several such states. But the money is difficult to justify legal 
ly as state money. It is derived from a federal tax for a 
statutorily prescribed purpose. Moreover, while many states 
would have more funds to use for administration if they col 
lected and retained the earmarked tax on their employers, a 
substantial minority of usually smaller states would collect 
less from that tax than they now receive.
Many recognize also that state rather than federal collec 
tion of a tax earmarked for administration would not 
necessarily be an improvement. The state-collected tax 
would not necessarily flow automatically to the state agen 
cies without state legislative appropriation and the oversight 
of state budget directors. State legislatures and executives 
could prove even more parsimonious than their Washington 
counterparts, particularly where controlled by individuals 
antagonistic to the state©s unemployment insurance pro 
gram.
Nor, in an era when money for benefit payments has 
become scarce, does it appear that relief from federal control 
over administration funds will come fron finding some in 
dependent source of such funds, as some states have urged, 
or from further distribution to the states of any excess of net
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federal unemployment taxes collected over administrative 
expenses. The so-called Reed Act adopted in 1954 provided 
that the excess of federal unemployment tax collections over 
administrative expenditures would be appropriated to the 
federal unemployment account until a loan fund of $200 
million was accumulated. It also provided for the return to 
the states of any excess above the $200 million reserve, the 
excess to be used either for benefit purposes or ad 
ministrative expenses including buildings (if appropriated by 
the state legislature for specific projects). 23 Excess moneys 
were actually returned to the states in 1956, 1957 and 1958. 
These Reed Act moneys became revolving funds in many 
cases. States that used them to buy buildings, for example, 
and were later reimbursed for those costs from ad 
ministrative grants, thereby recouped their Reed Act credits 
and used them again and again. However, many states© Reed 
Act moneys were considered depleted when they were forced 
to borrow from the federal loan fund as a result of the 
1975-78 recession. In order to borrow, all money available in 
the state fund for benefits, including Reed Act money, must 
first be expended. In 1982 Congress extended for 10 years the 
period within which any Reed Act moneys may be used for 
administrative purposes, 24 and also provided that states 
forced, in the past or in the future, to borrow money from 
the loan fund may, upon request of their Governor, have 
their Reed Act moneys that were considered expended for 
benefits restored and again available for administrative pur 
poses. In any event, although the turnover of original Reed 
Act moneys seems perpetual, there is little likelihood that 
any further distributions will be made to the states from this 
source in the foreseeable future.
Practical Checks to Federal and State Authority
The foregoing discussion suggests that despite the many 
responsibilities allocated to the states, the statutory division
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of authority is overwhelmingly weighted in the federal 
government©s favor. It is. In practice, however, federal and 
state powers have been roughly balanced. The reason is that 
the federal partner has neither the inclination until recent 
years, nor the resources to exercise even a small fraction of 
its potential authority. The inclination was weakened by in 
hibitions on federal initiatives represented by a state-oriented 
Congress. On three separate occasions, decisions holding 
state law out of conformity with federal requirements 
resulted in amendments to federal law either making the 
state practice acceptable or limiting federal authority over 
the issue. Federal officials are no more anxious to be in a 
position of imposing sanctions on states in cases of noncon 
formity than the states are to have them applied. This is true 
not only because success may be short lived, but also because 
the conformity process is a time and staff-consuming, fre 
quently acrimonious process.
Nor are the resources available. Federal staff in 
Washington (UIS) now responsible for administering more 
standards than ever before has, ironically, steadily declined 
in recent years. In the early 1970s, UIS staff in Washington 
reached a peak of about 225, a figure then considered barely 
adequate even before federal standards multiplied by reason 
of 1976, 1980, 1981 and 1982 federal law amendments. As of 
January 1,1983, authorized ceiling for the UIS was 113, with 
105 actually on board of which a substantial portion are 
clerical workers. State UI staff at the beginning of 1983 in 
cluded a base staff of about 40,000, a figure that has remain 
ed fairly constant during the last few years. 25 As the National 
Commission on Unemployment Compensation observed in 
1980, the federal staff is too small to perform even essential 
responsibilities competently, let alone monitor state ad 
ministration to the extent necessary to ensure compliance 
with federal administrative and program standards. 26 No 
thorough review can realistically be made of each state©s 
budget requests. Evaluation of a state©s regulations and pro-
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cedures is impossible given current staff limitations. There is 
not now adequate review even of the states© laws for confor 
mity; nor is the rapidly diminishing pool of experienced 
workers being replaced by adequately trained individuals.
Budgetary restrictions on travel by UIS officials imposed 
in 1982, combined with a 400-1 state-federal staff ratio, vir 
tually preclude the federal partner from providing even a 
semblance of the technical assistance to the states "in setting 
up their administrations and in the solution of the problems 
they will encounter," as recommended by the Committee on 
Economic Security. 27
Another restraining factor is the presence of internal 
discord among the federal staff. The Unemployment In 
surance Service is the DOL entity responsible for unemploy 
ment insurance. The UIS staff is divided among three groups 
of individuals with widely divergent views of the appropriate 
federal role. Dominant at one time, but now diminished in 
numbers and eclipsed in authority is a group of "old timers" 
who view the federal role as involving active leadership in in 
troducing and promoting program improvements, and 
vigorous enforcement of federal standards. A second group, 
made up in large part of former state employment security 
agency employees, has substantially less interest in these ac 
tivities than in assisting the states with technical problems 
and serving as a clearinghouse of information, particularly 
on administrative matters. The third group, now in the 
ascendancy, is composed of management-oriented in 
dividuals, with little background in UI, who are concerned 
less with preserving basic principles and concepts than with 
the cost effectiveness of the state agencies© operations. 
Although this analysis is an oversimplification, it serves to 
identify the major attitudes that compete for priority within 
a relatively small organization.
In addition, the UIS is frequently in conflict with at least 
three other DOL components. The Office of the Assistant
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Secretary for Program Evaluation and Review (ASPER) 
with responsibilities for long-range planning has had recom 
mendations on UI adopted by the Secretary (without UIS in 
put) which were wholly inconsistent with long-standing 
Departmental policy. 28 The Office of Policy, Evaluation and 
Research (OPER), in the Department©s Employment and 
Training Administration, with responsibility for coor 
dinating the DOL employment and training legislative pro 
gram, has occasionally conflicted with the UIS over ap 
propriate strategy or Departmental testimony on behalf of 
federal UI law changes. The Office of the Solicitor (SOL) 
has frequently frustrated UIS efforts, as much by inter 
minable delays in responding to requests for legal opinions 
as by opinions that counter UIS positions. These are not 
simply reflections of changes in political control of the ex 
ecutive branch, appearing first at higher levels and slowly 
working their way through the Department. The UIS has 
been responsive to political shifts, as any responsible 
bureaucracy must be. Rather, the conflicts reflect an un 
professional lack of coordination with UIS by separate 
organizational entities taking initiative in the UI area.
There are probably counterparts to these internal conflicts 
in most organizations. There is no reliable measure of their 
impact on the operations of an agency, and for that reason 
there is a tendency to disregard their influence. The fact is, 
however, that the existence of conflicting factions within an 
organization can sometimes be a determining factor in terms 
of particular actions taken or responsibilities abdicated.
All these factors have contributed to federal restraint. 
There are corresponding restraints on the exercise of state 
authority. It is generally recognized, for example, that when 
a state enacts a highly inequitable provision, or when it fails 
to update its law, or to improve its performance to reflect 
common expectations, it invites new federal standards. Some 
relatively recent federal restrictions barring denial of
Conceptual Framework 33
benefits to interstate claimants, prohibiting cancellation or 
total reduction of benefit rights, and preventing denial of 
benefits to claimants in vocational training courses reflect 
Congressional responses to demonstrably inequitable state 
law provisions. The adoption of a standard requiring all 
states to participate in a plan to give claimants who work in 
more than one state full credit for all their employment, and 
a federal standard, requiring minimum levels of state perfor 
mance in issuing first checks and appeals decisions promptly, 
represent reactions to state inaction in areas demanding 
reform.
As important as both statutory checks and practical 
limitations have been in restraining federal and state authori 
ty, they have been less significant than another factor. This 
has been the realization on the part of state and, until recent 
ly, federal officials, that the most effective means of resolv 
ing problems connected with the program is through 
cooperative effort.
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Chapter 2
Basic Statutory Provisions: 
Conflict and Cooperation
Each of the unemployment insurance responsibilities 
described by the Committee on Economic Security was 
assigned either to federal to state authority by the original 
Social Security Act of 1935. This chapter describes how the 
Committee©s ideas were implemented, what issues arose 
from the provisions of that Act, and how they were resolved. 
Later amendments affecting program standards are the sub 
ject of chapter 3. In implementing virtually all that the Com 
mittee had contemplated, the 1935 Act provided for every 
aspect of the system either through explicit statutory direc 
tion, or language sufficiently broad to allow a necessary flex 
ibility. Above all, the 1935 Act established the division of 
responsibilities and, consequently, the balance of power 
characteristic of the system until recent developments upset 
the balance in favor of the federal partner.
Tax Credit Incentive
The first responsibility of the federal government to pro 
vide an incentive for states to enact unemployment insurance 
laws was effectively accomplished by the establishment in 
the 1935 Act of a 3.0 percent payroll tax and a provision 
allowing credit against that tax to employers for taxes they 
pay under an approved state unemployment insurance law. 
Originally, the tax applied to total wages. In 1939 its applica-
37
38 Basic Statutory Provisions
tion was limited to the first $3,000 paid a worker by an 
employer in a calendar year. Only employers of eight or 
more workers in private industry and commerce were subject 
to the tax. In successive years, coverage was extended and 
both the tax rate and tax base were increased. The basic tax 
credit device itself has never been altered, and it remains a 
keystone of the system.
Control of Reserves
Another category of responsibilities assigned to the federal 
government, the safeguarding of reserves, was accomplished 
by two basic provisions that have not changed since 1935. 
They concern the deposit and withdrawal of state UI funds. 
The first requires states to pay all unemployment taxes they 
collect under the program "immediately" into the Federal 
Unemployment Trust Fund of the U.S. Treasury. This pro 
vides the federal government, as trustee of the funds, the 
means for preserving and protecting resources, one of the 
objectives of the Committee on Economic Security. Aside 
from an occasional dispute as to whether collected taxes are 
deposited quickly enough to satisfy the meaning of "im 
mediate," this requirement has not generated serious issues.
The second provision adopted to ensure the safeguarding 
of reserves was the requirement that money withdrawn from 
the Federal Unemployment Trust Fund by a state may be us 
ed (with certain minor exceptions) only "in the payment of 
unemployment compensation. . . .© M "Compensation" is 
defined as "cash benefits payable to individuals with respect 
to their unemployment." 2 This restriction on what the states 
may spend their tax receipts for has produced considerable 
federal-state friction.
For example, state proposals to have claimants engage in 
community work projects and receive their unemployment 
benefits as "wages" were rejected by DOL as violative of the
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withdrawal requirement. 3 State officials argued for accep 
tance, claiming that both the community and the 
unemployed would benefit from the proposal the former 
by getting important projects completed, and the latter by 
performing useful services and perhaps learning new skills.
DOL reasoning was that if benefits were conditioned upon 
claimants working for the community, they would not then 
be payable solely with respect to unemployment, but rather 
with respect to whether or not they performed such work. 
Even if the work was voluntary, as some states proposed, the 
requirement would not be met. Claimants performing com 
munity services would not have the opportunity to seek 
remunerative work. Thus, benefits would not be paid for 
unemployment due to lack of remunerative work, but rather 
to individuals whose unemployment was due, at least in part, 
to the fact that their engagement in community services 
prevented their search or availability for paying jobs.
DOL applied similar reasoning to state proposals to pay 
benefits to claimants out of work because of illness or 
disability. Claimants not able to work are not unemployed 
because of lack of work, but rather because of their physical 
condition. This interpretation of the withdrawal requirement 
was later modified somewhat to permit payment to in 
dividuals who become ill only after they file a claim. Benefits 
can be payable to them consistently with the withdrawal 
standard, provided they are not offered or do not reject a 
suitable job. The reasoning is that unless a claimant who 
becomes ill after filing a claim is offered a job, the 
unemployment can reasonably be considered due to the 
original cause of separation and continuing lack of work, 
not to the illness. 4
Another modification of the strict application of the fund 
withdrawal requirement applies to claimants undertaking 
training. Even though a claimant in training may not have
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the opportunity to seek work, and may even refuse a job of 
fer, DOL held that payment of benefits would not violate the 
withdrawal requirement. The reasoning was that by under 
taking training, the claimant was demonstrating his 
availability for work. The training may be the most realistic 
approach the claimant can take toward obtaining perma 
nent, meaningful employment. Some states continued to 
deny benefits on the grounds (used by DOL in other con 
texts) that a claimant who refuses an offer of suitable work 
or does not actively seek work because he is in training does 
not meet the availability-for-work requirement of the state 
law. The DOL approach prevailed by reason of a 1970 
amendment to the federal law expressly prohibiting all states 
from denying benefits to claimants in training with the ap 
proval of the state agency on the grounds that they violate 
the state©s availability, active search for work, or refusal of 
work requirements. 5
The withdrawal requirement, that involuntary unemploy 
ment must be the sole determinant of benefit eligibility, has 
proved to be the major statutory bulwark in preserving the 
principle that unemployment insurance is distinguishable 
from relief,
in that payments are made as a matter of right, not 
on a needs basis, but only while the worker is in 
voluntarily unemployed. 6
The requirement provided the basis for rejecting proposed 
state law amendments which would pay or increase benefits 
because of need, as well as others which would deny payment 
because of lack of need. A Wisconsin proposal was rejected, 
for example, which would have provided state extended 
benefits to individuals who exhausted regular benefits, pro 
vided they were in need, as defined in the state law on public 
assistance. Similarly, a New Jersey bill was considered 
violative of the withdrawal requirement because it provided 
a less severe penalty for voluntarily leaving work without
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good cause for individuals who could prove they were in 
need than applied to other claimants.
An Alaska bill, which provided that an individual with 
$7,000 in base-period wages would be required to serve an 
additional waiting week for each $1,000 in wages (up to a 
maximum of six weeks), was rejected as introducing a needs 
test rather than unemployment as the basis for paying 
benefits. The same reasoning was applied to an Oregon pro 
posal to disqualify all workers who received wages and 
benefits during a calendar year totaling more than $6,000.
The withdrawal requirement was the basis also for reject 
ing a Washington proposal for a higher qualifying wage re 
quirement for claimants who have a working spouse; a Min 
nesota proposal to put a lower ceiling on the maximum 
benefit payable to any secondary wage earner in a household 
with an employed head of the family; and a California pro 
posal for limiting the maximum benefits paid to a husband 
and wife to one and one-half times the maximum payable to 
an individual.
The most persistent challenge to the withdrawal require 
ment is represented by a 1963 amendment to the South 
Dakota law, similar in nature to the Alaska and Oregon pro 
posals noted above, requiring claimants whose base-period 
wages were higher than others to serve proportionately 
longer waiting weeks. The ensuing conformity confrontation 
is discussed in chapter 4.
Administration
In no aspect of the program, including the area of federal 
program standards, has federal control been more pro 
nounced or provoked more friction than in the area of ad 
ministration. As indicated in chapter 1, although the states 
have the responsibility to administer their laws, the federal 
government has authority over the administrative grants
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allocated to each state to assure that such funds will be spent 
"solely for the purposes and in the amounts found necessary 
by the Secretary of Labor for the proper and efficient ad 
ministration of such State law." 7
As if this authority was not enough, the Social Security 
Act also requires each state to provide:
Such methods of administration ... as are found 
by the Secretary of Labor to be reasonably 
calculated to insure full payment of unemployment 
compensation when due. 8
This requirement is sufficiently broad to permit virtually any 
federal control over administration the DOL sees fit to im 
pose. Control is not exercised through actual direct federal 
supervision of state operations or personnel. Federal in 
fluence is applied instead through development and enforce 
ment of detailed operating and performance standards.
The claim filing standard, for example, describes in detail 
the circumstances under which claims must be filed, whether 
in person or by mail; the time the state must give a partially 
employed worker to file a claim; the kinds of job finding 
assistance, placement and other employment services that 
must be provided different categories of claimants, and 
defining such categories as ranging from workers on short 
term layoffs to persons permanently separated from their 
jobs. 9
Operation standards similar to the claims filing standard 
and the claims determination standard, which concern ac 
tivities connected with eligibility determinations, 10 cover the 
most significant facets of state administration of claims and 
many less important activities as well. Failure of a state to 
adhere completely to these detailed standards does not 
automatically mean that it violates the "methods of ad 
ministration" requirement. If the state applies alternative 
provisions, DOL must determine if, in effect, they satisfy the
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federal requirement. If not, the state faces a conformity con 
frontation.
Distinguishable from operation standards, which dictate 
the procedural duties of the administrator, are two relatively 
recent performance standards requiring minimum levels of 
efficiency, as specified in terms of results. The appeals 
promptness standard, first issued in 1972 and later modified, 
prescribes as a minimum level of satisfactory state perfor 
mance the issuance of at least 60 percent of all first level ap 
peal decisions within 30 days of the date the appeal of an 
eligibility determination was filed and at least 80 percent 
within 45 days.©© A state that meets these minimum criteria is 
considered to be meeting the standard.
If DOL finds that the failure of a state to meet the criteria 
is attributable to factors reasonably beyond the state©s con 
trol and the state has done as much as is administratively 
feasible to overcome, the standard is considered satisfied. If 
the reasons were not beyond the state©s control, recommen 
dations are made for remedial action. Notice of an oppor 
tunity for a conformity hearing goes to the state in the event 
it fails or refuses to take necessary corrective actions.
The benefit payment promptness standard, issued in 1976 
and revised in 1977, follows a similar pattern. 12 The criteria 
for minimum satisfactory levels of performance are issuance 
of 90 percent of first payments within 14 days following the 
end of the claimant©s first compensable week claimed in the 
case of states requiring a noncompensable waiting week, 90 
percent within 21 days for nonwaiting week states, and 95 
percent within 35 days for all states. This applies only to in- 
trastate claims (claims filed within a state by individuals 
whose benefits are based on wages earned in the same state). 
Separate criteria for interstate claims (filed by individuals 
with wages earned in a state other than the one in which they 
are filing) are 75 percent within 14 and 21 days with respect
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to waiting week and nonwaiting week states, respectively, 
and 80 percent within 35 days for all states.
The standard on payment promptness prescribes seven 
specific remedial steps to be taken by DOL if a state agency 
fails, "for an extended period," to meet the criteria or fails 
to show satisfactory improvement after having submitted a 
plan of corrective action. The first step is informal discus 
sion with state agency officials. The ultimate step is notice to 
the state of an opportunity for a hearing on the question of 
whether the state is in nonconformity and, accordingly, 
whether administrative grants should be withheld.
The "methods of administration" requirement would 
seem broad enough to permit the federal government to dic 
tate to the states any requirement having an administrative 
impact. Perhaps not anticipating the full interpretative 
potential of this provision, Congress explicitly included four 
specific administrative requirements in the Social Security 
Act. These concern the use of employment offices to pay 
benefits, selection of staff, information reports, and provi 
sion for fair hearing.
Payment Through Employment Offices
Federal law requires that the states pay unemployment 
benefits only through public employment offices. 13 This ap 
proach had been a recommendation of the Committee on 
Economic Security, but that Committee©s Report contains 
no explanation of why this was considered necessary for effi 
cient administration. It may have been intended to help en 
sure close cooperation with the employment service which 
has job referral functions and plays an important role in 
identifying work refusal and unavailability-for-work issues.
In any event, this requirement was the basis for one of the 
rare occasions in which a state was temporarily denied ad 
ministrative grants. In 1939, grants to South Dakota were
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withheld when the state proposed to pay unemployment 
compensation through the state public welfare offices in 
stead of through public employment offices. The proposal 
was advanced because no state appropriations had been 
made for the state©s employment offices, to match federal 
grants for these offices, as was then required under the 
Wagner-Peyser Act. 14 The federal grants were restored after 
two months, when the state finally made money available to 
reopen the state employment offices.
Merit System Requirement
The Committee on Economic Security indicated that 
among federal conditions necessary to ensure competent ad 
ministration, "... we deem selection of personnel on a 
merit basis vital to success." 15 The "methods of administra 
tion" standard in the Social Security Act was amended in 
1939 to add the merit system requirement, though with a 
restriction on federal enforcement of the requirement, as 
follows:
(including after January 1, 1940, methods relating 
to the establishment and maintenance of personnel 
standards on a merit basis, except that the 
Secretary of Labor shall exercise no authority with 
respect to the selection, tenure of office, and com 
pensation of any individual employed in accor 
dance with such methods). 16
According to Frances Perkins© biographer, the language 
explicitly denying the Secretary authority over selection, 
tenure or compensation of any individual employed under a 
merit system was the result of Congressman (later Chief 
Justice) Fred M. Vinson©s determination that "no damned 
social workers are going to come into my State and tell our 
people whom they shall hire." 17 The Executive Director of 
the Committee on Economic Security later gave credit to the 
Social Security Board©s interpretation and implementation
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of the provision for giving great impetus to sound state ad 
ministration by its insistence upon basing the selection and 
tenure of all employees in state employment security ad 
ministrations on a merit basis. At the time, the great majori 
ty of states had no merit-based Civil Service systems. The 
Board required those states to establish special merit systems 
for employees concerned with employment security opera 
tions. This resulted in relatively competent staffing of 
unemployment insurance and employment service agencies 
and stimulated the passage of general state Civil Service laws 
in a number of states, based on a merit system. Eventually, 
there developed a large number of experienced employment 
security administrators and a strong tradition of nonpolitical 
administration. 18
In 1970, responsibility for administering the merit system 
requirement was shifted from DOL to the U.S. Civil Service 
Commission. Established regulations governing state merit 
system requirements were substantially relaxed in 1979, par 
ticularly those identifying the UI positions that states were 
permitted to exempt from the merit system. The revised 
regulations provide that,
To assure proper organizational responsiveness, 
appropriate numbers of top level positions may be 
exempted if they determine or publicly advocate 
substantial program policy, provide legal counsel, 
or are required to maintain a direct confidential 
working relationship with a key exempt official. 19
The relaxation of merit system requirements is the result 
primarily of pressure from governors for more state flexibili 
ty; of the 1978 Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPA), 
which requires that federal standards "shall be prescribed in 
such a manner to minimize federal intervention in state and 
local personnel administration"; of the declared position of 
the Carter Administration that governors shall be given max-
Basic Statutory Provisions 47
imum leeway in running grant-in-aid programs; and of the 
relaxation of regulations governing the federal Civil Service.
The result has been a substantial increase in recent years in 
the number of state agency positions exempt from merit 
system requirements. Another result, of course, is the 
absence of a single issue being raised in recent years of non 
conformity or noncompliance with this requirement, in con 
trast with earlier experience of several of these issues being 
presented each year.
Required Reports and Disclosures 
of Information
The Social Security Act and the FUTA provide a number 
of information requirements of the states to facilitate ad 
ministration and to authorize information exchange with 
other agencies:
(6) The making of such reports in such form and 
containing such information, as the Secretary of 
Labor may from time to time require, and com 
pliance with such provisions as the Secretary of 
Labor may from time to time find necessary to 
assure the correctness and verification of such 
reports; and
(7) Making available upon request to any agency of 
the United States charged with the administration 
of public works or assistance through public 
employment, the name, address, ordinary occupa 
tion and employment status of each recipient of 
unemployment compensation, and a statement of 
such recipient©s rights to further compensation 
under such law. 20
The requirement of paragraph (6) is the basis for both 
regular statistical and special research reports from states. 
Under an established routine reporting system, state agencies
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collect and organize data from their UI operations for 
transmittal to DOL which summarizes and publishes the 
statistics for various purposes. Aside from the significance 
of the information for the purposes of managing and 
evaluating the program, much of the data, particularly 
regarding UI claims activity, are important factors useful in 
general economic analysis. In addition, weekly insured 
unemployment data are used to trigger on and off the pay 
ment of extended benefits. 21
The reporting requirement of paragraph (6) has generated 
some minor issues. On occasion, states have resisted requests 
for special reports, usually on the grounds of insufficient 
staff. Some state agencies are habitually late in providing re 
quired reports. One state agency regularly does not respond 
or responds late and inadequately to requests for informa 
tion concerning pending legislation. None of these issues, 
however, has been considered serious enough to warrant a 
conformity hearing. Paragraph (7) similarly has not produc 
ed serious issues, probably because the public works and 
work relief programs that now exist are administered at state 
or local levels; at the time this provision was adopted (1935), 
such programs were federally administered.
Another provision includes the following requirements for 
state agency cooperation with other federal agencies. Cer 
tification of granted funds is denied if the Secretary finds:
(1) That such State does not make its records 
available to the Railroad Retirement Board and 
furnish to the Railroad Retirement Board at the ex 
pense of the Railroad Retirement Board such 
copies thereof as the Railroad Retirement Board 
deems necessary for its purposes; or
(2) That such State is failing to afford reasonable 
cooperation with every agency of the United States 
charged with the administration of any unemploy 
ment insurance law. 22
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The foregoing requirements were either part of the original 
Social Security Act or were added during the very early years 
of the program.
Several additional disclosure requirements were added 
more recently. One requires disclosure, to a state or political 
subdivision, of wage information necessary for determining 
an individual©s eligibility for (and the amount of) aid or ser 
vices to needy families with children. 23 Another requires 
disclosure, to officers of any state or local child support en 
forcement agency, of wage information for the purposes of 
establishing child support obligations and locating and col 
lecting such obligations. 24 A third requires disclosure, to of 
ficers and employees of the Department of Agriculture and 
of any state food stamp agency, of information concerning 
an individual©s wages, application and eligibility for UI, 
name, address, any refusal of an offer of work, and if so, a 
description of the work offered. 25
All the disclosure provisions require that the state agency 
adopt safeguards ensuring the information is used only for 
purposes of the programs for which it is requested. Authori 
ty to develop such safeguards for state adoption is granted to 
the Secretary of Labor in the case of the last two of the above 
disclosure standards and to the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services in the case of the first standard.
Provisions requiring disclosure of information to the iden 
tified agencies have not generated issues. The relatively new 
requirements should not create problems, provided the 
volume of requests from welfare, child support and food 
stamp agencies does not become excessive and the informa 
tion requested is easily obtainable from existing records.
The absence of conformity issues under the foregoing pro 
visions requiring disclosure does not mean that states are free 
of problems in this area. Many issues arise, not from these 
provisions, but rather from requirements prohibiting
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disclosure under certain circumstances. Both the Wagner- 
Peyser Act and the Social Security Act©s "methods of ad 
ministration" requirement have been interpreted as pro 
hibiting disclosure of information obtained in the ad 
ministration of the program from claimants and employers, 
if such disclosure would tend to deter individuals from filing 
claims, or employers from cooperating fully with employ 
ment security agencies. A state agency may not post the 
names of UI claimants on a courthouse wall, for example, or 
publish information about an employer that would help his 
competitors.
On the other hand, the federal interpretations permit 
disclosure (if consistent with state disclosure provisions) in a 
broad range of circumstances, including "disclosure to a 
public official in the performance of his public duties." Per 
mitted disclosure is always conditioned upon it not disrupt 
ing agency operations, and upon the agency being reimburs 
ed by the requesting authority if obtaining the information 
involves more than incidental expenses or staff time. Many 
states have had problems with excessive requests for the 
names and addresses of claimants, particularly from law en 
forcement officials. As a result, most states have more 
restrictions on information disclosure than set by federal in 
terpretations, and all provide penalties for unauthorized 
disclosure.
Fair Hearing
One of the single most important of the administrative 
provisions included in the Social Security Act is the require 
ment that a state law provide:
Opportunity for a fair hearing, before an impartial 
tribunal for all individuals whose claims for 
unemployment compensation are denied. 26
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This provision is categorized here as an administrative rather 
than a benefit standard. Its principal purpose is to require of 
each state the organizational machinery, trained staff in 
cluding enough qualified and impartial referees, and all 
other features necessary to implement fully the right of each 
claimant who is denied benefits to a fair hearing. This right 
has been extended to employers who experience an adverse 
determination, on the grounds that this is necessary if the 
system is to ensure not only that benefits are paid to eligible 
individuals but also that they are denied to other individuals 
who do not meet the eligibility conditions.
The "fair hearing" provision has been interpreted by 
DOL over the years to require that any claimant or employer 
wishing to appeal an adverse determination shall be provided 
a hearing at a reasonably convenient location, at no expense, 
and with neither any obligation nor any need to obtain legal 
counsel. The hearing process must provide all parties at least 
the following due process safeguards. 27
 Right to a hearing tailored to the capabilities and cir 
cumstances of those who are to be heard;
 Right to be represented by a person of the party©s own 
choosing;
 Opportunity to present argument, to produce evidence 
and witnesses, and to offer evidence in explanation or 
rebuttal;
 Right to a compulsory process for obtaining necessary 
witnesses and records;
 Right to confront and be confronted by opposing par 
ties and their witnesses;
 Right to cross-examine the other parties and their 
witnesses;
 Right to a prompt and comprehensive written decision 
giving the referee©s findings, reasons, and conclusions, 
with substantial evidence obtained at the hearing to sup 
port them.
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Each referee (the most common term used for state hear 
ing officers) must understand and apply these due process 
rights, insure that the hearing and decision are completely in 
telligible to the parties, and obtain at the hearing all the facts 
necessary to reach a decision. Obviously, proper administra 
tion of this requirement is one of the most demanding 
responsibilities of a state agency. The key is a highly trained 
staff and effective management.
Under its "Appeals Performance Appraisal Project," 
DOL evaluates the quality of hearings and decisions by 
reviewing a sample of the written decisions and tapes of 
recorded hearings of one-third of the states each year. 
Failure, without good cause, of a state to attain minimum 
adequate levels of quality (established by uniform test 
criteria) constitutes violation of the requirement. Hearings 
and decisions are evaluated by applying several criteria and 
assigning specific points for "good," "acceptable," and 
"unsatisfactory" performance. The criteria include, for ex 
ample, questions similar to the following:
 Was there opportunity for confrontation of all oppos 
ing witnesses?
 Was the language used in questions to witnesses geared 
to the comprehension of those present?
 Was the testimony taken in appropriate order and se 
quence?
 Did the decision contain the ultimate findings of fact re 
quired to resolve the issues in the case, and were they 
supported by the evidentiary findings of fact?
 Was the final decision of the referee clearly stated?
"Fair hearing" also means a reasonably prompt hearing 
and decision. As noted above, since 1972 performance stan 
dards have prescribed for the states minimum satisfactory 
levels of promptness. From the fair hearing and performance 
standards has evolved a system of informal administrative 
hearings unmatched by any other social program in pro-
Basic Statutory Provisions 53
viding fair, inexpensive, and quick determinations of issues 
for over a million appellants annually.
"Fair hearing" is not a static concept. For example, the 
National Commission on Unemployment Compensation 
(NCUC) has recommended deletion of two provisions, long 
standing in some state laws, which it considers violative of a 
fair hearing. The first denies a party to a hearing the right to 
be represented by anyone other than an attorney. The second 
prohibits any consideration of an appeal filed beyond the 
statutory time limit, regardless of the reason for the late fil 
ing. In addition, a minority of the Commission has argued 
that fairness requires the availability in each state of free and 
independent assistance and representation for claimants. 28
The "fair hearing" requirement has been the basis of a 
large number and variety of conformity issues arising not on 
ly from violations of due process rights by state officials in 
conducting hearings, but also from state statutory provisions 
and proposed amendments. For example, a New Jersey in 
terpretation permitting appeals tribunals to decide appeals 
solely on the basis of a review of the record was considered 
by DOL to be in violation of the fair hearing requirement 
because it gave claimants no opportunity to present 
testimony or arguments. An interpretation of a Wyoming 
provision, that a claimant must be conclusively presumed 
unavailable for work during any week in which he received a 
pension from his most recent employer, was considered by 
DOL a violation of the federal fair hearing standard; as have 
been other states© amendments establishing conclusive 
presumptions of ineligibility that offer no opportunity for 
the claimant to challenge. 29
A claimant who fails, with good cause, to appear at the 
original hearing on his claim must have his hearing reopen 
ed, according to a DOL interpretation issued to all states. 30 
And the fair hearing standard has been interpreted to require 
that benefit and eligibility hearings be public, subject to the
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limitation that the hearing tribunal must have authority to 
close a hearing involving matters of an intimate, or a per 
sonal nature. 31 DOL has consistently insisted that 
"sunshine" laws permit this exception to otherwise required 
open hearings. These examples represent only a small sample 
of the variety of fair hearing issues that arise each year.
Federal Program Standards
The Committee on Economic Security emphasized in its 
Report that unemployment insurance provisions in state law 
should be left entirely to the state legislatures in "all matters 
in which uniformity is not absolutely essential. ..." This 
applied only to substantive program matters. Administrative 
matters required a cooperative effort; requirements aimed at 
safeguarding the fund, such as the immediate deposit and 
withdrawal standards, were federal responsibilities.
The Committee did not indicate any provision which it 
considered absolutely essential, but it was not reluctant at 
least to make recommendations as to what a state law should 
contain. Among others, it recommended relating duration or 
number of weeks of benefits payable to the number of weeks 
of prior employment; limiting benefits only to individuals 
both able and willing to work; providing additional weeks of 
benefits to individuals who have been long employed without 
drawing benefits; limiting benefits of seasonal workers to 
unemployment occurring within the usual season for their in 
dustry; and provision of partial benefit formulas which en 
courage claimants to take part-time or odd-job work when 
possible. 32 Most states adopted some but not all of these pro 
visions. The following two Committee recommendations 
were incorporated into the 1935 Social Security Act as 
federal program standards.
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Labor Standards
In the part of its Report titled "Suggestions for State 
Legislation," the Committee on Economic Security stated 
that claimants should be denied benefits if they refuse to ac 
cept suitable work. "Workers, however, should not be re 
quired to accept positions with wage, hour, or working con 
ditions below the usual standard for the occupation or the 
particular region, or outside of the State, or where their 
rights of self-organization and collective bargaining would 
be interfered with." 33
Although the Committee had not recommended these pro 
tections be imposed as a federal standard, the original Social 
Security Act required that each state include such labor stan 
dards in its law as a condition for approval for tax credit. 
These requirements were included probably to assure labor 
that unemployment insurance would not become a means of 
destroying unions or undermining existing wage, hour, and 
working conditions. This apprehension had caused the 
American Federation of Labor to oppose compulsory 
unemployment insurance before 1932. 34
The Committee©s recommendation was translated into the 
following federal standard that must, as a condition of ap 
proval for tax credit, be included in a state law:
compensation shall not be denied in such State to 
any otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac 
cept new work under any of the following condi 
tions:
(A) if the position offered is vacant due directly to 
a strike, lockout, or other labor dispute;
(B) if the wages, hours, or other conditions of work 
are substantially less favorable to the individual 
than those prevailing for similar work in the locali 
ty;
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(C) if as a condition of being employed the in 
dividual would be required to join a company 
union or to resign from or refrain from joining any 
bona fide labor organization. 35
The purposes of parts (A) and (C) of these "labor stan 
dards" are to prevent UI claimants from being used as 
strikebreakers, and to protect the rights of claimants to join 
unions of their choice. Part (A) provoked a conformity con 
frontation with the States of Washington and California in 
1949. The issue was whether workers who were separated 
prior to a labor dispute could be disqualified for refusing to 
return to their employer during the dispute. The Department 
of Labor held that the jobs refused constituted new work for 
those workers and that their disqualification violated the 
standard. The case was dropped when Washington changed 
its interpretation and California temporarily retracted its 
decisions disqualifying the workers. 36
The issue led to a federal law amendment, sponsored by 
Senator William Knowland of California, restricting the 
Secretary©s authority. Enacted in 1950, it stops the Secretary 
of Labor from finding that a state©s interpretation of its law 
is preventing substantial compliance with the "labor stan 
dards" requirements until either the opportunity for ad 
ministrative review of the interpretation is exhausted under 
the state law, or the interpretation is no longer subject to 
judicial review in the state.
Part (B) of the "labor standards" is intended to protect 
employed workers by preventing states from coercing 
claimants to accept depressed wages and working conditions. 
The provision is not easy to administer. It requires deter 
minations of "new work," "similar" work, "prevailing" 
wages, hours and working conditions for similar work, and 
geographical boundaries of "locality." In 1950, DOL issued 
a 34-page detailed guide describing how the provision should 
be administered. 37 State claims and appeals adjudicators fre-
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quently still fail to identify a job offer as an offer of "new 
work," which can be either a new job or a change in condi 
tions of a current job which constitute a change in the 
original employment contract. It is also still common to see 
the labor standards requirements confused with the concept 
of suitable work.
Suitable work criteria were intended originally to protect 
claimants by allowing them to refuse jobs without dis 
qualification that were wholly incompatible with their ability 
or experience, constituted a danger to their health, safety or 
morals, or were too far away from their homes. Suitable 
work criteria were contained in draft bills of suggested state 
legislation prepared by the Social Security Board and its suc 
cessors and adopted usually with little change by most states. 
In recent years, however, many states have narrowed the 
conditions under which a claimant may refuse a job because 
of its unsuitability. The most common change requires that 
after a prescribed number of weeks of unemployment, deter 
minations of suitability need not take into consideration the 
claimant©s prior wage levels, work experience, or training.
Suitable work criteria relate to the individual, while the 
labor standards (e.g., prevailing wage) relate more to the 
nature of the job or job market. Accordingly, a job that pays 
the prevailing wage and otherwise meets the labor standards 
may not be suitable work. Conversely, a claimant may refuse 
suitable work without disqualification if it is substandard in 
terms of prevailing hours, wages or conditions.
The most common conformity issue in this area arises 
from state amendments that ignore the prevailing wage re 
quirement. Connecticut, for example, enacted an amend 
ment to its law in 1973 which provided that a job offer shall 
be considered suitable if it pays either the prevailing wage or, 
"in the absence of a prevailing rate," a wage that is within 15 
or 25 percent of the claimant©s normal wage, depending 
upon whether the claimant had been unemployed six or more
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weeks or less than six weeks. Since a job that met these 
criteria automatically would be considered suitable, a claim 
ant must take it or be denied benefits. The agency was advis 
ed by DOL that if claimants are disqualified for refusing a 
job that falls within the prescribed percentages but still pays 
less than the prevailing wage for similar work in the locality, 
the provision would present a question of conformity with 
the labor standards requirement (Part B, above). The Con 
necticut provision was deleted. There have been many such 
amendments and proposals.
Despite imperfect administration and less than universal 
understanding of the labor standards, these requirements 
have been important in preventing the unemployment in 
surance program being used as a vehicle for strikebreaking, 
depressing working conditions and otherwise undermining 
gains made by American workers.
Experience Rating Standard
Experience rating is intended to provide an incentive for 
employers to limit layoffs. Employers with favorable layoff 
experience in relation to payrolls receive lower tax rates than 
those with less favorable experience.
President Roosevelt had insisted that the unemployment 
insurance program promote employment stabilization, and 
experience rating appeared to be an appropriate vehicle for 
that purpose. The House had passed the Social Security bill 
without any experience rating provision on the grounds that 
by allowing states to vary employers© tax rates, such a provi 
sion would generate competition among the states in keeping 
employers© costs low. The Senate restored the experience 
rating provision partly because Wisconsin and several other 
states had already enacted laws with experience rating, and 
partly because a majority of the Senate Finance Committee 
subscribed to the concept. 38
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The Committee on Economic Security recommended leav 
ing to the states the option of whether or not they would 
assign employers tax rates below 2.7 percent, the level 
necessary for the full normal credit against the federal tax. 
The Committee suggested that an employer assigned a reduc 
ed rate should receive not only the normal credit for the state 
tax against the federal tax, but also additional credit 
amounting to the difference between the actual state tax paid 
and the 2.7 percent level if the rate reduction was based on 
the accumulation of adequate reserves or on low unemploy 
ment experience. However, the Committee identified only 
two approaches a state might apply: it could permit par 
ticular industries or companies to have individual reserve or 
guaranteed employment accounts, or it could permit reduced 
rates on the basis of employers© favorable layoff experience.
The original Social Security Act and later the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act permitted states to allow reduced 
rates only on those grounds. Although a few state laws 
originally provided for individual reserve or guaranteed 
employment accounts, 39 all states eventually came to pro 
viding reduced rates only on the basis of employers© ex 
perience. The Federal Unemployment Tax Act requires, as a 
condition for additional credit, that a state law provide 
reduced rates for an employer only on the basis of his
. . . experience with respect to unemployment or 
other factors bearing a direct relation to unemploy 
ment risk during not less than the 3 consecutive 
years immediately preceding the computation 
date. . . . 40
The law was later amended, first to permit reduced rates on 
the basis of as little as one year of experience, and later to 
newly covered employers "on a reasonable basis" (but not 
less than 1.0 percent) until they have enough years to qualify 
for a rate based on their experience.
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This standard is important because it makes experience 
rating the only approach available to a state wishing to lower 
tax rates. Reductions in rates to levels below 2.7 percent can 
not be made uniformly for all employers, or by any means 
other than the individual employer©s "experience with 
respect to unemployment or other factors bearing a direct 
relation to unemployment risk." Under most state ex 
perience rating plans, this means that an employer©s tax rate 
is keyed largely to the amount of benefits paid his former 
employees based on work performed for him.
Experience rating as a feature of unemployment insurance 
is unique to the United States, as is its federal-state system. 
All other countries with UI have uniform national programs 
and none establishes tax rates on the basis of individual 
employer©s experience.
Once the experience rating standard was enacted, it has 
always had Congressional support. At the outset, many 
states did not provide for it at all, assuming they would need 
the full 2.7 percent or more to finance benefits. However, it 
soon became clear that costs were overestimated in many 
states and too much revenue would be generated. During 
World War II when unemployment levels were low, reserve 
funds accumulated in many states far in excess of amounts 
needed for benefit costs. Experience rating, which some 
states were reluctant to adopt, represented the only means 
available for reducing reserves. Although the degree of 
adherence to experience rating continues to vary widely 
among the states, Congress is committed to the concept. The 
recent rise, effective 1985, in the FUTA rate to 6.2 percent 
with a maximum tax credit of 5.4 percent seems designed to 
strengthen experience rating by forcing states to raise their 
maximum rates and thereby permit a wider range of rates. 
There is continuing controversy over the merits of experience 
rating, and these are better evaluated elsewhere. 41
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The important point here is that experience rating is man 
dated by federal law and has strong adherents despite recur 
ring efforts to change or delete the requirement. In 1968, an 
administration-supported package of comprehensive UI 
changes (H.R. 8282) contained a provision deleting the stan 
dard. The proposal was opposed vigorously and removed 
from the bill in an early stage. The National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation did not support a proposal by 
its Chairman merely to relax the requirement by giving states 
more flexibility. The proposal would have allowed the states 
to experience rate on the basis of "employment" as well as 
unemployment and to eliminate the requirement for a 
"direct" relationship to unemployment risk. 42 As in the case 
of every past effort to delete or modify the standard, the 
chief opposition came from employer representatives, 43 or 
dinarily in favor of eliminating federal standards.
The requirement, that any reduced rate be based on the 
employer©s "experience with respect to unemployment or 
other factors bearing a direct relationship to unemployment 
risk," has been the source of much intergovernmental fric 
tion. DOL and its predecessors developed and applied very 
detailed and subtle interpretations of the standard over the 
years. So voluminous and complex were the interpretations 
that by 1950 it became necessary for DOL©s Office of the 
Solicitor to issue a precedent manual on experience rating 
rulings "For Intra-Departmental Use Only." This "Ex 
perience Rating Digest" contains 50 single-space typed pages 
and well over 300 separate citations to formal and informal 
communications. 44 Until the comprehensive 1970 amend 
ments (P.L. 91-373) which generated more issues in other 
areas, experience rating was the major source of conformity 
issues.
DOL rulings cover all aspects of experience rating the 
composition of particular formulas for allocating rates, rate 
determinations for employers with gaps in experience, rates
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for employers involved in whole or partial transfers of 
business, and procedures governing group accounts. The 
Department has found acceptable many proposed factors for 
measuring employers© experience (e.g., separations, compen- 
sable separations, benefits, payroll declines) and has rejected 
others (e.g., the number of years the employer has been in 
business, the amount of taxes paid). The most common fac 
tor among the states is benefits charged to employers. The 
most common experience rating formula is the reserve ratio, 
under which the amount of an employer©s reserve is 
calculated as contributions paid and credited to his account 
over all past periods reduced by the amount of benefits 
charged to his account during the same period. The reserve is 
then divided by the employer©s recent annual payroll to pro 
vide a reserve ratio. The employer is assigned a rate in accor 
dance with a schedule of tax rates associated with reserve 
ratios the higher the ratio, the lower the rate.
An early Social Security Board ruling provided that not all 
benefits must be charged as long as those that were charged 
provided a reasonable measurement of an employer©s ex 
perience with respect to the unemployment risk of his 
workers. This provoked pressure from a variety of sources 
for relief from charges, and noncharging of benefits was per 
mitted under a wide variety of circumstances: benefits paid, 
without disqualification, to workers who quit their jobs with 
good cause not attributable to the employer; benefits paid 
following the serving of a disqualification; dependents© 
allowances; extended benefits. Some of the noncharging was 
permitted in the hope of easing pressure for more severe dis 
qualifications. 45 Noncharging was justified on the grounds 
that the measure of each employer©s experience would not be 
seriously distorted by relieving them of these charges, par 
ticularly in the case of benefits paid following separations 
not caused by the employer©s action.
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The rationale for certain other kinds of noncharging is not 
clear. There is lacking any coherent guiding principle and, as 
a result, rulings have been inconsistent. The Department of 
Labor has accepted noncharging of benefits paid for 
unemployment caused by a natural disaster, but rejected 
noncharging of benefits paid for other types of unemploy 
ment also caused by circumstances beyond the employer©s 
control; e.g., the permanent closing of a mine because of the 
depletion of resources; the shutting down of a defense plant 
due to loss of a government contract; the dissolution of a 
business because of the illness of a partner. The Department 
has accepted as consistent with federal law a Delaware provi 
sion which provides some noncharging relief to employers 
who hire handicapped workers. Delaware, which considers 
the unemployed workers© wages instead of benefits in com 
puting tax rates for employers, provides for disregarding, 
i.e., noncharging all wages paid to handicapped workers 
during the first 90 days of their employment. The Depart 
ment, however, has barred similar relief from charges for 
employers for hiring veterans or minorities, or for par 
ticipating in programs aimed at employing youth and other 
targeted groups. The Department permits no distinctions 
based on industrial classification or employer size in assign 
ing reduced rates (except for new employers).
Other than the experience rating requirements, states are 
under no restrictions concerning the assignment of rates. 
States are free, for example, to set rates higher than the stan 
dard rate on any basis they choose. Accordingly, although 
all states have minimum and maximum rates, these vary 
widely among states. Tax bases also vary, so that effective 
tax rates (the tax payable as a proportion of total payroll) 
may be different even for employers with identical ex 
perience and identical rates in different states. No two tax 
structures are the same.
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The inconsistencies in rulings and lack of guiding prin 
ciples make DOL positions vulnerable. There have been 
relatively few conflicts over experience rating in recent years 
only because the Unemployment Insurance Service has been 
preoccupied with an avalanche of issues arising from new 
legislation. It has ignored state law amendments that in past 
years would have provoked conformity confrontations. For 
tunately, the great majority of experience rating issues arise 
over obscure provisions that have little or no significant im 
pact on the program.
State Programs
The original Act followed the example of the Tenth 
Amendment to the Constitution by providing, at least im 
plicitly, that all unemployment insurance responsibilities not 
expressly delegated or implied to the federal government are 
reserved to the states. While the states were required to 
adhere to such basic requirements as those relating to deposit 
and withdrawal of tax moneys, and to conform with other 
federal requirements, originally there were relatively few 
such requirements governing administrative matters (merit 
system, fair hearing, payment through employment offices, 
disclosure) before extensive interpretations were made of the 
"methods of administration" requirement. Only two federal 
program standards ("labor standards," experience rating 
standards) inhibited state action in this area.
As described in chapter 1, originally the most significant 
restraint on state autonomy in the program area was ig 
norance of what an unemployment insurance law should 
contain and consequent dependence on federal guidance. 
States gradually acquired more experience and thereby more 
independence, and concurrently, the federal government 
developed more interpretations of existing statutory re 
quirements, particularly in the administration and ex 
perience rating areas. These developments were somewhat
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inevitable since reactions were needed to issues and new state 
provisions constantly arising during the early years.
The interpretation approach, in contrast to the later 
reliance on enactment of federal standards, proved compati 
ble with the federal-state balance of authority. Federal inter 
pretations were addressed to particular problems, developed 
usually from a sound legal basis, and designed to be consis 
tent with basic objectives of unemployment insurance. This 
was not always true with enactment of federal program stan 
dards. Equally important, interpretations of federal law 
were more easily subject than federal law amendments to 
successful challenge by the states often before they became 
effective. Finally, interpretations were more likely than 
statutory enactments to be the product of cooperative effort, 
and consequently, more likely to represent realistic solutions 
to problems. In effect, the basic structure provided by the 
original Social Security Act permitted both state and federal 
jurisdictions the flexibility necessary to allow state UI pro 
grams to adjust to changing conditions while continuing to 
serve fundamental principles.
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Chapter 3
Federal Program Standards: 
Weakening the Balance
The states have never been entirely free to enact "complete 
and self-sustaining" unemployment insurance laws covering 
"all matters in which uniformity is not absolutely 
essential . . . ," as recommended by the Committee on 
Economic Security. The original Social Security Act includ 
ed federal requirements covering the maintenance of tax 
funds, distribution of administrative responsibilities and 
other provisions establishing the system©s structural 
framework. In addition to these "structural" requirements, 
the original act contained two program standards. The 
"labor standards" requirement barred states from disquali 
fying claimants for refusing an offer of new work which was 
substandard or which prevented them from joining a union 
of their choice. The experience rating standard permitted 
states to assign reduced UI tax rates to employers only on the 
basis of their experience with unemployment.
These two original program standards, the "structural" 
requirements outlined above, and interpretations of all these 
provisions, remained the only federal requirements for 35 
years. The program standards described in this chapter were 
added in 1970, 1976, 1980, 1981 and 1982. They vary widely 
in terms of their impact on the program. Each diminished 
the scope of state autonomy over the program area and, to 
that degree, also weakened the federal-state balance. In most
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cases, it is questionable that this result was offset by any 
benefit the standard brought to the program. Their discus 
sion here is organized according to their prevailing motiva 
tion: to protect the rights of claimants, and to restrict 
benefits rights to the "deserving" claimants. A third 
category includes two complex standards that contain re 
quirements aimed at both these objectives. Each standard is 
examined in terms of the problem that produced it and the 
issues it has presented. For very few of these program stan 
dards can it reasonably be argued that uniformity imposed 
by federal law was "absolutely essential" (the Committee©s 
criterion). Most were enacted, not because uniformity was 
necessary, but simply to supersede certain state provisions 
Congress considered either too harsh in their impact on 
claimants or too lenient. The latest standards were also the 
products of two developments: inclusion of the unemploy 
ment trust fund in the federal budget; and the financial crises 
of the 1970s and early 1980s. The first made UI a potential 
target for federal budget cutting efforts. The second provid 
ed the motive for actual federal and state cost reduction 
enactments.
Standards that Protect Claimants
Protection of Interstate Claimants
One of the perplexing problems faced by the Committee 
on Economic Security was that posed by workers who move 
from state to state. Under a strictly national system, all 
workers could be treated the same; but under a system in 
volving largely autonomous state programs, the interstate 
worker could be left without protection. Soon after the 
system began, the states developed a plan under which each 
state would act as the agent for other states which were liable 
for benefits claimed by workers based on employment and 
earnings in the liable state but who moved to the agent state.
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The agent state took the claims of such workers for the liable 
state. All states participated in this plan. Other interstate 
plans allowed a worker to combine wages earned in two or 
more states if the wages earned in any one state were not suf 
ficient to qualify the claimant for benefits or if combining 
would result in higher benefits. Not all states participated in 
the combined wage plans. The result was that interstate 
claimants were treated differently in different states.
In 1970, federal law was amended to require that all states 
"shall participate" in a plan which combines the wages and 
employment of an individual who worked in more than one 
state so that eligibility for and amount of benefits could be 
based on the combined wages and work when applying the 
provisions of a single state. 1 This standard did not produce 
issues of conformity with any state, but it did generate a 
number of technical issues. One question, for example, con 
cerned liability for benefit charges to an employer©s ex 
perience rating account when a claimant©s wage credits earn 
ed with that employer are transferred to another state for 
combining purposes but are insufficient alone to qualify that 
claimant in the transferring state. 2
A second standard affecting interstate claimants was also 
adopted in 1970. 3 It too resulted from the failure of some 
states to treat claimants equitably. In 1963 Ohio and Wyo 
ming provided that an interstate claimant filing against these 
states may not qualify for a maximum higher than that 
payable in the agent state where they file their claim. Alaska, 
as early as 1955, provided a maximum of $45 to claimants 
filing within the state but a maximum of $25 to claimants 
who filed claims against Alaska from outside the state. 
Dependents© allowances were payable only for dependents 
residing in Alaska.
These discriminatory provisions were characterized by a 
Congressional Committee as:
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. . . not only inequitable to the individual claimant 
and injurious to the proper functioning of the 
unemployment insurance system but inhibit among 
workers a very desirable mobility which is impor 
tant to our economy. 4
The enacted federal standard bars states from denying or 
reducing benefits to an individual solely because the claim is 
filed from another state (or Canada) or because of a change 
in residence to another state (or Canada) where the claim is 
filed. 5 Ironically, the only exception to this federal ban on 
discrimination against interstate claimants is another federal 
provision enacted ten years later. That provision amended 
the extended benefits program by prohibiting payment of 
more than two weeks of extended benefits if the claimant fil 
ed from a state where an extended benefit period was not in 
effect. 6
It may be argued that the failure of some states to par 
ticipate in combined wage plans and the enactment by others 
of discriminatory provisions made federal intervention in 
evitable. It is possible that, as their economies declined, 
more and more states would have followed Alaska©s exam 
ple. Representatives of that state argue that individuals who 
work in Alaska, often in seasonal jobs, and then move south 
represent a drain on the state©s economy. Their unemploy 
ment benefit checks reflect high seasonal wages and an 
economy with a high cost of living. When they move to lower 
cost states, there may be little incentive to work for wages 
that compare unfavorably with their unemployment 
benefits. There may also be less incentive for an agent state 
to test the availability or develop job openings for an in 
terstate claimant than for an intrastate claimant drawing 
benefits from the agent state©s fund.
The foregoing may be true in some situations, but the pat 
tern is not characteristic of interstate claimants. There are
Federal Program Standards 73
sound reasons why each year thousands of workers move 
from one state to another. In any event, the remedy to 
abuses of the system by interstate claimants would seem to 
lie in improved administration of the interstate program. 
This is also the remedy for the unequal treatment interstate 
claimants continue to receive despite the federal standards. 
As noted in chapter 2, their claims are processed and paid 
more slowly than intrastate claims, and their appeals also 
take longer to complete. The delays are partly the result of 
the additional processing necessary for an interstate claim, 
but most of the unequal treatment is attributable to failure 
of the federal partner consistently to insist upon promptness 
as well as equal administration of these claims.
Among all the standards intended to protect claimants 
against unfair disqualification, a strong case can be made 
that those relating to interstate claimants provide a needed 
uniform protection. It may be, however, that even those 
standards would not have been necessary, given reasonable 
interpretations of the original Social Security Act. For exam 
ple, if the "withdrawal-of-funds standard" can be inter 
preted as barring payment or denial of benefits on the basis 
of need, presumably it could also have been interpreted as 
barring discrimination against interstate claimants. The 
same reasoning would seem to apply: under both situations, 
benefits would be paid or denied on a basis other than the 
claimant©s unemployment due to lack of work. It would 
seem feasible also that the "methods of administration" re 
quirement in the original Act could have been interpreted as 
requiring all states to participate in a uniform combined 
wage plan. In any event, the results would have been the 
same. The only point is that they (and perhaps better results) 
could have been achieved earlier through interpretation than 
by enactment of new standards.
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Protection of Claimants Taking Training
The Department of Labor had long encouraged states to 
provide training and retraining for claimants who would 
benefit from new skills. The experience rating standard was 
interpreted to permit states to relieve employers of charges 
for benefits paid claimants engaged in approved training. 
Benefits paid a claimant taking training were considered 
benefits paid for unemployment even though the claimant 
might be unavailable for work by reason of the training, and 
even though he may refuse a suitable job because it in 
terfered with his training. Not all states subscribed to this 
position. Several disqualified claimants in training for refus 
ing work and some held them unavailable if the training 
precluded an active search for work.
The federal standard adopted by Congress in 1970 bars the 
states from disqualifying claimants in approved training on 
the grounds that they are unavailable, are not making an ac 
tive search for work, or have refused an offer of suitable 
work. 7 According to the Senate Finance Committee Report 
on the 1970 amendments, these provisions "should not be 
used to discourage claimants from entering training which 
has been approved by the state agencies. 8 In commenting on 
the new requirement, DOL recommended that states develop 
regulations to assure that before approval, it is established 
that the training will enhance the claimant©s employability. It 
advised, however, that under the requirement, "each state is 
free to determine what training is appropriate for a claimant, 
what criteria are established for approval of training for an 
individual, and what safeguards are established to assure 
that the claimant for whom the training has been approved is 
actually attending such training." 9
Few issues have been presented by this federal standard 
because not all states actually developed criteria for approv 
ing an individual for training, and not many unemployment
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insurance claimants are involved in training or retraining 
anyway. The federal requirement may be circumvented easi 
ly by a state either refusing to approve training for any 
claimant, or setting prohibitive conditions on the approval 
of training.
A potential issue was presented by a number of state laws 
which deny benefits to claimants taking any training pro 
viding cash or other allowances. Since an individual taking 
Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) 
training (which usually paid allowances) had approval of the 
state employment security agency, it was argued within DOL 
that the state laws denying benefits to claimants taking 
allowance-paying training were inconsistent with the UI 
training standard. However, the issue was never raised.
Protection Against Excessive Penalties
Another standard aimed at protecting claimants from 
unreasonable penalties was a reaction to a trend toward in 
creasingly severe disqualifications. For many years, DOL 
fought a losing battle in this area, trying to persuade the 
states of the advantages of limiting disqualifications to a 
postponement of benefits for about six weeks (the national 
average duration of a spell of unemployment). In 1944 the 
experience rating standard was interpreted to permit states to 
noncharge employers for benefits paid following a dis 
qualification. It was hoped that this would help ease the 
pressure for harsher disqualifications. 10
The standard enacted in 1970 prohibits states from 
cancelling the wage credits (earnings on which benefits are 
based) or completely eliminating the benefit rights of any in 
dividual disqualified for any cause except discharge for 
misconduct connected with the work, fraud in connection 
with a claim, or receipt of disqualifying income. ! l According 
to the Senate Finance Committee Report,
76 Federal Program Standards
This proposal is directed solely to the preservation, 
in all but the excepted cases, of some portion of an 
individual©s monetary entitlement for his benefit 
year, the "bank account" of benefits against 
which, if otherwise eligible, he can draw. The re 
quirement would affect only those few State laws 
which cancel wage credits or totally reduce 
benefits. 12
Although the standard caused a few states to amend their 
laws, it actually represents a very modest restraint on states. 
The provision in no way restricts states in establishing any 
conditions it sees fit as eligibility requirements for benefits. 
It does not prevent any state from increasing the number or 
type of infractions for which a disqualification may be ap 
plied. It does not really inhibit, in any significant way, a state 
from imposing as severe a disqualification as it wishes for 
any cause. The provision does not preclude a disqualification 
for the duration of the claimant©s unemployment and until 
the claimant obtains another job, works at least a prescribed 
minimum period, earns at least a specified minimum amount 
and is then separated from the job for nondisqualifying 
reasons. This is permitted under the standard, even though 
failure to obtain another job is tantamount to complete 
denial of benefits. Most states now apply such a disqualifica 
tion for one or all of the major causes of disqualification.
The standard prohibits any cancellation of wage credits 
(except in the three specified situations). This means the state 
may not cancel for benefit purposes wages earned from an 
employer from whom the claimant separated under disquali 
fying conditions. The standard bars only "total" reduction 
of benefit rights. Cancellation of wage credits may not be as 
severe a penalty as reduction of benefit rights, particularly 
for claimants with more than one base-period employer. For 
example, a state may be consistent with the standard if, in 
the case of a claimant otherwise entitled to 26 weeks of
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benefits, it disqualifies the claimant for 25 weeks, with an 
equal reduction in benefits. Since this leaves the claimant 
with one week of benefits, and thus preserves "some portion 
of an individual©s monetary entitlement," it satisfies the 
standard. The impact of such a disqualification is denial of 
all but one week of benefits for a year, not only six months. 
This is because every claimant must wait a year, beginning 
when his first claim is filed, before new benefit rights can be 
accumulated based on fresh wage credits. 13
At least one state14 actually provides precisely for wiping 
out all but one week of a claimant©s benefit entitlement if the 
claimant left work voluntarily or refused an offer of work. 
This clearly was not the result Congress had hoped to ac 
complish:
Severe disqualifications, particularly those which 
cancel (as opposed to postpone) earned monetary 
entitlement, are not in harmony with the basic pur 
poses of an unemployment insurance system. Most 
disqualifications under State law provisions are ap 
plied for voluntary terminations without good 
cause (frequently cause must be attributable to an 
employer), or for refusals of suitable work. Such a 
situation may represent an error in judgment on the 
part of the worker, or be the result of cir 
cumstances over which he had no control. The 
penalty for a disqualifying act should not be out of 
proportion to the disqualifying act. 15
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion made only one recommendation to Congress in the area 
of disqualifications. It went beyond the standard described 
above and recommended that Congress prohibit not only 
total reduction of benefit rights, but any reduction of benefit 
rights, except for fraud or receipt of disqualifying income. 16 
As of early 1983, a dozen states provided for some reduction
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of benefit rights as the penalty for voluntarily quitting work 
without good cause and 15 reduced benefit rights of 
claimants disqualified for refusing suitable work. 17
Protection Against Automatic 
Disqualification for Pregnancy
A third standard intended to protect claimants from 
unreasonable penalties sought elimination of the provisions 
of 19 states as of the mid-1970s,
. . . which, in effect, deny benefits because of 
pregnancy. They vary from State to State, but they 
are all inequitable in that they deny benefits 
without regard to the woman©s ability to work, 
availability for work, or efforts to find work. 
Under eligibility provisions applicable to all 
claimants, including pregnant women, anyone who 
is physically unable to work or who is unavailable 
for work is ineligible for benefits. These determina 
tions are made on the basis of the facts of each in 
dividual case and make discriminatory disqualifica 
tions because of pregnancy unnecessary. 18
The standard, enacted in 1976, prohibits benefit denial solely 
on the basis of pregnancy or termination of pregnancy.
Provisions of the 19 states concerning pregnant women 
varied considerably in application and severity, ranging from 
Delaware©s disqualification only for any week the individual 
was actually unable to work because of pregnancy, to Utah©s 
automatic denial of benefits for 12 weeks before the date of 
childbirth and 6 weeks following childbirth. Ironically, some 
of the state provisions may have been based on the following 
Social Security Board©s 1942 suggestion for state legislation:
Provided further, however, that a woman shall be 
considered unable to work for the period within 
two weeks before the anticipated date of childbirth
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and four weeks after childbirth unless it is shown 
by facts such as a doctor©s or midwife©s certificate 
or by her work record during previous periods of 
pregnancy that she is able to work during such 
period. 19
By the time the 1976 standard was enacted, the Utah 
pregnancy provision had been declared unconstitutional by 
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court had ruled that:
. . . the Utah unemployment compensation 
statute©s incorporation of a conclusive presumption 
of incapacity during so long a period before and 
after childbirth is constitutionally invalid. . . . 20
The adoption of the federal standard, which categorically 
prohibits denial of benefits solely on the basis of pregnancy 
or termination of pregnancy, settled any questions that may 
have remained even after this decision, including the 
legitimacy of pregnancy provisions that contained rebut- 
table, rather than conclusive, presumptions of unavailability 
or inability to work.
In any event, no special provisions dealing with pregnancy 
now exist in state UI laws. The standard, however, covers 
only one aspect of sex discrimination found in these laws. A 
number of states still provide special disqualifications for 
claimants unemployed because they left work to marry, to 
accompany their spouses to a new location, or to meet 
domestic obligations. In most cases, the individual is dis 
qualified for benefits until another job is found, a specified 
minimum amount is earned, and the individual is then 
separated for nondisqualifying reasons. Almost invariably 
women are the victims of these disqualifications.
Dependents© allowance provisions and practices in the 
dozen or so states that provide these supplements are another 
example. Such allowances are often granted to male 
claimants more readily than to female claimants. The latter
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must usually make a greater effort to prove her children are 
her dependents.
Women are also disproportionately represented among 
claimants subject to certain voluntary quit provisions. Most 
states do not exempt from disqualification claimants who 
had good personal cause for leaving work. Unless the in 
dividual had good cause "attributable to the employer," the 
disqualification is imposed. This limitation on good cause 
results in benefit denial for any individual who must leave 
work to meet a domestic emergency (e.g., to care for a sick 
child or spouse, to accompany a spouse to another job) or 
for other compelling personal reasons. The usual reasoning 
for so limiting good cause to that connected with the work or 
the employer is that it is not reasonable to expect the 
employer to bear the costs of unemployment he did not 
cause. This assumes a necessary linkage between benefit and 
financing provisions, which experience rating encourages. In 
any event, for those concerned with eliminating 
discriminatory provisions, the prohibition of disqualifica 
tion on the grounds of pregnancy represented a gain, but did 
not go far enough. 21
Proposed Benefit Standards
No discussion of federal program standards aimed at pro 
tecting claimants would be complete without mention of pro 
posed benefit standards which, though never enacted, have 
generated more controversy than any other. 22 The controver 
sy arises because standards affecting weekly benefit amounts 
and the duration of benefits payable pose a greater cost 
potential than any other type of requirement. Proposed 
benefit standards sometimes have also covered qualifying re 
quirements and disqualification rules. Four national ad 
ministrations have fought for benefit standards without suc 
cess. The states continue to exercise complete authority over 
these areas, the most important aspects of unemployment in-
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surance. In 1950, President Truman proposed comprehen 
sive UI changes, including minimum benefit standards, as 
part of a special message to Congress. The bill incorporating 
the proposed standards did not survive the House Ways and 
Means Committee. President Eisenhower did not propose 
benefit standards, but recommended instead that the states 
seek on their own to meet appropriate benefit adequacy 
goals. In 1959, a benefit standards bill failed by one vote to 
clear the Ways and Means Committee. The Kennedy and 
Johnson Administrations included benefit standards in their 
UI legislative proposals. The 1965 bills (S. 1991 and H.R. 
8282) included the following requirements for states:
(a) a weekly benefit amount equal to at least 50 percent 
of the claimant©s average weekly wage;
(b) a maximum weekly benefit amount equal to at least 
66-2/3 of the statewide average weekly wage, to be 
phased in by July 1, 1971;
(c) a qualifying requirement of not more than 20 weeks 
of work or the equivalent in earnings during the prior 
base period;
(d) a maximum of at least 26 weeks duration of weekly 
benefits payable for claimants meeting such require 
ment;
(e) a maximum of six weeks suspension of benefits for 
disqualification for most causes, with no reduction or 
cancellation of benefit rights.
No state law met all of these proposed requirements and few 
met any of them at that time. Following hearings in 1966, 
most of these standards passed the Senate, failed the House, 
and could not be agreed upon in the House-Senate con 
ference. No UI legislation was adopted because of the im 
passe.
The Nixon Administration©s 1975 UI proposals included a 
weekly and maximum benefit amount standard similar to (a)
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and (b) above. The proposed standards were defeated sound 
ly on the House floor.
In July 1975, a majority of the state agency administrators 
comprising the Interstate Conference of Employment Securi 
ty Agencies supported the same kind of federal benefit 
amount standard. Four years later, the same organization 
overwhelmingly reversed its position. In 1980, by a 7 to 5 
vote, the National Commission on Unemployment Compen 
sation endorsed substantially the same standard, to be phas 
ed in gradually by 1986.
Cost is probably the major reason weekly benefit amount 
standards have regularly been defeated. The Commission 
estimated that the increase in costs in 1980 of setting benefit 
ceilings to at least 55 percent of average wages would be 
about 15 percent overall; ranging from no increase in states 
that already provide a maximum at least that high, to over 
100 percent increase in Alaska. If maximums were raised to 
60 percent, the national cost would rise by about 19 percent; 
and at 66-2/3 percent, it would rise by about 25 percent 
above 1979 levels. 23
A second, less significant, reason for opposition to weekly 
benefit amount standards is apprehension that they will lead 
to additional standards and ultimately to federalization of 
the program. To prevent states from compensating for the 
increase in costs caused by higher weekly benefits by tighten 
ing qualifying, duration and disqualification provisions, 
Congress may consider standardizing all benefit provisions, 
thereby finally removing all remaining vestiges of state 
autonomy. As a further calamity, it is argued that at the 
same time Congress eliminates state authority over substan 
tive program matters, it is likely to saddle the states with 
responsibility for raising the taxes needed to meet the in 
creased costs.
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Most opponents of a weekly benefit amount standard do 
not contest the need to maintain adequate benefit levels. 
Most even agree with the minimum 50 percent weekly wage 
replacement goal. The sticking points are the level of the 
maximum weekly benefit amounts and, equally important, 
whether it should be the subject of a federal standard. 24
Standards that Restrict Payment
If Congress determined at certain times that the states 
were too harsh on claimants, at other times it focused on 
state provisions and practices it considered too lenient. In re 
cent years, financial crises and the desire to find ways of 
reducing costs have produced additional motivations for 
restrictive federal standards. Whether protective or restric 
tive, the results of imposing federal standards were the same: 
a further diminution of state authority; the removal of an 
issue from the arena of debate; and inequities that invariably 
follow decisions adopted without adequate consideration. In 
very few cases has a program standard adopted by Congress 
been based on careful consideration of available experience 
at the state level. This is ironic since the federal-state system 
provides the opportunity for individual states to serve as ex 
perimental laboratories. Indeed, the Committee on 
Economic Security believed that the lack of experience in this 
country with unemployment insurance,
. . . clearly suggests the desirability of permitting 
considerable variation, so that we may learn 
through demonstration what is best. 25
The failure to base standards more on state experience 
may simply reflect the fact that individuals with different 
values assess experience differently. What is the "best" 
qualifying requirement from the standpoint of low-wage 
workers, for example, may be the least desirable from a 
budget cutter©s perspective. This does not detract from the
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advantages of having individual laboratories or the value of 
individual state experience to other states, if not to Congress 
for standard setting purposes. Many program improvements 
now in most states© laws originated first in single states on an 
experimental basis.
"Double Dip" Restriction
In 1970 Congress reacted to an apparent loophole in some 
state benefit formulas that made it possible for claimants to 
qualify for two successive rounds of benefits without in 
tervening employment. The so-called "double dip" was 
possible because in many states there is a substantial gap in 
time between an individual©s base period and his benefit year 
(see footnote 13). In some states, when an individual first 
files a claim for benefits, he automatically establishes a four- 
quarter base period in the recent past for the purpose of 
measuring his work experience. The amount of work per 
formed and the wages paid during the base period determine 
if he qualifies for benefits and, if so, the weekly benefit 
amount and the number of weeks of benefits payable. The 
filing of the claim establishes also the individual©s benefit 
year. This is a one-year period, usually beginning with the 
date of the first claim, during which he may draw his benefit 
entitlement.
In most states, the base period is defined as the first four 
of the last five completed calendar quarters immediately 
preceding the first claim. These states usually maintain 
records for every worker showing the wages paid, as 
reported by employers on a quarterly basis. The gap between 
the claimant©s base period and benefit year eases administra 
tion by making it likely that complete information on the 
claimant©s wages is available for the first four of the last five 
completed calendar quarters. The fifth quarter, or the most 
recent completed quarter, is called a "lag" quarter. Wage 
credits earned during the lag quarter and in the following
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quarter will not be available for benefit purposes until after 
the claimant finishes his benefit year, files another first 
claim, and establishes a new benefit year and base period.
For example, a claimant who first filed any time between 
April 1 and June 30, 1982, would have the four quarters of 
calendar year 1981 as a base period. The wages earned dur 
ing the first and second quarters of 1982 would not be 
counted. However, those "lag" wages would be included in 
the claimant©s next base period if he filed a new claim and 
established a new benefit year before July 1, 1983.
The "double dip" occurred because some states did not 
require earnings in more than one quarter, or in much more 
than one quarter, in order to qualify for benefits. In those 
states the individual in the example could collect benefits in a 
second benefit year solely on the basis of those first and sec 
ond quarter 1982 lag-period wages that were not used before, 
without having been employed since the beginning of his first 
benefit year.
The claimant would have to be unemployed in order to 
establish a new entitlement and meet all the eligibility condi 
tions of the law. Collecting benefits solely on the basis of his 
lag-period wages could reasonably be considered an abuse on 
the claimant©s part. However, it did constitute an ad 
ministrative loophole in that it provided more than was 
probably intended. In 1970 the "double dip" was possible in 
15 states. Other states either required substantially more 
than one quarter of wages to qualify, or some employment 
subsequent to the start of the first benefit year, or operated 
without a base period-benefit year lag by requesting recent 
information on each claimant from the employer when the 
claim was first filed.
The federal standard requires, as a condition for tax 
credit, that a state law provide,
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... an individual who has received compensation 
during his benefit year is required to have had work 
since the beginning of such year in order to qualify 
for compensation in his next benefit year. 26
Prior to adopting the standard, no effort was made to 
evaluate the experience of states where the "double dip" was 
possible in terms of the work experience of individuals who 
qualified for it, cost to the state, or any other criteria. It is 
not clear why this issue was considered sufficiently serious to 
warrant a federal standard prohibiting anyone from qualify 
ing twice without intervening work but not serious enough 
for Congress to bother prescribing precisely how much work 
should be required. That was left to the states. DOL recom 
mended not more than three weeks of work or the equivalent 
in wages (e.g., six times the weekly benefit amount), but it 
provided no reason for choosing this amount. 27 As of 1983, 
state requirements ranged from amounts equal to from three 
to ten times the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. 28
Restriction of Benefits 
to Certain Aliens
A second restrictive standard was adopted in 1976 as part 
of a comprehensive unemployment insurance bill. The stan 
dard was provoked by the belief of its sponsor, Congressman 
Sisk of California, that despite illegal aliens being ineligible 
for UI (because they are not genuinely available for work in 
this country), many are nevertheless drawing benefits. The 
standard appears to have been a reaction to abuses of the UI 
system alleged in a television program. It represented a reac 
tion also to a recent California agency decision to stop ask 
ing claimants whether they are citizens or aliens.
The standard requires states to prohibit benefits based on 
services performed by an alien unless he was lawfully present 
in the United States either for the purpose of performing
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such services, or was admitted for permanent residence, or 
was residing in the U.S. under color of law at the time the 
services were performed. 29 In discussion of how the stan 
dard, which provides no specific penalties, would prevent il 
legal aliens from drawing benefits, Congressman Sisk advis 
ed that,
. . . really when we get down to it, on the basis that 
a person might swear to anything in order to get 
some money if he wants to do it, this statement 
really becomes a sense-of-Congress statement that 
we do not believe illegal aliens should draw 
unemployment compensation. 30
During the House floor discussion on the standard, no facts 
and no estimates were offered concerning the number of il 
legal aliens collecting unemployment benefits.
The standard did generate concern that it might lead to ad 
ministrative harassment of minority ethnic groups, whether 
or not they were citizens or otherwise eligible for benefits. 
This and other concerns were reflected in discussion of 
amendments to the standard aimed at ensuring that benefits 
are denied only to aliens not lawfully admitted, without 
penalizing either citizens or lawfully admitted aliens. Under 
the amendments, any information required by a state agency 
to determine a claimant©s alien status shall be uniformly re 
quired of all applicants for benefits, and that no determina 
tion denying benefits under the standard shall be made ex 
cept on a preponderance of the evidence. 31
In conforming their unemployment insurance laws with 
the standard, as amended, most states used the same 
language as the standard.
The Unemployment Insurance Service (UIS) issued in 
structions advising the states that all claimants should be 
asked the same basic questions on the claims forms as 
follows:
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©Are you a citizen of the U.S.?© 
©If "no," when you were working in the U.S., were 
you issued an Alien Registration Card, Form 1-151, 
commonly called a "green card"?© 
©If "no," when you were working in the U.S., what 
document or form number were you issued?©
To guide staff with regard to the last two questions, the UIS 
issued almost 30 pages of instructions describing different 
categories of aliens and the various documents issued to 
them identifying their status and whether or not they are per 
mitted to work. 32 This was followed by a substantial number 
of detailed procedural instructions. Neither the Department 
of Labor nor the states keeps records showing how many, if 
any, individuals are denied benefits on the basis of the re 
quirements of the standard.
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion recommended unanimously that the entire standard be 
eliminated as it was ineffective, unnecessary, and inap 
propriate as a federal standard. It concluded that the stan 
dard would not deter a determined alien from filing for UI, 
that there is no record of a single individual being denied by 
reason of the standard, that aliens not legally in the U.S. are 
ineligible anyway for benefits, and that the provision has un 
necessarily burdened the administration of the program and 
delayed payment of benefits to aliens who are eligible. 33
Restriction of Benefits 
to Professional Athletes
Another restrictive federal program standard enacted in 
1976 sought to curtail another alleged abuse of the system. 
As with the standard on aliens, this one was apparently also 
a reaction to abuses alleged in a television program which in 
cluded an interview with "a professional golfer who collects 
unemployment benefits." It was discovered that not only
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golfers, but also professional ball players apparently were 
eligible for benefits. According to Congressman Sisk,
. . . it is a matter of record that regulations of some 
States make professional athletes eligible for 
unemployment compensation. It was reported last 
March, for example, that the president of the 
Milwaukee Brewers confirmed that some members 
of the team have been drawing jobless payments 
for a number of years. 34
In the House floor discussion of the standard, no facts were 
presented and no estimates given of the number of profes 
sional athletes collecting benefits and the circumstances 
under which such benefits were paid.
The standard requires states to deny benefits based on any 
services,
. . . substantially all of which consist of par 
ticipating in sports or athletic events or training or 
preparing to so participate, for any week which 
commences during the period between two suc 
cessive sport seasons (or similar periods) and there 
is a reasonable assurance that such individual will 
perform such service in the later of such seasons (or 
similar periods). 35
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion unanimously recommended that the standard be 
eliminated, as unnecessary, discriminatory and difficult to 
administer. It was unnecessary because athletes on a 
12-month contract would not be considered unemployed 
during the off season. In no state would benefits be permit 
ted if the athlete limits his availability during the off season 
to participation in his sport. It was discriminatory because it 
would automatically deny benefits to athletes during the off 
season (if they have a reasonable assurance of resuming the
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sport the next season), regardless of whether or not they are 
available for other kinds of work during the off season.
The standard is difficult to administer because it requires 
the following special determinations:
1. If "substantially all" the individual©s services during 
the base period were in sports or athletic events;
2. Of the beginning and ending of a "sport season" and 
the length of the period between successive seasons (which 
vary among different sports and individuals);
3. If the individuals who performed services as profes 
sional athletes in the last season have a reasonable 
assurance that they will do so in the next season;
4. If the individual performing the services was self- 
employed or an employer. 36
As in the case with the standard concerning aliens, there is no 
record of how many individuals have been denied benefits 
under the terms of the standard.
The standard restricting the eligibility of athletes, like the 
standard discussed below prohibiting benefits to school 
employees between terms, represents an attempt to deal with 
prominent aspects of the general issue of seasonal unemploy 
ment. This issue was first identified by the Committee on 
Economic Security in reporting that English experience 
demonstrated that seasonal industries would cause a heavy 
drain on unemployment funds "unless the benefits to 
seasonal workers are limited to unemployment occurring 
within the usual season for that particular industry." 37 
However, most states that applied special seasonal restric 
tions for certain industries or operations or workers en 
countered administrative problems as difficult as those 
described above. Moreover, it was never demonstrated that 
benefits to seasonal workers constituted substantial drains 
on state UI funds. As of early 1983, fewer than a dozen
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states had special seasonal provisions, and some of these are 
rarely applied or applied only with respect to a few specific 
industries. 38 In most states no distinction is made between 
seasonal and nonseasonal work or wages in crediting a 
worker©s employment toward meeting the qualifying require 
ment. Adequate minimum wage and work qualifying re 
quirements have succeeded in automatically screening out in 
dividual claimants whose only or primary employment has 
been in limited seasonal work. Moreover, most states ques 
tion carefully the availability for work of UI claimants who 
earned a large part of their base-period wages in seasonal 
employment, particularly if they are filing for benefits dur 
ing the off season of the industry in which the wages were 
earned. 39
Deduction of Retirement 
Income from Benefits
There has been less agreement on the question of whether 
or not retirement income should be deducted from benefits 
than on most issues. 40 Those who favor reducing a 
claimant©s weekly benefit amount by the prorated weekly 
amount of his pension argue that no individual should 
receive duplicate payments for not working. Moreover, if the 
individual is already receiving a pension, he is not in need of 
unemployment benefits. They contend that eligibility and 
receipt of a pension are proof of the recipient©s withdrawal 
from the labor force. They claim also that it is unfair to ex 
pect any employer to finance a former worker©s pension as 
well as his unemployment benefits.
Those who oppose deducting pensions from unemploy 
ment benefits counter these arguments on the grounds that 
retirement benefits and unemployment benefits are not 
duplicate payments, since they are paid for different con 
tingencies. They argue that any presumption that a pension 
recipient has withdrawn from the labor force should be
rebuttable, not conclusive. Moreover, it can be tested by ap 
plying regular availability and work search requirements. It 
may be true that a pension recipient may be in less need than 
other claimants for unemployment benefits, but the same 
reasoning could apply to others with nonwage sources of in 
come such as rents or interest. In any event, need is not sup 
posed to be a consideration in determining eligibility. As for 
the unfair double burden that may fall on employers, they 
point out that this can apply only to a claimant©s base-period 
employers since only they would be financing both 
unemployment and pension payments.
Prior to adoption of a federal program standard, the lack 
of consensus on the desirability and manner of pension 
deduction was reflected in the variety of state provisions on 
the issue. Most states provided for reduction of benefits by 
pension income, but only pensions financed in whole or in 
larger part by base-period employers. Some deducted all 
pension income but Social Security, and several provided for 
no deduction at all. There were variations of each of these 
provisions.
In 1976 the Senate Finance Committee, in reporting out a 
bill containing comprehensive unemployment insurance 
amendments, included a pension deduction standard. The 
standard would have disqualified from unemployment in 
surance completely any individual receiving any retirement 
income regardless of the amount. This severe proposal was 
amended in its final form, as enacted in 1976, to require each 
state to simply reduce a claimant©s weekly unemployment 
benefit by the prorated weekly amount of any pension or 
retirement benefit he receives. Even this standard was more 
stringent than any existing state provision. Perhaps for that 
reason, the standard©s effective date was postponed to 1979,
. . . thereby permitting the National Commission on 
Unemployment Compensation an opportunity for
Federal Program Standards 93
a thorough study of this issue and the Congress to 
act in light of its findings and recommendations. 41
In its first interim report issued November 1978, the Com 
mission recommended unanimously that the pension deduc 
tion standard be eliminated. This recommendation was 
repeated in its July, 1980 Final Report with an additional 
recommendation that, failing repeal of the standard, Con 
gress move to reduce its severity.
By the time the NCUC Final Report was issued, Congress 
had already acted, not to abolish the standard, but at least to 
modify it. 42 The resulting federal standard on pension deduc 
tion represents a minimum requirement. States may enact 
provisions that are more severe, but they may not enact less 
restrictive pension deductions. As amended, the standard re 
quires states to deduct from the UI benefit the employer- 
financed portion of a pension contributed to by a UI base- 
period employer if that employer©s contribution affected the 
claimant©s eligibility for or increased the amount of the pen 
sion. Social Security Act or Railroad Retirement Act pen 
sions are deductible regardless of the effect of the base- 
period employer©s contribution. The state may, but is not re 
quired to, adjust the amount of the pension deduction after 
taking into account any contributions to the pension made 
by the employee. 43
In considering the latter provision, the Senate rejected an 
amendment proposed by Senator Javits of New York that 
would require, rather than permit, a state to take into ac 
count any and all contributions the individual made to his 
pension. The amendment was vigorously opposed by the 
manager of the bill, Senator Boren of Oklahoma, who 
declared that the Javits amendment was not "based upon a 
correct observation of what the unemployment insurance 
system is meant to do." The amendment, he said,
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. . . would allow an abuse of the system by people 
who are not in the work force, who are retired, who 
have decided to retire and draw a pension and 
simply are looking to gain additional unemploy 
ment benefits on the side when they are no longer 
part of the work force. 44
After being advised by Senator Bellman that the Javits 
amendment would add between $5 and $10 million to the 
fiscal year 1980 cost of the unemployment insurance system, 
and being urged by that senator to reject the amendment on 
those grounds, the Senate voted down the Javits amendment 
69 to 23. 4S
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion considered any federal standard in this area wholly inap 
propriate, presumptuous and unnecessary in light of the fun 
damental disagreements among states as to the desirability of 
deducting retirement pay from UI and even greater dif 
ferences concerning the extent to which deductions should 
apply.
The standard was clearly not an area where uniformity 
was absolutely essential. It was not based on any significant 
evaluation of state experience with pension deduction provi 
sions. It had little or no support or input from state agencies. 
It reflected three factors that have increasingly influenced 
federal decisions on unemployment insurance matters: a 
suspicion of unemployed workers who apply for benefits; a 
skepticism of the ability of the system to correct abuses; an 
overriding concern with the cost implications of program 
proposals.
Standards With Both Protective 
and Restrictive Features
Two important standards, coverage and extended benefit 
standards, cannot be classified solely as either protective or
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restrictive. Each is a conglomerate of several related re 
quirements, not all adopted at the same time, and not all 
reflecting the same motivation.
Coverage Standard
Universal coverage of wage and salary employment has 
been an unemployment insurance objective since the begin 
ning of the program. Coverage extension has been a gradual 
process over the years, with some states pioneering in this 
area but with major advances coming from federal legisla 
tion. The latter extensions (employment in small firms, 
agricultural, and domestic household service) have been ac 
complished by broadening the applicability of the federal 
unemployment tax. This was done either by redefining sub 
ject "employment" or "employer" to include the new 
groups, or simply by eliminating prior exclusions. State UI 
coverage followed, since without coverage by state law and 
application of the state UI tax, the employers in question 
would not qualify for credit against the federal tax and their 
employees would not be protected by unemployment in 
surance.
Nonprofit and Public Employment
Unlike all other coverage extensions, most employment in 
nonprofit organizations and in state and local governments 
was brought into the system by the 1970 and 1976 FUTA 
amendments making state coverage of these groups a federal 
standard. 46 Failure of a state to cover a political subdivision 
or a nonprofit hospital, for example, would threaten the 
denial of tax credit for all covered and taxable employers in 
the state. Coverage of these categories was accomplished this 
way to avoid making nonprofit organizations subject to the 
federal tax47 and to avoid the constitutional prohibition 
against imposing a federal tax on states or their 
subdivisions. 48
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State coverage of nonprofit organizations with four or 
more employees was mandated by the 1970 amendments to 
the FUTA. It extended the UI umbrella to about two million 
nonprofit jobs. 49 The 1970 amendments also extended 
coverage to some state jobs (those in state hospitals and in 
stitutions of higher education) but the bulk of state and local 
government employment was brought into the system as a 
result of the comprehensive 1976 amendments to the FUTA. 
By that time, 29 states had already extended coverage to 
most state government workers without any federal incen 
tive, but only eight states had covered local government 
employees on a mandatory basis (some allowed voluntary 
coverage). The 1976 amendments brought approximately 
600,000 jobs in state government and some 7.7 million jobs 
in local government into the program. There seems little 
question that coverage of these groups would not have been 
accomplished to any comparable extent by the states acting 
alone, in the absence of the 1970 and 1976 federal amend 
ments.
Adoption of the coverage standard for these categories 
raised two types of issues. The first included broad questions 
such as the following:
  Does the standard require unqualified state coverage of 
every category of public employment, or was it enough 
if a state covered only substantially all employment in a 
category, such as only those subject to the state merit 
system?
  Does mandatory state coverage of state and local 
government workers as a condition for tax credit for 
other covered employers so intrude the federal govern 
ment into state budgeting and personnel matters as to 
violate the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution?
  Does mandated coverage of employment in primary and 
secondary schools extend to church-related schools, or
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do the latter continue to be exempt by reason of certain 
remaining FUTA exclusions of religious organizations?
These questions were resolved only after conformity hear 
ings or Supreme Court decisions. They are discussed in 
chapter 5.
The second category of issues related to interpretations of 
specific exclusions from the otherwise required coverage. 
These exclusions include services performed in the employ of 
a church or an organization operated primarily for religious 
purposes; services performed by a minister or by members of 
a religious order in the exercise of religious duties; and ser 
vices performed for a nonprofit organization with fewer 
than four employees. Permitted exclusions to state and local 
government coverage, as well as nonprofit organizations, in 
clude services performed by employees in the exercise of 
their duties as: elected officials; members of legislative 
bodies or the judiciary; members of the State National 
Guard or the Air National Guard; employees hired for the 
duration of such emergencies as fire, storm, snow, earth 
quake, flood; participants in sheltered workshops; inmates 
of a custodial or penal institution; participants in publicly 
financed unemployment work-relief or work-training pro 
grams; and employees in major nontenured policymaking or 
advisory positions, or in policymaking or advisory positions 
requiring eight or fewer hours of work per week. 50
In addition, services already excluded from the federal act 
could continue to be excluded even if performed for a non 
profit organization or state or local government. These in 
cluded service performed by a student for a school in which 
he is enrolled, service not in the course of the employer©s 
business for which remuneration is less than $50, service for 
a foreign government or international organization, service 
performed in the delivery of newspapers by an individual 
under 18, and others. 51
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Within a short period, issues concerning the scope of the 
permitted exemptions were resolved. They included, for ex 
ample, a Kentucky provision excluding temporary employees 
of the state legislature; refusal by the Idaho legislature to ex 
tend coverage to the Boise Symphony Orchestra; an Ohio 
provision excluding state employees paid on a commission 
basis; and a proposal at the federal level in 1977 52 to add 
substitute teachers to the list of exclusions. In each case, the 
state exemptions were found inconsistent with the federal 
standard and eventually disapproved. The federal proposal 
was not enacted.
Questions concerning services already excluded from the 
federal act focused on the scope of the exclusion of services 
performed in the employ of a school by a student enrolled 
and regularly attending classes at the school, and services 
performed by individuals under the age of 22 who are enroll 
ed in work study programs. Issues arose over the phrase 
"regularly attending" and its application to doctoral can 
didates, and proposals to apply the work-study exemption to 
individuals older than 22. In each case, the Unemployment 
Insurance Service (UIS) offered interpretations which resolv 
ed these and a host of other issues. The UIS issued an 85 
page Draft Bill providing draft statutory language for state 
consideration in implementing the 1976 amendments, com 
mentary and explanatory material and five lengthy and 
detailed supplements covering a wide range of questions, 
many of which related to the coverage standard and its im 
plications. 53
Reimbursement Financing
A significant part of the conglomerate coverage standard 
concerns the financing of benefits paid to employees of non 
profit organizations and state and local governments. For a 
number of reasons, these groups of employers were given a 
special advantage in the form of a financing option other
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than taxes and experience rating. For many years, the most 
important obstacle to extending coverage to nonprofit 
organizations was recognition that since many had very tight 
budgets and depended on voluntary contributions for finan 
cing, they "should not be required to share in the costs of 
providing benefits to workers in profit-making 
enterprises." 54 In other words, they should not be forced to 
finance benefits through taxes which cover not only their 
own costs but pooled costs as well, including benefit costs 
charged to but not financed by the employer who is already 
at the maximum tax rate, costs attributable to employers 
who go out of business, and noncharged benefit costs.
States that had taken the initiative and already covered 
their own employees were never forced to be subject to the 
experience rating standard. That standard required only that 
reduced rates to "persons" be based on their experience, as 
measured by the state©s system of experience rating. Govern 
ments are not "persons" for this purpose.
Accordingly, Congress directed the following preferred 
treatment for nonprofit organizations and state and local 
governments:
. . . the State law shall provide that a governmental 
entity or any other organization (or group of 
governmental entities or other organizations) 
which, but for the requirements of this paragraph, 
would be liable for contributions with respect to 
service to which paragraph (1) applies may elect, 
for such minimum period and at such time as may 
be provided by State law, to pay (in lieu of such 
contributions) into the State unemployment fund 
amounts equal to the amounts of compensation at 
tributable under the State law to such service. The 
State law may provide safeguards to ensure that 
governmental entities or other organizations so
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electing will make the payments required under 
such elections. 55
The requirement, that states offer governmental entities 
and nonprofit organizations the reimbursement option, 
generated more issues than did the provisions requiring 
coverage of these employers. Since they paid no federal tax, 
the administrative costs attributable to their workers (and 
the federal share of extended benefits paid to their former 
employees in the case of nonprofit organizations) are ab 
sorbed by private sector employers. The major issue was the 
extent, if any, states could shift still other costs to the private 
sector by not charging reimbursing employers for certain 
benefits. This issue was the subject of a conformity hearing 
and is treated in chapter 5.
Most other reimbursement issues were resolved soon after 
issuance of Department guidelines. Early issues arose over a 
proposed amendment in one state to set the effective period 
for an election to reimburse or contribute at no less than ten 
years; another state proposal to require any employer 
wishing to elect the reimbursement method to post a bond 
equal to $50,000; a proposed amendment to limit the reim 
bursement option only to the state as a whole and not to its 
component units; a proposed state regulation requiring 
deposit of reimbursements in special state funds; a bill to 
allow employers with a positive experience rating balance to 
apply that balance to offset future liability incurred as a 
reimburser; and another to prohibit employers whose ex 
perience rating accounts showed that their benefit charges 
exceeded their contributions from electing the reimburse 
ment option. All these provisions were reviewed by DOL and 
considered inconsistent with the reimbursement standard.
The reimbursement option is likely to continue to be a 
source of friction, particularly during high cost and high tax 
periods. Yet, this sole departure from experience rating in 35 
years helped make possible the coverage of nonprofit
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organizations and governmental entities by overcoming 
arguments that coverage would be inequitable since the taxes 
collected would far exceed the benefit costs of these tradi 
tionally low turnover employing units.
Equal Treatment Requirement
In extending coverage to jobs in nonprofit organizations 
and state and local government, Congress apparently an 
ticipated that states might adopt measures to cut costs that 
would undermine the intent of extending protection to 
workers in these jobs on the same basis as others. For exam 
ple, states conceivably could establish special qualifying re 
quirements, a separate benefit structure, or separate eligibili 
ty conditions applicable only to public and nonprofit 
employees. For a number of reasons, states might be more 
likely to single out public employees for restrictive treatment 
than other workers. Each state is directly liable for financing 
the benefit costs of its own employees, and it might be sub 
ject to substantial pressure from political subdivisions for 
relief from benefit costs they incur. Pressure for cutting 
public employee benefit costs might also ensue from tax 
payer groups as well as competing interests for public funds. 
In the case of nonprofit organizations, their employees 
might be the subject of special treatment as a reaction to 
their employers© immunity from federal tax and the advan 
tage they enjoy of electing to finance benefit costs on a reim 
bursement instead of a state tax basis.
Some evidence existed that states might discriminate 
against certain employees. A 1960 federal amendment56 
allowed states to extend coverage to services performed on 
American ships under certain conditions. Although the law 
provided that these maritime employees be treated the same 
as other workers, no penalty for violation was included. 
Ohio enacted special restrictive requirements relating to 
Great Lakes seamen. Consequently, the 1970 federal law
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amendments included a special provision denying maritime 
employers credit against the federal tax if a state does not 
treat their employees on an equal basis with other workers. 57
Regardless of whether or not such Congressional ap 
prehensions either existed (relevant Congressional reports 
provide no explanation) or were realistic, the result was 
enactment of an "equal treatment" standard requiring all 
states to provide compensation to employees of nonprofit 
organizations and state and local government employees,
... in the same amount, on the same terms, and 
subject to the same conditions as compen 
sation . . . payable on the basis of other service 
subject to the State Law. 58
School Employees: Between-Terms 
Denial Requirements
The extension of coverage to nonprofit organizations and 
state and local government workers in 1970 and 1976 was not 
an unqualified blanket protection of all such workers. Most 
school employees did not perform services for the school 
during the break between terms. They were not considered 
by Congress to be "unemployed" then, within the meaning 
of unemployment insurance, particularly if they were 
assured of reemployment with the school the second term 
and certainly if they were employed under 12-month con 
tracts. It is not clear how this category of workers is 
distinguishable from other groups of workers similarly cir 
cumstanced. Automobile workers are regularly laid off on a 
temporary basis during recurring model change-over 
periods. Longshoremen, fishermen, farm workers arid many 
other occupations are no less seasonal than school 
employees.
School workers are large in numbers, often well organiz 
ed, relatively well paid and usually regularly employed. But
Federal Program Standards 103
the main distinguishing feature is that most are public 
employees, subject to public criticism and tight budgetary 
restraints. Most, particularly teachers, were generally con 
sidered fortunate to enjoy a lengthy "vacation" each year 
and indeed this was probably a strong motivation of some 
for entering the profession. The prospect of paying benefits 
to these workers during school breaks was considered neither 
consistent with unemployment insurance objectives nor 
desirable from the standpoint of fund solvency. Congress 
was skeptical that the states© availability and work search re 
quirements could limit benefits to the few teachers genuinely 
ready, willing and able to work during the school break. 
Evidently, Congress was distrustful even of the states© will 
ingness or ability to enact appropriate restrictions.
The special protection afforded nonprofit and public 
employees by reason of the equal treatment requirement 
was, therefore, counterbalanced by a standard providing a 
special disqualification applicable to school employees:
. . . with respect to services in an instructional, 
research, or principal administrative capacity for 
an educational institution . . . , compensation 
shall not be payable based on such services for any 
week commencing during the period between two 
successive academic years or terms (or, when an 
agreement provides instead for a similar period be 
tween two regular but not successive terms, during 
such period) to any individual if such individual 
performs such services in the first of such academic 
years (or terms) and if there is a contract or 
reasonable assurance that such individual will per 
form services in any such capacity for any educa 
tional institution in the second of such academic 
years or terms. 59
The above paragraph requires the denial of benefits to 
"professional" employees of schools (instructors, research-
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ers, principal administrators) during the periods between 
school terms if they worked for the school during the first 
term and have a contract or a reasonable assurance of work 
for the school during the next term in the same or another 
professional capacity. States were given the option to extend 
the between-terms denial to nonprofessional employees 
(e.g., bus drivers, cafeteria workers, school crossing guards) 
of schools below the college level, but not to nonprofessional 
employees of colleges and universities. Apparently the latter 
were not made subject to any between-terms requirement 
because the thinking in 1970 (when they were first covered) 
was that they were less likely than professionals to have 
12-month contracts, and in addition their jobs were not real 
ly different from their counterparts in private industry. They 
remained untouched by extension of the restrictive provi 
sions in 1976, apparently on the grounds that once the condi 
tions of their coverage had been established, it would be un 
fair to subject them to new restrictions. This anomalous 
result was corrected in 1982 by an amendment requiring 
states that choose the option to deny benefits to nonprofes 
sional employees of primary and secondary schools to in 
clude in the denial nonprofessional employees of colleges 
and universities. In other words, nonprofessional employees 
of all educational institutions in a state must now be treated 
alike. 60
Most states had adopted the option relating to nonprofes 
sional employees of primary and high schools. Subsequent 
legislation enacted in 1977 permitted states to extend the 
blanket denial not only during periods between school terms 
but also during established vacation or holiday periods oc 
curring within terms. 61 Over half the states have adopted this 
option. Further permission was given, also in 1977, to states 
to apply the between-terms denial provisions not only to 
school employees, but also to employees of educational ser 
vice agencies, defined as governmental agencies or entities 
established and operated exclusively to provide services for
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schools. 62 Few states adopted this option. This is the only ex 
tension of the denial provisions to individuals other than 
school employees.
The between-terms denial requirements have generated 
more controversy than most standards. They have 
necessitated a large variety of federal interpretations, in 
cluding definitions of "educational institutions," 
"reasonable assurance," "principal administrative 
capacity," and "term." For example, they presented such 
questions as: Whether the denial applies to a school principal 
who has reasonable assurance only for a teacher©s job for the 
coming term; if the denial applies when reasonable assurance 
of reemployment is conditioned upon community approval 
of a budget; if the denial applies if reasonable assurance is 
given but the individual©s union has not yet signed a con 
tract; if reasonable assurance is valid when it is provided 200 
former employees but budget cuts permit only 150 jobs to be 
filled during the next term; what assurance of reemployment 
is appropriate in the case of substitute teachers who worked 
less than full time the preceding term; if the between-terms 
requirement is satisfied if an individual, provided reasonable 
assurance, finds that there is actually no job available during 
the succeeding term and is then paid benefits retroactively 
for the summer; if the between-terms denial may apply to 
school crossing guards employed by governmental entities 
other than schools. The last two questions were the subjects 
of conformity hearings, discussed in chapter 5. The question 
concerning retroactive payment for the summer was finally 
resolved by a 1982 amendment requiring that nonprofes- 
sionals denied benefits between terms and not offered a job 
for the second term shall be entitled to a retroactive pay 
ment, provided they had continued to file claims during the 
between-terms period. 63
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion found the between-terms denial requirement not an ap-
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propriate federal standard. According to the Commission, it 
reflects a wholly unwarranted Congressional apprehension 
that, absent the standard, the states would otherwise pay 
benefits during the summer indiscriminately to school 
employees who do not really want jobs. However, the action 
of the great majority of states, in adopting the option to ex 
tend the denial to nonprofessional employees of primary and 
secondary schools, demonstrates that states will indeed act to 
prevent benefit payments to school employees during school 
breaks. A divided Commission (8-4) recommended removing 
all federal between-terms denial requirements, limiting the 
equal treatment requirement to periods other than school 
breaks, and thus allowing the states to handle between-terms 
issues as they see fit under the state law. 64
Extended Benefit Standard
One of the most significant federal program standards was 
first enacted in 1970. 65 It requires states to provide additional 
weeks of benefits during heavy periods of unemployment for 
individuals who exhausted their regular entitlement. 
Unemployment insurance was intended to tide workers over 
a temporary period of unemployment. Over the years this 
objective was translated to mean that enough weeks of 
benefits should be provided to see the great majority of 
beneficiaries through their entire spell of unemployment. 
The average potential duration provided by the states of 
about 24 weeks seemed adequate in good times when, na 
tionally, only about 20 percent of those filing first claims ex 
hausted their benefits (i.e., drew all their entitlement before 
finding a job). It was not adequate during recessions, when 
the exhaustion rate rose to 30 percent or more. Such were the 
circumstances in the late 1950s by which time most state 
duration provisions allowed benefits up to a maximum of 26 
weeks.
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A number of states tried to resolve the issue by raising 
their regular duration maximum beyond the usual 26 weeks. 
Other states adopted provisions for temporary extensions of 
benefits, triggered on only during periods of high unemploy 
ment. The federal government approached the problem in 
the recessions of 1958 and 1961 by enacting temporary pro 
grams of extended benefits. The first, the Temporary 
Unemployment Compensation Act (TUC), provided for 
voluntary participation by the states and was financed at 
first by U.S. Treasury advances eventually repaid by state 
funds. The second, the Temporary Extended Unemployment 
Compensation Act (TEUC), was financed by FUTA 
revenues with mandatory participation by all states. Both 
programs extended benefit duration by 50 percent with an 
overall maximum of 39 weeks in the second program. 66
Enactment of a permanent program of extended benefits 
in 1970 reflected a Congressional conclusion that unemploy 
ment during recessions was a joint federal-state responsibili 
ty, to be met by state standby programs of extended benefits 
payable during high unemployment periods and financed on 
a 50-50 federal-state basis. The extended benefit (EB) pro 
gram answered long-standing questions of how much of an 
increase in benefit duration should be provided (an overall 
limit of 39 weeks was adopted for regular and extended 
benefits); whether the same number of weeks of EB should 
be paid to all claimants, or whether EB entitlement should 
relate directly to regular benefit entitlement (the latter course 
was chosen); at what level of unemployment EB should 
become payable (state and national triggering indicators bas 
ed on insured unemployment rates were specified); whether 
EB should be voluntary or mandatory (it is mandatory); 
whether EB claimants should be subject to additional 
eligibility requirements beyond those required of regular 
benefit claimants (no added requirement was specified in the 
1970 law).
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As demonstrated by the 1971 and 1974-76 recession ex 
periences, EB did not obviate the occasional resort to addi 
tional federally mandated emergency benefits. 67 The 1970 
EB law did, however, effectively relieve the states of any fur 
ther pressures to provide their own protection beyond the 
26th week of unemployment, at least under recession condi 
tions.
Enactment of the EB program represented a major federal 
intrusion into a substantive program area (duration of 
benefits) that had (with the brief exceptions of TUC and 
TEUC) long been the exclusive jurisdiction of the states. 
However, the extended benefits program was not entirely 
dominated by the federal partner. Generally, the same 
eligibility and disqualification provisions that applied to 
regular claimants applied also to EB claimants. Qualifying 
requirements and weekly benefit amounts were determined 
by applying state regular benefit provisions. States thus re 
tained control of these aspects of extended benefits.
Beginning in 1980, however, federal authority expanded 
even more over the extended benefits area. In the process of 
developing the fiscal 1981 and subsequent federal budgets, 
the Administration and Congress sought ways to reduce 
nondefense spending. In the UI area these proposals took the 
form of restrictions on the extended benefits program. There 
have always been many advocates of such restrictions in any 
case. The budget imperatives of this period helped increase 
these numbers.
Beginning with the recession of the mid-1970s, the federal 
and many state unemployment insurance funds were in dif 
ficulty. After 1978, liabilities mounted year by year because 
of unremittingly heavy unemployment. By early 1983 over 20 
states had outstanding loans from the federal loan fund 
amounting to more than $10 billion. More states were ex 
pected to borrow in 1983. These deficits provided a negative 
climate at both state and federal levels for any amendments
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that would result in increased costs, and an ideal climate for 
virtually any cost-cutting measure. Pressure to cut benefit 
costs increased at the state level as unemployment rates con 
tinued to climb, deficits increased, and federal amendments 
were adopted to require interest on moneys borrowed by 
states from the loan fund.
Most of the restrictive amendments to the EB provisions 
of the federal UI statute were included in the Omnibus 
Budget Reconciliation Acts of 1980 and 1981. The first three 
of those summarized below were estimated to reduce federal 
program costs in fiscal year 1981 by about $150 million. 68
Waiting Week
Three of the amendments to extended benefit provisions 
represented reversals of long-standing federal policy express 
ed in DOL policy statements and recommendations to the 
states. The first was intended to provide an incentive for all 
states to require that claimants serve an uncompensated 
week of unemployment before they may become eligible for 
benefits. It provides for elimination of the federal 50 percent 
matching share for the first week of extended benefits in any 
state which does not have a waiting period for regular 
benefits. This applies to states with no waiting week provi 
sions (11 as of October 1981); to states which have a waiting 
week for which the individual is later reimbursed if still 
unemployed after a specified period (7); to states whose laws 
authorize the suspension of the waiting week under emergen 
cy conditions (1); and even to states that waive a waiting 
week requirement if it would interrupt a continuous period 
of unemployment (5). The amendment affected 24 states in 
all.
Since 1950, DOL had recommended that states consider 
eliminating their waiting week requirement. 69 It no longer 
serves an administrative need, the chief original argument 
for a waiting period, and it causes a serious delay in pro-
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viding claimants (many of whom delay filing claims to begin 
with) with needed income in the early stages of their 
unemployment. Even in a state meeting the prompt payment 
standards, payment of the first benefit check will occur no 
earlier than three full weeks following the first claim, and it 
will represent compensation for no more than one week of 
unemployment. Elimination of the waiting week does not 
shorten the time it takes to process a claim, but the first 
check covers two weeks of unemployment.
The main argument to eliminate the federal 50 percent 
matching share for the first week of EB in any state that has 
no waiting week for regular benefits was that it would save 
an estimated $25 million in federal costs in fiscal year 1981. 
The cost savings argument is the most persuasive. There is no 
question that elimination of the waiting week is a relatively 
expensive step. In addition, a waiting week requirement 
represents less of a burden on claimants than most alter 
native means of cutting comparable amounts of benefit 
costs. Most unemployed workers have enough resources to 
get by a payless week at the outset of their unemployment. 
Moreover, if a claimant remains unemployed and exhausts 
his benefit entitlement, he will have collected his full entitle 
ment regardless of the waiting week.
A less persuasive argument advanced by supporters of the 
amendment, is that restoration of the waiting week would in 
duce unemployed workers to look for work rather than 
"beat a hasty track to the government office":
If the State wants to go ahead and do away with the 
1-week period, if they want to follow the policy of 
saying that a person has no responsibility to even 
try to seek employment before drawing the 
benefits, that would be left to the States. But the 
Federal taxpayers, including the taxpayers of those 
States which have already put their own houses in 
order, should not be asked to fund such a program.
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Mr. President, I would suggest that it is certainly 
not too much to ask that a person try to find work 
for just 1 week before he turns to the Government 
and asks for unemployment benefits. 70
It is not clear how the waiting period would cause 
unemployed workers to forego filing claims temporarily and 
begin earnest work searches, since with or without a waiting 
period, a delay in filing a claim means a delay in benefits. As 
one Senator observed:
There is no evidence that a 1-week waiting period 
provides any incentive to find work, rather it only 
creates an additional hardship for a worker who 
has lost a job. 71
Unless he has first filed a claim and thereafter certifies, 
with respect to such week, that he was able and available for 
work and seeking work, no individual can receive credit for 
either a waiting week or a compensable week of unemploy 
ment. This is one reason why DOL has consistently recom 
mended that individuals file claims as soon as they are 
separated. The other reason is to ensure that individuals have 
exposure as soon as possible to job finding, training, and 
other assistance available through the employment service.
Disqualification for Duration 
of the Unemployment
The second amendment that reversed a prior federal posi 
tion requires all states to provide that extended benefit 
claimants who were disqualified from regular benefits for a 
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, or refusal of 
suitable work, meet a subsequent work requirement before 
they can qualify for extended benefits. Most states have 
moved to this type of disqualification over the years but 
some still apply a specific period of benefit suspension after 
which regular benefits can be paid. This rework or duration
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type of disqualification is particularly harsh as an extended 
benefit requirement since it is during periods when EB is 
payable that jobs are likely to be particularly scarce. It had 
been consistently opposed for state provisions in the past by 
the Department of Labor. The disqualification also creates 
inequities. Claimants whose skills are in demand will be able 
to meet the requalifying requirement easier than others. 
Moreover, the disqualification is harder on claimants seek 
ing permanent, full-time work than on claimants looking on 
ly for temporary jobs.
The most serious inequity will occur in those states which 
prescribe a voluntary quit and misconduct disqualification 
for regular benefits which is different from the disqualifica 
tion imposed for extended benefits. Claimants who have 
already satisfied a suspension disqualification may find 
themselves ineligible for EB because of the same separation 
that provoked the first disqualification. For this reason, and 
because of the administrative burden of determining if all EB 
claimants have had some work since any disqualifying 
separation, some states with a suspension disqualification 
for regular benefits have subsequently enacted the more 
severe duration of the unemployment type of disqualifica 
tion for regular benefits simply to provide uniform treatment 
and avoid administrative difficulties. The trend was in that 
direction before; the new requirement has accelerated it.
Suitable Work and Work Search
The third amendment that reverses federal policy required 
all states to add special suitable work and work search provi 
sions applicable to extended benefit claimants. Except for in 
dividuals whose prospects for work in their usual occupation 
within a reasonably short period are good, suitable work for 
an extended benefit claimant is defined as any work within 
the individual©s capabilities that pays at least the higher of 
the minimum wage or the individual©s average weekly benefit
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amount, and is otherwise suitable within the meaning of 
state law, disregarding state criteria concerning consistency 
with the individual©s prior training, education, work ex 
perience and wage level. All extended benefit claimants must 
engage in a systematic and sustained effort to obtain work 
and must provide tangible evidence of that effort. Claimants 
who fail to meet these requirements must be disqualified for 
the duration of their unemployment and may become eligible 
only if they have been subsequently employed for at least 
four weeks after the disqualification and earned wages equal 
to at least four times their weekly benefit amount.
This suitable work definition differs substantially from the 
definition first recommended by the Social Security Board 
and later in DOL draft bills:
In determining whether or not any work is suitable 
for an individual, the (State) Commission should 
consider the degree of risk involved to his health, 
safety, and morals, his physical fitness and prior 
training and experience, his length of unemploy 
ment and prospects for securing work in his 
customary occupation and the distance of the 
available work from his residence. 72
This definition reflects the premise that suitable work should 
vary with the circumstances of each claimant, and the 
assumption that if a skilled worker is required to accept a job 
far below his level of skills, the individual is not likely to be 
there long and, meanwhile, the job is closed to those for 
whom it really is suitable work. All states already require 
claimants to lower their sights in terms of the kind of work 
and level of wages they will accept, as the period of their 
unemployment lengthens. The new suitable work re 
quirements applicable for EB limit the flexibility of both 
claimants and state agencies by requiring that the claimant©s 
prior experience and wage levels be eliminated from con-
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sideration in determining if a given job offer constitutes 
suitable work for EB claimants.
Conformity with the new provisions would oblige most 
states to have one definition of suitable work for regular 
claimants and another for EB. As observed by one Senator:
Many States may prefer to avoid that confusion, 
and if the Congress enacts this provision, the only 
route open to them would be apply this unfair 
Federal rule to the regular State program as well. 73
As for requiring "tangible evidence" of a claimant©s ef 
forts to obtain work, DOL recommended against such a pro 
vision in the past:
Proof that a claimant has actively sought work may 
be an empty gesture, demoralizing to the claimant 
and a nuisance to employers when no work is 
available in an area. Such proof should not be re 
quired of all claimants by statute. While claimants 
should be active candidates for jobs as a condition 
for receiving benefits, the test of availability should 
be realistic, taking into consideration such factors 
as business conditions, the penetration of the 
employment service, the hiring methods in the in 
dustry in which the claimant is seeking work and 
the claimant©s individual circumstances. 74
In advocating the new suitable work provisions for EB, no 
attempt was made to distinguish between them and the con 
ventional provisions of most state laws which were patterned 
after the DOL draft bill recommendation.
Since the suitable work requirements for EB were made 
conditions for credit against the federal tax, at stake for a 
state considering not to adopt the requirements was not 
simply denial of the 50 percent federal share of EB but 
forfeiture also of tax credit for all the state©s employers and 
of all administrative grants.
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These three requirements were estimated to reduce federal 
program costs by $25 million, $32 million and $94 million, 
respectively, in fiscal year 1981. The appeal for their enact 
ment was made largely, but not only, on that basis. The 
argument that the claimants affected were long term 
unemployed and, therefore, lacking in initiative, and the fact 
that federal funds are used to finance 50 percent of extended 
benefits were added as justification for the amendments.
Triggers
In 1981 Congress adopted additional restrictive amend 
ments to the EB program. Three involved the criteria for 
triggering on and off the availability of extended benefits in 
a state. The first amendment eliminated the national trigger. 
Prior to the amendment, extended benefits in a state could 
be made available either by high levels of insured unemploy 
ment in the state activating a state trigger, or by a national 
seasonally adjusted insured unemployment rate of 4.5 per 
cent or more over a 13-week period. The objective of the na 
tional triggering of EB was to help limit the impact of a na 
tionwide business downturn. Another argument was that EB 
meets the needs of the long term unemployed in states with 
low insured unemployment rates.
In urging elimination of the national trigger, the Ad 
ministration advanced two arguments: first, that the result 
would be to target extended benefits only to those states 
whose workers genuinely need such extra help and thereby 
save money; and second,
In addition, I submit that the present system works 
as a disincentive for the unemployed to become 
quickly reemployed in those States with low 
unemployment when the national trigger is on. 75
The second 1981 trigger amendment increased the level of 
insured unemployment necessary to activate the state trigger.
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Prior to the amendment, extended benefits became payable 
when a state©s insured unemployment rate (IUR) averaged 4 
percent or more for 13 weeks and was at least 120 percent of 
the average IUR for the corresponding 13-week periods in 
the two preceding years. A state could opt to disregard the 
120 percent requirement and trigger on if its current 13-week 
rate was as much as 5 percent. The 1981 amendments in 
creased from 4 percent to 5 percent the required state IUR 
trigger level and from 5 percent to 6 percent the optional trig 
ger level for states choosing to waive the 120 percent require 
ment.
In recommending adoption of the higher trigger points, 
the Administration argued that "structural changes in the 
labor force have contributed to a generally higher level of 
normal unemployment," and that
The new laws for extended benefits will better 
reflect these changes and provide these additional 
benefits where they are truly needed. 76
The third 1981 trigger change altered the method of 
calculating the insured unemployment rate (IUR). Prior to 
the change, the IUR calculation included individuals filing 
claims for extended benefits as well as regular benefit 
claimants. The amendment eliminated extended benefit 
claimants from the count. The Administration©s explanation 
for the change was, in part, that the prior method was 
"technically flawed and produces several anomalies." 77
Qualifying Requirement
The final EB standard adopted in 1981 prohibited states 
from granting federally shared extended benefits to any 
claimant with fewer than 20 weeks of work, or an equivalent 
earnings pattern, in his base period. In states that do not use 
weeks of work as the qualifying requirement, the equivalent 
to 20 weeks would be total base-period earnings of one and
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one-half times the claimant©s highest quarter of wages, or 40 
times the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. This amend 
ment was consistent with the 1980 pattern of using EB 
amendments as leverage for accomplishing changes in states© 
regular benefit programs. Of course, the amendment also 
helped cut costs since some claimants did qualify for regular 
benefits in many states with limited employment or earnings.
According to the Administration, the advantage of the 
amendment was that it would prevent EB being paid to 
workers who were employed for less than 20 weeks in the 
base period.
Extended unemployment benefits are paid general 
ly from the 27th up to the 39th week of unemploy 
ment. Such long-term benefits should not be paid 
to workers who were employed for less than 20 
weeks in the base period. . . , 78
Actually, extended benefits may be paid to some claimants 
for weeks of unemployment coming much earlier as soon 
as the fourth or fifth week in a few cases since EB is 
payable to claimants after they exhaust their regular benefit 
entitlement which could be much less than 26 weeks. In 
many states, claimants with less than 39 weeks of base- 
period work would qualify for fewer than 26 weeks of 
benefits, and those who worked less than 20 weeks would 
usually be eligible for less than 15 weeks of regular benefits 
plus only a few weeks of EB.
The impact of the 1981 EB changes on unemployed 
workers was substantial, mostly because of changes affecting 
the triggers. These changes resulted in the payment of ex 
tended benefits in many states and in much lower EB outlays 
overall during the recession year of 1982. On the basis of 
DOL estimates, outlays for extended benefits that were ex 
pected to amount to $4.9 billion in fiscal 1983 under the old 
law were cut to $1.2 billion as a result of the changes. In
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fiscal 1984, EB outlays had been estimated at $3.3 billion, 
but the changes reduced that total to $302 million.
Put another way, 3.3 million people who would 
have been eligible for the 13-week extended benefits 
in fiscal 1983 will not be eligible. Another 2.6 
million will be excluded in fiscal 1984 and about 
600,000 in fiscal 1985. 79
Despite the restrictions, the severe unemployment prob 
lems of the 1982 recession nevertheless resulted in the 
establishment of another temporary post-EB program, as oc 
curred in the mid-1970s, although more limited. Congress 
enacted, with Reagan Administration agreement, a special 
6-month program of emergency benefits, wholly federally 
financed out of general revenue, to become available from 
September 12, 1982 through March 31, 1983. An individual 
in a state already triggered on could qualify for a maximum 
of 10 weeks of "federal supplemental compensation." Eight 
weeks were available in states not triggered on, but with 
lURs of at least 3.5 percent. Up to six weeks were available 
in all other states, regardless of the level of unemployment. 80 
The program was expected to cost about $2.1 billion and 
help about two million workers, thereby temporarily restor 
ing part but not all of the reductions made by the 1981 
amendments. 81 The 1981 amendments remained untouched.
Aside from the pressures of an election year, it is not clear 
how the 1982 rationale for making emergency extended 
benefits available in states with lURs of less than 5 percent 
could be reconciled with the 1981 decision to eliminate the 
federal trigger in the regular EB program and to raise the 
state "on" triggers from 4 to 5 percent. As it turns out, the 
only advantage that seems to have resulted from the EB trig 
ger changes with respect to the 1982-1983 period has been a 
financial one from the point of view of state UI funds and 
employers, in that federal general revenues replaced UI tax
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financing for some of the long term benefit protection pro 
vided.
Rounding
One additional EB standard was enacted in 1982. 82 It pro 
vides a condition (in addition to the waiting week require 
ment) of state entitlement to the federal 50 percent share of 
EB costs: if a state does not provide for a benefit formula 
under which regular benefits are rounded down to the next 
lower multiple of one dollar, the state will not be entitled to 
the federal 50 percent matching share on the amount by 
which extended benefits exceed the amount that would have 
resulted from such rounding down. The rounding applies to 
weekly regular benefits, weekly extended benefits, state 
minimum and maximum weekly benefit amounts, partial 
benefit payments, amounts payable after deduction for pen 
sions or after any other deductions.
Most states (if not all) currently round uneven benefit 
amounts to the next higher whole dollar. Although the 
amendment was expected to save $10 million and $19 million 
in fiscal years 1984 and 1985, respectively, it is not clear how 
the excess resulting from current practices will be calculated 
or how the standard will be enforced in states that do not 
adopt this requirement. 83 As of early 1983, fewer than a 
dozen states had adopted the rounding-down requirement.
The extended benefit standards of 1980, 1981 and 1982 
were adopted despite the objections of those who questioned 
the wisdom of making permanent substantive changes 
". . . on a piecemeal basis prompted by a sudden fever to 
cut the budget." 84 Nor were arguments effective that appeal 
ed against the provisions from the perspective of the 
unemployed:
This is an attempt to change the system which aids 
the unfortunate, and once again, it is the unfor-
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tunate without jobs who will suffer. When job 
prospects are so poor, why are we trying to lessen 
the support of the unemployed? We are doing this 
as a cost saving measure, but indirectly we are ask 
ing those who can least afford it to pay. 85
The issue of federal-state relations was raised only briefly:
. . . these amendments allow increased Federal en 
croachment into a program functioning quite well 
at the State level. 86
 without effect.
These standards are clearly not absolutely essential to the 
program. They are not based on states© experience or any 
particular problem then confronting the system. They reflect 
not only the overriding motivation to cut costs but also the 
same distrust of the unemployed and skepticism of the 
system©s ability to prevent abuses that are characteristic of 
most recent federal program standards.
The extended benefit standards are highly significant for 
several reasons. They preempt the issue of long term 
unemployment for federal determination. They affect more 
workers than any of the other standards. By adopting 
amendments that reversed long time federal recommenda 
tions, almost solely on cost savings grounds, Congress broke 
precedent with a 45-year practice of enacting legislation at 
least intended to enhance the program©s objectives and effec 
tiveness. Through this legislation, Congress seemed to com 
municate four messages to the states. First, federal respon 
sibility for maintaining a strong and balanced federal-state 
partnership is secondary to budget considerations. Second, 
as long as "federal funds" are involved, Congress is justified 
in imposing its will, notwithstanding traditional state areas 
of authority. Third, past federal recommendations in the 
program area are not to be considered immutable. Fourth, 
additional federal standards are likely to follow unless more
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states take steps to "improve" their programs to reflect 
prevailing federal attitudes toward workers who file for 
unemployment insurance.
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Chapter 4
Administration of Federal Standards: 
Direct Federal-State Confrontation
Federal statutory enactments are of no consequence at all 
unless implemented by state legislation. No change of any 
kind will affect a single worker, claimant or employer unless 
and until the state UI law is amended to reflect that change. l 
In converting Congressional mandate to actual practice, 
federal-state confrontation occurs directly and frequently. 
How that confrontation arises and is resolved, the parties or 
machinery involved at the state and federal levels, and trends 
in experience over the years constitute the subject matter of 
this chapter.
State Legislation
The volume of proposed unemployment insurance legisla 
tion in all states averages about 2,000 bills a year. The 
number varies widely year to year, particularly in relation to 
the volume of federal UI amendments and the consequent 
need for implementing state legislation. In most states, when 
conforming legislation is needed, the state agency responsi 
ble for administering the law takes the initiative for develop 
ing a UI legislative program. This unit is the most 
knowledgeable about the subject matter and usually the only 
state organization in communication with a federal DOL 
regional UI office about issues or problems presented by 
federal requirements. The state administration usually has
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the bill introduced in the legislature and provides 
background and support during the legislative proceedings.
This pattern is less likely to be the approach taken in the 
case of substantive program legislation not involving new 
federal requirements. In some states, a three or more 
member advisory council, appointed for staggered terms and 
representative of labor, management and the public, plays 
an active (and in some states a dominating) role in the 
development of UI legislative programs. In such cases, the 
state agency provides technical advice to the council, par 
ticularly on conformity matters. In a few states, legislative 
committees assume a leadership role in formulating UI 
legislative programs.
In all states, interest groups attempt to influence the fate 
of bills that may affect them. Their efforts are reflected in 
the advisory council and in appropriate legislative commit 
tees. As in other areas, their success in UI varies greatly 
depending on their expertise, popularity, organizational and 
financial strengths, with the most important determinant 
usually being the quality of opposing interest groups, if any. 
Management groups are usually more effective than labor in 
UI. They have a concrete objective (lowering costs) that sus 
tains an interest in all aspects of UI. State labor organiza 
tions seem usually less interested in UI than workers© com 
pensation, and theirs has often been a single issue (e.g., max 
imum weekly benefit amount) focus. This may be because 
they usually have less staff and fewer resources for lobbying 
efforts than their management counterparts. Nor is there the 
same close consensus among labor representatives on such 
issues as disqualification penalties as exists among business 
groups.
In some states, the fate of UI legislation is often greatly in 
fluenced by the dominant personalities of a few persons or 
even a single individual. It may be a state agency represen-
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tative, an employer, an employers© group representative, or, 
less frequently, a representative of a labor group. 
Characteristically, these individuals have long experience, 
great expertise, and command wide confidence and in 
fluence.
There are, of course, many variations of these patterns, 
even within a single state at different times. There are con 
siderable variations also in the quality of legislative drafting 
among the states. A number of factors are responsible. 
Larger states with legislatures regularly in session often have 
more specialized committees, more skilled staff continuity 
and, accordingly, more knowledge and experience in both 
the subject matter and legislative drafting. But even in larger 
states, regularly occurring changes in the political climate 
determine the composition of the legislature, its committees 
and staff, as well as the executive branch and agency of 
ficials. Given the program©s complexity, frequent change of 
key legislative and executive personnel makes difficult the 
accumulation of the knowledge and understanding necessary 
to produce sound laws.
In any event, a relatively large number of bills are poorly 
drafted. They may be incomplete or simply too ambiguous 
to accomplish the framer©s intent. One of the most common 
problems is for the author of an amendment to a state law 
provision to neglect to take account of its implications for 
other elements of the law. The various components of 
benefit formulas, particularly, are interdependent and 
changes in one aspect may have an automatic and sometimes 
undesirable impact on other aspects. A simple increase in a 
state©s maximum weekly benefit amount may affect qualify 
ing requirements, benefit duration, partial benefits, and dis 
qualification provisions. With a qualifying requirement, for 
example, expressed as a multiple of the weekly benefit 
amount (as in almost one-third of the states), an increase in 
the maximum will result automatically in an increase in the
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qualifying wages for the maximum. In most states where the 
number of weeks benefits are payable is determined by 
dividing the total amount of entitlement (set as a specified 
proportion, usually one-third, of total base-period earnings) 
by the weekly benefit amount, an increase in weekly amounts 
may translate into fewer weeks or payments for many 
claimants. An increase in the maximum weekly benefit will 
have implications in states where partial earnings limits and 
disqualifications are expressed as multiples of the 
individual©s weekly benefit amount.
Although the secondary impacts are often anticipated, this 
is not always true; and the results are not always desirable, as 
when, for example, an increase in the minimum weekly 
benefit results in substantial numbers of unemployed 
workers failing to meet the minimum qualifying require 
ment, or when an increase in the maximum weekly benefit 
results in individuals with substantial high quarter earnings 
failing to qualify for any benefits. 2
Federal Review of Proposed 
State Legislation
As of 1983, a staff of two or three skilled legislative 
analysts in the Department of Labor©s Unemployment In 
surance Service reviews proposed state UI legislation for 
conformity with federal law. The bills come directly from the 
state UI agency to the UIS pursuant to the Secretary of 
Labor©s responsibility for certifying each state©s law for tax 
credit or administrative grants. A second source of UI bills is 
Commerce Clearing House, and a third source is DOL©s 
regional offices. The review is not confined to conformity. 
The staff comments on the technical adequacy of a bill. At 
least until 1982, when it seems that the practice was suspend 
ed, they also made recommendations with respect to the bill 
from a policy standpoint. The responsibilities of this unit ex-
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tend to negotiating the resolution of issues if a problem bill is 
actually enacted. Finally, if it comes to that, they are respon 
sible for developing support for DOL©s position in a hearing 
on state legislation containing conformity issues. This activi 
ty of the UIS is described in some detail because it is a critical 
factor in maintaining a viable federal-state partnership.
The UIS staff works closely with the one or two attorneys 
from DOL©s Solicitor©s Office assigned to unemployment in 
surance. Earlier in its history, Solicitor©s Office staff assign 
ed this responsibility was much larger and played a signifi 
cant role in the review process. All communications by UIS 
to the states directly or through the regional offices were re 
quired to be "cleared" with the Solicitor©s Office before 
release. The resulting delays and internal disputes were 
tolerable when issues were relatively few and generally con 
fined to technical experience rating proposals. The pro 
cedure was abandoned when the volume of federal UI 
legislation and subsequent issues increased significantly as a 
result of the 1970 and 1976 amendments. By 1980, the UIS- 
Solicitor©s Office relationship became more analogous to a 
conventional lawyer-client arrangement, with clearance 
generally confined only to maturing conformity issues, and 
with the UIS selecting the issues on which it seeks advice or 
interpretation.
DOL regional office staff dealing with UI matters also 
participate in the legislative review process, but the extent of 
their involvement varies substantially among regions. It 
depends on their interest, their skill in this area, the pressure 
of other business, and their relations with their "client" state 
agencies. Some regional offices operate only as transmission 
belts, forwarding bills and whatever relevant information is 
available to the National Office and transmitting National 
Office reactions to the state agencies. Others play an active 
role not only in the review process (adding often valuable 
observations to other information about bills they send to
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the National Office) but also in the promotion of needed or 
desirable legislation, and in "translating" National Office 
comments to the state agencies, not to change the substance 
of the communication, but either to personalize the response 
or to add or soften emphasis where appropriate from their 
standpoint.
Some regional offices have acquired a paternal, protective 
relationship with their state agencies. Others share their state 
agencies© negative attitudes toward National Office com 
munications. Both types tend to defend state actions, 
diminish the significance of nonconformity issues, and seek 
compromise favorable to the states in the resolution of con 
flicts. Most regional offices, however, invariably adopt Na 
tional Office positions as their own, and some are vigorous 
and highly skilled proponents of DOL positions on specific 
state bills. No regional office presumes to act independently 
of the National Office on state legislation except in the case 
of familiar, routine bills which have been the subject of 
previous correspondence. On the other hand, no regional of 
fice welcomes direct state agency-National Office com 
munications except in occasional situations where contact 
needs to be quick and the subject is highly technical or com 
plicated.
The regional offices that are knowledgeable in the 
legislative area provide a valuable service in helping the Na 
tional Office assess the prospects of conflict-producing 
legislation. They are often aware of the motivation of the 
bill©s sponsor, the political climate in the state legislature and 
the Governor©s position on the bill. Not the least of their 
contributions is information they provide about the intent of 
bills that may be so ambiguous or obscure as to defy 
analysis. Some state agencies provide a thorough analysis of 
unemployment insurance bills for the benefit of their ad 
ministrations or advisory councils and these are usually for 
warded to the National Office.
Administration of Federal Standards 133
Review Priorities
The small percentage of the thousands of UI amendments 
introduced each year that actually are reviewed carefully by 
the UIS legislative analysts are the bills that state agencies or 
regional offices indicate will receive serious consideration by 
the states© legislatures. These include state administration- 
backed bills (particularly those designed to implement 
federal law requirements), bills introduced by influential 
legislators or on behalf of established interest groups, and 
bills supported by the state©s advisory council on unemploy 
ment insurance. Bills not identified as likely to receive 
serious consideration are not usually analyzed unless they 
contain obvious or serious conformity issues or unless they 
begin to receive favorable action. State agencies© indications 
of probable legislative activity are only preliminary 
estimates. The analysts© priorities may change as bills begin 
to move through the legislative process. Each action taken 
on a bill, as well as copies of each introduced bill and its 
amendments are communicated on a reasonably current 
basis to the UIS by Commerce Clearing House (CCH), a 
private organization headquartered in Chicago. This is a ser 
vice subscribed to by the UIS and funded from the DOL 
budget.
Since bills may sometimes move quickly through a 
legislature, the CCH "action sheets" showing the status of a 
bill will reveal what new bills will need review and also dic 
tate the analysts© priorities and the means they use for com 
municating comments on issues. A matter involving 
technical corrections of a bill will be shelved temporarily to 
treat a bill with provisions that are undesirable from a policy 
standpoint. These bills will in turn be sidetracked in order to 
give priority to a bill that has strong support, particularly if 
comments were specifically requested by the state agency. 
This priority will yield to a bill containing a conformity 
issue, and all other actions will be suspended, if necessary, to
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handle a potential conformity issue in a bill that has been 
reported favorably by a committee or already passed one 
House of the state legislature. As each of the more demand 
ing priorities is satisfied, attention reverts to the less urgent 
matters.
Technical Adequacy
The review of state legislation is not easy. Unemployment 
insurance is a very complicated program, with 53 variations 
of each major ingredient. Nearly fifty years of precedent 
decisions, recent comprehensive changes in federal laws, in 
numerable interpretations and policy positions take time to 
absorb. Another skill, that of applying federal requirements 
to proposed state legislation, takes long experience. The 
ability to communicate opinions, either orally or in writing, 
clearly and succinctly takes time to develop. It is usually a 
minimum of two years before a UIS analyst can handle even 
routine reviews and correspondence without close supervi 
sion.
Many state legislative proposals are technically inade 
quate. Ambiguous language, misplaced punctuation, miss 
ing sentences, inappropriate positioning, erroneous cita 
tions, are not uncommon. These are in addition to the most 
common failing, already mentioned, of neglecting to take ac 
count of the implications of a proposed amendment on 
other, interrelated elements of the program.
Legislative drafting skills are certainly not confined to 
federal officials, but DOL technicians have an advantage 
over most of their state counterparts simply because they are 
continuously engaged in reviewing and commenting on pro 
posed and enacted UI legislation from 53 jurisdictions. The 
advantage is most obvious when enactment of new state 
legislation is necessary to implement federal law re 
quirements. Following adoption of any changes in federal
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law requirements or definitions, DOL develops suggested 
draft language for states that will conform with the new 
amendments. Federal technicians will thus have already con 
sidered the disadvantages of deviations from the recom 
mended language. Moreover, they are more likely to have a 
better understanding of precisely what is required, since the 
new federal requirements may well have been drafted by 
them originally, and in any event, they will usually have had 
more direct knowledge than state officials of the relevant 
legislative history. Accordingly, it is common for states to 
adopt suggested DOL draft language either verbatim or with 
no more changes than the minor adjustments necessary to 
tailor the language to the peculiarities of each state law.
In matters solely within the scope of state jurisdiction, 
federal recommendations on program policy may go unheed 
ed, but DOL advice on technical adequacy is usually 
welcome and followed. If a proposed state amendment will 
conflict with federal requirements, federal technicians may 
offer alternative language that will serve the intent of the 
sponsor, consistent with federal law, even if DOL considers 
the result undesirable from a program standpoint.
Program Policy
The same degree of state acceptance of DOL technical sug 
gestions does not extend to recommendations for program 
improvements. In many, if not most, states, qualifying re 
quirements, eligibility conditions, disqualifications, benefit 
duration, and benefit formulas are more often the result of 
labor-management negotiations and compromises than 
careful evaluation of the merits. A common compromise, 
for example, involves trading an increase in the maximum 
weekly benefit amount in return for a tightening of the 
eligibility or disqualification requirements. Benefit increases 
are often simply not possible without concomitant actions to 
minimize costs.
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Undeterred by the usually cool reception it receives to its 
program recommendations, DOL has in the past continued 
to urge states to adopt its recommendations for a sound pro 
gram. They range from key program elements (e.g., max 
imum weekly benefit should equal two-thirds of the 
statewide average weekly wage) to highly technical matters 
(e.g., for qualifying requirements, the specified minimum re 
quired high-quarter wage should not exceed one-fourth of 
the minimum base-period wage required, so that no claimant 
who meets the latter requirement will be denied benefits sole 
ly because his base-period earnings were distributed evenly 
among the four quarters of the base period). 3
The latest comprehensive compilation of DOL policy 
recommendations, issued in 1962, 4 still constitutes DOL 
policy on benefit formulas and other matters not subse 
quently affected by federal legislation. Until the late 1970s, 
DOL vigorously advanced policy recommendations, in react 
ing to specific individual state legislative proposals, and 
through general legislative planning sessions. Following the 
1970 and 1976 federal amendments, for example, DOL ex 
ploited the opportunity to capitalize on states© interest in the 
new legislation by conducting nationwide seminars for state 
agency officials and not only explaining new conformity 
conditions but also advocating improvements in program 
areas untouched by Congress. Some state agencies that 
agreed with DOL were successful in getting improvements 
enacted, perhaps because of the heavy volume of necessary 
legislation and the confusion that regularly exists between 
amendments required for conformity and those advanced 
only on a policy basis.
Since the 1976 seminars, there has been a hiatus in DOL©s 
active advocacy of program policy recommendations. The 
1974-76 recession and the consequent depletion of funds in 
several states produced an inhospitable climate for DOL©s 
benefit duration and disqualification recommendations.
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Many otherwise sympathetic state agencies were apprehen 
sive that any attempt to amend the state UI law would serve 
only to provide an opportunity for the introduction of 
restrictive legislation. In addition, DOL was somewhat com 
mitted to delaying any major recommendations, pending the 
Final Report of the National Commission on Unemployment 
Compensation (NCUC).
Diminished DOL policy pushing was also due to the 1970 
and 1976 federal amendments. Creation in 1970 of the per 
manent program of extended benefits left states little incen 
tive to extend regular duration beyond 26 weeks, or even to 
liberalize their duration formulas. Extensions of coverage 
mandated by the federal amendments left relatively few jobs 
still unprotected, thereby reducing the need to press the 
states to expand coverage on their own. The three remaining 
major program policy areas, benefit adequacy, fund solven 
cy, and disqualification severity, not yet preempted by 
federal amendments, offered little promise. Most states had 
already adopted the recommended "escalator" concept of 
tying the maximum weekly benefit amount directly to 
changes in the statewide average weekly wage so that a 
change in the latter automatically produces a change in the 
former. By 1978, about a dozen states had established the 
maximum as an amount equal to as much as two-thirds of 
the statewide wage, the recommended level. But any further 
improvements in benefit amount and duration seemed 
unlikely, at least until many states© programs were on a 
firmer financial footing.
States have also been reluctant to adopt DOL recommen 
dations on tax and financing provisions. This advice general 
ly concentrated on the need for each state to establish an ade 
quate reserve, and offered as a guideline a measure based on 
the state©s past experience. Such a reserve, it was suggested, 
taken as a percent of total payrolls in the state, should equal 
at least one and one-half times the highest benefit cost rate
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(total benefit outlays as a percent of payrolls) in any 
12-month period during the preceding ten or more years. 
While proportionately more states adhering to the guideline 
avoided the need to borrow than those with reserve levels 
below this minimum, not all states that followed the 
guidelines succeeded in remaining solvent.
Federal financing recommendations also stressed methods 
for predetermining annual tax yields, having higher or lower 
tax rate schedules take effect in response to realistic fund 
level measures (e.g., reserves as ratios of total payrolls rather 
than as fixed dollar amounts made obsolete by inflation), en 
suring adequate financing of pooled costs (noncharged 
benefits and benefits ineffectively charged to employers 
already at the maximum rate) through a reasonable 
minimum or surtax rate.
In recent years, financing recommendations have been 
aimed largely at assisting debtor states to evaluate the op 
tions available in repaying loans, regaining solvency as 
quickly as possible, and maintaining adequate reserves on a 
long term basis. Of course, the expansion of federal loan 
repayment requirements has moved the federal-state 
dialogue in regard to financing beyond the advisory level.
Even in good times, DOL was never successful in per 
suading states to adopt its recommendations on disqualifica 
tions. DOL had always urged that a disqualification for 
voluntary quit, discharge for misconduct, or refusal of 
suitable work should result in denial of benefits only for the 
period of unemployment presumed attributed to the claim 
ant©s own action, or about six weeks, the length of the 
average spell of unemployment. After that period, the in 
dividual©s continued unemployment could reasonably be 
considered due to economic conditions and, therefore, com- 
pensable. Most states consistently rejected this concept, 
preferring instead to consider a disqualification as punish 
ment for irresponsible action.
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The cessation of DOL policy recommendations was also 
attributable to personnel changes within the Labor Depart 
ment. UIS staff had been steadily reduced over the years. 
The number of analysts responsible for reviewing and com 
menting on state legislation was cut from eight to four. The 
number of attorneys in the Solicitor©s Office solely responsi 
ble for unemployment insurance matters was reduced from 
six to one. Corresponding reductions were made in the 
research staff. UIS library facilities were eliminated entirely. 
Perhaps most significant, virtually every UIS staff member 
with long experience in the program, some dating back to its 
origin (and usually with a correspondingly firm commitment 
to its original principles and orientation), was gone by 1980. 
Beginning that year, the UIS was headed for the first time by 
an individual with no prior UI background, operating under 
a hierarchy of officials for whom the unemployment in 
surance program was clearly not a high priority. During this 
period, the UIS and even DOL became considerably less in 
fluential than the Office of Management and Budget, for ex 
ample, in determining unemployment insurance policy.
Finally, by 1982, the making of policy recommendations 
by staff on state legislation seems to have been discontinued. 
This includes even recommendations which simply follow 
established policy as contained in the draft bills or the com 
prehensive DOL policy statement issued in 1962.
Conformity
Only once has a state been assessed any penalty for non 
conformity with PUT A provisions. Only twice have ad 
ministrative grants been withheld for violations of Social 
Security Act provisions, and then only for brief periods. It is 
rare for an issue even to go to a hearing, as evidenced by a 
history of only about a dozen conformity hearings since 
1937.
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The infrequency of hearings is certainly not due to the lack 
of serious issues. Each year there may be as many as 50 
potential conformity issues presented by proposed or 
enacted state legislation and a residue of 15 to 20 actual 
issues requiring negotiation. The small number of hearings is 
due primarily to the mutual interest of both levels of govern 
ment to avoid formal confrontations that could produce 
disadvantages for both. For the state, an adverse Secretary©s 
decision means either sanctions or, if they are to be avoided, 
capitulation and a change in law or practive which the state 
does not really want. At stake for DOL is the potential, exer 
cised on a few past occasions, of Congressional intervention, 
possibly with a consequent diminution of the Secretary©s 
authority. 5
To keep the number of serious confrontations to a 
minimum, it is not enough for the two levels of government 
simply to share an interest in this objective. Other factors 
must also be present, including a federal staff skilled in 
detecting issues, communicating opinions and reasons, and 
initiating and negotiating solutions. Nor is it always enough 
that issues are settled. Resolution of an issue on the 
grounds of political expediency, or intimidation, or on any 
other basis than the best available judgment of what the 
federal law requires and the most practical means of achiev 
ing conformity is only a temporary settlement.
Identifying Issues
It is very unusual for an issue to be overlooked, although 
the likelihood increases as federal review staff and resources 
are reduced. A major incentive to be thorough is the known 
difficulty and embarrassment involved in trying to persuade 
a state legislature to remove a conflicting provision from its 
law when no indication had been made of the existence of an 
issue at the time the bill was still pending and there was op 
portunity to defeat or amend it. Because of its staff©s
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familiarity with the federal law, it is also very unusual for 
DOL to be successfully challenged on an allegation of non 
conformity. Conformity issues are not raised lightly by 
analysts; issues are always raised with the recognition that it 
may be necessary to defend their position at a hearing. If the 
analysts are not confident of their position, they will advise 
the state that the possibility of a conformity issue is being ex 
plored and hope that because of the doubt raised, the bill will 
not survive.
A typical memorandum will pinpoint the language of the 
bill that raises an issue, describes DOL©s understanding of 
the language and its intent; cite applicable federal law provi 
sions and their interpretations; and describe as clearly as 
possible the basis for the opinion that if the provision is 
enacted, the state law, as so amended, will not meet federal 
law requirements. The DOL analysis is always expressed as 
an opinion, since only the Secretary can decide that a provi 
sion is out of conformity, and then only after he has notified 
the Governor, extended to the agency an opportunity for 
hearing, conducted a hearing, if one is desired, and submit 
ted his findings to the state. If there does not appear to be 
time for a written communication, the UIS may wire its opi 
nion directly to the state agency, or it may telephone state 
agency officials either directly or in concert with the regional 
office. If a bill with a serious issue is enacted, the UIS may 
request the Governor to veto it. All communications will 
contain full explanations of the reason for DOL©s opinion.
Reactions by state agency officials to DOL comments con 
cerning the conformity of pending state legislation range 
from relief to hostility. Experienced state officials are 
seldom surprised by a DOL position. In many cases they will 
have been alerted to the possibility of an issue being raised by 
the regional office on an informal basis, usually after a quick 
consultation with National Office staff. Often, the state 
agency officials will request an opinion on the conformity of
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a questionable bill. State officials have a considerable incen 
tive in making sure the state legislature knows at an early 
stage about any potential conformity issues associated with a 
bill. It is very awkward for state officials who have not given 
their legislature the DOL warning at the earliest opportunity 
to advise against enactment of a problem bill that has 
already gained momentum.
Most bills containing conformity issues are not ad 
ministration bills or even supported by the state administra 
tion. Often they would create serious administrative prob 
lems for the agency if they were enacted, or otherwise disrupt 
established practices or principles. It is not uncommon for 
state agency officials informally to express the hope that 
federal analysts will somehow find a conformity issue in the 
bill so that DOL, rather than state agency officials, will bear 
responsibility for its defeat. For example, from time to time 
several states have sought to combine in one organizational 
structure all state administrative adjudicatory functions and 
staff, including unemployment insurance referees as well as 
hearings officers in workers© compensation and other state 
programs. DOL has recommended strongly against this ap 
proach as inimical to both the quality and the promptness of 
UI hearings. But to the disappointment of state agency of 
ficials, DOL has found no basis for challenging the confor 
mity of such a practice, provided federal performance stan 
dards are met and granted funds are used only to meet UI 
responsibilities.
A hostile reaction to a negative DOL opinion on the con 
formity of a provision sometimes occurs but is unusual even 
among state agency officials who disagree with the federal 
position. When such a reaction has occurred, it has often 
been a manifestation of an underlying animosity toward all 
federal intervention in state affairs. Generally, an indication 
from DOL that enactment of a pending bill would present a 
question of conformity with federal law is recognized as
Administration of Federal Standards 143
reflecting the DOL analysts© best judgment. It is accepted if 
the reason for the opinion seems persuasive, and it is usually 
enough to deter enactment of the vast majority of problem 
bills.
Avoiding Confrontation
If it appears that a bill posing a conformity issue will be 
enacted despite DOL recommendations that it be defeated, 
withdrawn or amended, the state is usually urged to adopt a 
"savings clause" along with the bill. The one recommended 
by DOL provides that the provision in question will not take 
effect unless and until the Secretary of Labor finds that it is 
consistent with federal law requirements. Adoption of this 
type of savings clause gives the Secretary ample time to act 
and avoids the necessity of a conformity hearing. Although 
DOL is often successful in persuading a state to adopt a sav 
ings clause, usually the clause provides that the challenged 
provision will become effective unless and until the Secretary 
finds the provision inconsistent with federal law re 
quirements rather than DOL©s version.
The advantage of any savings clause is that it permits a 
provision to become null and void without further action by 
the legislature. This can be important to a state confronted 
with an adverse decision by the Secretary issued during a 
period when the state legislature is not in session. It is also 
advantageous to DOL since it obviates the possibility of a 
sanction, and it usually ends the issue without judicial 
review. A number of states have rejected adoption of any 
kind of a savings clause on the grounds that by allowing the 
fate of an amendment to be determined by the Secretary of 
Labor, it constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of 
legislative authority.
Once a bill containing a conformity issue is enacted. DOL 
will usually request an opinion from the state agency or the
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state©s attorney general as to how it will be interpreted; DOL 
will advise the state if there is a possible interpretation of the 
law or the provision that will avoid the issue. For example, as 
indicated in the preceding chapter, some states amended 
their definition of suitable work to include any job paying 
the higher of the minimum wage or the claimant©s weekly 
benefit. However, both federal and state laws prohibit dis 
qualification of a claimant for refusing a job paying less than 
the prevailing wage for such jobs. To avoid an issue that 
could be raised if an individual were disqualified for turning 
down a job that paid the minimum wage but not the prevail 
ing wage, DOL recommended that the states interpret their 
laws as requiring disqualification for refusal of a minimum 
wage job only if that wage was also the prevailing wage for 
that type of work.
A more common attempt to avoid a conformity issue by 
interpretation concerns the so-called automatic coverage 
provisions in most state laws which require that any employ 
ment that is either subject to the FUTA or required by the 
FUTA to be covered under state law as a condition for tax 
credit shall be considered covered under state law. Upon 
enactment by the state of a bill excluding services that are re 
quired by federal law to be covered, DOL will ask if the state 
law will be interpreted to make the automatic coverage re 
quirement controlling.
Less dependable a basis for avoiding a conformity issue 
are general savings clauses in some state laws that provide 
for the automatic nullification of any provision found by the 
Secretary to be inconsistent with federal requirements for tax 
credit or administrative grants. On the few occasions when it 
would have been helpful, DOL has not succeeded in per 
suading states to apply this provision. On the other hand, 
there have been occasions when a flexible attorney general 
has found an interpretation never contemplated by DOL. In 
one instance, a problem provision was interpreted to have a
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meaning opposite from that suggested by its crystal clear 
language, on the grounds that the state legislature would 
never knowingly have enacted a bill that would jeopardize 
employers© tax credits.
Infrequently, DOL will recede from a position by chang 
ing its interpretation of the federal law. For example, a posi 
tion held for many years that federal law bars states from 
relieving employers of benefit charges to their accounts 
(which could affect their tax rates) for unemployment caused 
by so-called "Acts of God." DOL had argued that natural 
calamities such as earthquakes and storms were part of the 
risk of doing business. The fact that such unemployment was 
beyond an employer©s control was not persuasive, since most 
unemployment is regarded as beyond an employer©s control. 
In 1972 a severe flood caused considerable disruption and 
job dislocations in Pennsylvania and other states. DQL was 
persuaded to adjust its position at least to the extent of per 
mitting noncharging of benefits paid for unemployment if 
caused by a natural disaster declared as such by the President 
pursuant to the terms of the Disaster Relief Act.
Even more infrequently, DOL will agree not to pursue an 
issue of nonconformity. This occurs usually only when the 
offending provision has limited, temporary application. For 
example, in 1973, New York law was amended to permit 
noncharging to reimbursing employers of benefits paid over 
a one-year period to former employees unemployed because 
of a flood. Up to that time DOL interpreted federal law as 
prohibiting any noncharging of employers financing benefits 
on a reimbursable basis. However, since the noncharging in 
the New York case was a one-time situation, and since the 
Department itself then intended to seek a change in federal 
law permitting the practice, the issue was not pursued. Occa 
sionally, a state court will decide a case on the basis of an in 
terpretation of the state UI law that will present a conformity 
issue. DOL will sometimes not pursue the issue if the state
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agency can convince the Department that the court©s deci 
sion has no applicability other than to the instant case, that 
the state will continue to adhere to a conforming interpreta 
tion and that it will appeal the court©s ruling, if possible.
Resolution of Issues
With these few exceptions, conformity issues that are once 
raised with a state are pursued until they are resolved. There 
is no single approach to resolution. One determining factor 
will be the seriousness of the issue, as indicated by factors 
such as the number of individuals affected, the impact on 
claimants or employers, and the potential consequences to 
the program. For example, the South Dakota issue described 
below satisfied all criteria. So did the failure of some states 
to extend coverage to church-supported schools, as required 
by the 1976 federal law amendments, according to DOL in 
terpretation. These are usually the most difficult to settle. 
The South Dakota issue, for example, took two and one-half 
years to resolve. Even more time can be expected if a state 
seeks judicial review of a Secretary©s adverse determination, 
as in the case of the church schools issue. In light of these 
delays, if DOL fails to achieve at least a temporary suspen 
sion of a serious nonconforming provision, it will quickly 
begin the procedures that culminate in a hearing.
The pattern followed is different in the case of less serious 
matters which constitute the large majority of issues. Instead 
of moving directly toward a formal confrontation, DOL will 
follow a variety of alternate roads to eventual settlement 
which will avoid the burden and risks involved in a hearing. 
The most common approach is to determine if the state agen 
cy and presumably the state administration will introduce 
and support a bill next year that will correct the problem. If 
the agency agrees, and concurrence is reached on the 
language of the corrective legislation, DOL will hold the 
issue in abeyance until next year©s state legislature has had an
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opportunity to act on the bill. Failure of the legislature to 
correct the issue will usually set in motion the procedures for 
a hearing.
The law requires that the Secretary of Labor certify to the 
Secretary of the Treasury on October 31 of each year all 
states whose laws have been approved so that employers may 
receive credit against the federal tax. The Secretary of Labor 
cannot deny certifying a state law for tax offset credit and 
cannot withhold administrative funds until the state agency 
has had an opportunity for hearing. There are built-in time 
constraints in the federal laws for each step between notifica 
tion to the Governor of the issue, notice of hearing, schedul 
ing the hearing, exchange of briefs, mailing of proposed 
decisions, issuance of the administrative law judge©s recom 
mended decision, Secretary©s decision, and opportunity for 
judicial review. The result is that unless the initial steps are 
taken by early summer, the state©s law must be certified on 
October 31 and the issue moves over to the following year. 
Usually, the state legislature will then have another oppor 
tunity to correct the problem. If it does so within a 
reasonable time, the issue will be resolved. Although the Oc 
tober 31 deadline does not apply to issues involving the 
possible denial of granted administrative funds, there are 
still substantial delays between notification of an issue and 
the application of that sanction.
The issues that linger the longest are often relatively minor 
problems that could be corrected by a change in state agency 
regulations or procedures. If the state agency is not really in 
terested in making the necessary change, and DOL is reluc 
tant to go to a hearing because the issue is not important 
enough to warrant the time and work, the conforming 
changes can be delayed almost indefinitely. Resolution of 
such an issue may well await the eventual appointment of 
new, more amenable state agency leadership. One of the 
longest continuing issues involves a state©s regulations which
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apply different filing and reporting requirements to partially 
unemployed claimants (claimants entitled to a reduced or 
partial unemployment benefit for a week in which some 
wages were earned but less than a specified amount) than 
those prescribed in the federal Employment Security 
Manual This document contains interpretations of federal 
law requirements and spells out acceptable state practice in 
various administrative situations. Before a nonconformity 
hearing on the state©s regulations can even be scheduled, the 
Manual prescribes a procedure requiring federal evaluation 
of whether the state provisions, while differing from the sug 
gested Manual provisions, could nevertheless still be con 
sidered consistent with federal law. The evaluation must be 
made in concert with state authorities. This particular issue 
has remained unresolved for almost a decade, although there 
have been several exchanges of proposed regulations and 
comments over the years.
A number of personal factors also influence success in 
resolving issues short of a hearing. Mutual respect between 
federal staff (regional and national) and state agency of 
ficials as well as competence in the art of negotiation can be 
critical. Conversely, heavy pressure ordinarily has negative 
results. The application of pressure on a Secretary by the 
state©s legislative delegation, for example, usually has no ef 
fect. But this is not invariable. There have been instances 
where a change in federal position appears to have been in 
fluenced by political pressure.
The traditional pattern of resolving most issues prior to a 
hearing may be altered in the future. First, the federal stan 
dards enacted in 1980 as well as additional amendments 
enacted in 1981 are viewed by many states as serious and 
threatening intrusions into state authority. Unlike the com 
prehensive amendments enacted in 1970 and 1976, there was 
neither opportunity nor effort made in 1980 to obtain and 
consider reactions from the states either individually or
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through the Interstate Conference of Employment Security 
Agencies (ICESA). Moreover, some states considered 
unreasonable the short deadlines imposed for implementa 
tion of the amendments (matter of a few months in some 
cases), in contrast to the two-year period that is usually per 
mitted. Second, since 1970 states have had the opportunity 
for judicial review of an adverse determination by the 
Secretary. Only a few states have exercised that right, but in 
the one instance to date in which the courts ruled against the 
state in 1980, the consequences were far less severe than the 
potential penalty. 6 Armed with this precedent, states can 
now consider contesting a decision with less fear that the full 
sanctions will be imposed. Finally, the UIS has lost substan 
tial credibility in recent years, its advice is increasingly 
disregarded. This is due in part to the loss of effective, ex 
perienced and authoritative personnel and the consequent 
deterioration of performance; the relinquishment of leader 
ship to agencies other than DOL, and the consequent rever 
sal of many long-standing policies; and the increasingly fre 
quent pattern of failing to follow up warnings of sanctions 
or even to pursue issues at all. In any event, the increased fre 
quency of hearings suggests that apprehensions concerning 
the prospect of a conformity hearing are disappearing.
Many of the elements involved in a conformity case can be 
illustrated best by examining one in detail. The issue describ 
ed in the appendix to this chapter is one of the most signifi 
cant to confront the system. It arose over a proposal for 
amendment to the South Dakota law which the state agency 
submitted on June 22, 1962, to the DOL regional office in 
Kansas City for comment. The issue was resolved December 
11, 1964.
The chronology of the South Dakota issue documents 
some of the common approaches toward resolution of an 
issue prior to a hearing, including informal attempts of each 
party to persuade the other, consideration of alternative pro-
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visions, and adoption of a savings clause that appeared to in 
vite a determinative DOL decision on the basis of an infor 
mal hearing. 7
The chronology also shows the development of strategy by 
each party, including the utilization of interest groups, con 
gressmen and other state agencies. None of these efforts was 
successful in heading off a hearing. Why did resolution of 
this issue (and only about a dozen others) require a hearing, 
while many hundreds of other issues have been resolved in 
formally, including almost identical issues in other states at 
other times? Certainly the following factors contributed: the 
Governor©s support of the questioned amendment; poten 
tially significant savings in benefit costs, and consequent 
strong support by business groups; strong convictions con 
cerning federal versus state authority by proponents and op 
ponents of the amendment; and the existence of more than 
one contentious issue.
Whatever disadvantage the state incurred because the 
hearing was conducted in Washington, by a federal ad 
ministrative law judge, on the basis of which the decision as 
to the state©s conformity with federal law is made by the U.S. 
Secretary of Labor, was eliminated six years after the South 
Dakota hearing by amendment of the federal law (Public 
Law 91-373) under which a state may seek judicial review of 
an adverse Secretary©s decision.
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Appendix to Chapter 4 
Chronology and Anatomy of a Conformity Case
6-22-62 P.J. Maloney, Commissioner and Counsel of the 
South Dakota Employment Security Department, submitted 
a legislative proposal to the Kansas City Regional Ad 
ministrator of DOL©s Bureau of Employment Security, for 
comment. The proposed amendment would effectively deny 
payment of unemployment insurance to claimants by 
lengthening the waiting period from 1 week to 7 to 13 weeks, 
depending on the amount of the claimant©s base-period earn 
ings. Only those who earned $6,000 or more would be sub 
ject to the proposed benefit postponement schedule:
Amount of base-period Number of weeks
earnings of benefit delay
$6,000 - 6,999.99 7
7,000 - 7,999.99 9
8,000-8,999.99 11
9,000 - over 13
6-29-62 The Regional Administrator©s response advised 
Maloney that the proposed amendment would raise ques 
tions of conformity. The amendment injects a consideration 
of "need" as a condition of eligibility for benefits. Under 
the proposal, benefits would not be paid solely with respect 
to unemployment, as required by federal law.
The regional office mailed a memorandum to Robert C. 
Goodwin, Administrator, Bureau of Employment Security, 
attaching copies of the agency©s letter and the Regional Ad 
ministrator©s response.
7-20-62 Memorandum from William Norwood, National UI 
Office, Director, UIS, to the Regional Director advised that 
the National Office concurs with the June 29, 1962 regional 
office letter to the state and provided further comment in
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support of the position along the following lines: The pro 
hibition against a needs test as a condition for the payment 
of compensation is implicit in the FUTA definition of "com 
pensation." Sections 303(a)(5) of the Social Security Act and 
3304(a)(4) of the FUTA require, as a condition for the cer 
tification of state unemployment insurance laws, that such 
laws provide for the use of all moneys withdrawn from the 
state unemployment funds solely in the payment of 
unemployment compensation, with certain exceptions not 
relevant to the present problem. "Compensation" as defined 
in Section 3306(h), FUTA, means "cash benefits payable to 
individuals with respect to their unemployment." This 
limitation on the expenditure of moneys withdrawn from 
unemployment compensation funds negates, by necessary 
implication, the disbursement of such moneys on a needs 
basis.
7-25-62 Letter from Regional Administrator to Maloney 
transmitted the National Office comments and reasserted 
that the proposed legislation would raise a question of con 
formity.
7-31-62 Agency response from J.V. Yaukey, South Dakota 
Chief of Benefits, to Regional Administrator advised that 
the proposed amendment had the support of several large 
and influential employers in the state who are trying to solve 
the problem of paying benefits in the winter months every 
year to claimants who consistently earn high wages plus 
overtime about nine months of the year and then draw 
unemployment benefits for the remaining three months, 
even though they had already put in a full year©s quota of 
hours worked. The agency requested a counter-suggestion as 
to how to solve this problem.
8-3-62 Charles Wilkins, UIS Regional Director in Kansas Ci 
ty, transmitted agency letter to UIS, National Office (Nor 
wood) with a request for assistance.
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8-24-62 Norwood©s response reiterated the position that the 
proposal to increase the waiting period for claimants whose 
base-period earnings exceed $6,000 would introduce the con 
cept of "need" as a condition of eligibility and would pre 
sent a question of conformity with federal law. The 
memorandum advised that although the Bureau was reluc 
tant to recommend seasonality provisions because of the dif 
ficulty of administering them equitably and effectively, it 
was submitting a draft seasonality provision for the agency©s 
consideration that would provide a better solution to the 
state©s problem than the proposed amendment.
9-4-62 Letter from Wilkins transmitted to Maloney the Na 
tional Office comments and the suggested seasonality provi 
sion.
9-10-62 Letter, Yaukey to Regional Administrator, argued 
that the Bureau is looking at the "needs" test concept too 
narrowly. It rejected the seasonality provision because it 
would be "devastating in its effect on low income people" 
while the additional waiting period proposal "would prob 
ably not affect more than 100 or 150 claimants."
9-18-62 Wilkins© letter to Maloney advised that the National 
Office was preparing comments and attached a copy of an 
earlier Bureau paper entitled "Entitlement to Unemploy 
ment Benefits Based on Consideration Involving Need: Con 
formity with Requirements of Federal Law." This 
monograph was prepared by DOL National Office staff and 
distributed at a legislative meeting held in Kansas City in 
1961.
9-19-62 Wilkins transmitted to Norwood copies of the latest 
correspondence as well as a report of a discussion with state 
agency officials indicating the agency©s belief that 
dependents© allowances added by some states to weekly 
benefits are based as much on need as the proposed amend 
ment, and yet they are not held out of conformity.
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10-8-62 National Office (Norwood) memorandum to the 
regional office (Wilkins) referred to the article, "The Means 
Test and Dependents© Allowances" in the July 1961 issue of 
the Employment Security Review, a monthly publication of 
the Department of Labor, reiterated the Bureau©s position 
and explained again why it believes the proposal in question 
does not meet the requirements of federal law. The 
memorandum pointed out that the position taken is consis 
tent with prior advice given other states and disagreed that 
the suggested seasonality provision would unjustly deny 
benefits to low-income workers.
10-24-62 Letter to state agency from regional office discuss 
ed desirable legislation for the 1963 legislative session and 
recommended against adoption of the increased waiting 
week proposal.
11-16-62 Memorandum to Norwood from Wilkins transmit 
ted a savings clause that the agency wished to add to the pro 
posed amendment. It provided that the provision would be 
inoperative if on or before January 2, 1964, the Secretary of 
Labor found it inconsistent with federal law.
12-10-62 Wilkins informed Norwood that the State Advisory 
Council approved the proposal on November 28, 1962. He 
also forwarded a copy of an agency study indicating that in a 
nine-month period, about 4 percent of claimants would be 
affected and in a 12-month period, there would be a reduc 
tion of $45,000 in benefits paid. The regional office also 
transmitted copies of a letter to the agency from an attorney 
for the Greater South Dakota Association, an organization 
of businessmen, supporting the proposal. Wilkins advised 
that the proposal probably would be enacted during the 1963 
legislative session.
12-21-62 National Office telephone call to Wilkins advised 
that suggested language for a savings clause would be mailed 
within a few days. This followed a December 17, 1963
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memorandum to the Bureau from the Solicitor©s Office sug 
gesting revisions in the Bureau©s proposed language.
12-16-62 Memorandum from Bureau Director (Goodwin) 
advised Norwood (Director, UIS) of a call from Assistant 
Director of the Social Security Department of the AFL-CIO, 
Ray Munts, concerning the state proposal and requesting in 
formation about the issue.
12-27-62 National Office (UIS) memorandum to regional of 
fice suggested a savings clause under which the operation of 
the amendment would be made conditional upon the 
Secretary©s finding that the amendment was consistent with 
federal requirements. The memorandum advised that if the 
agency continued to support the savings clause it had pro 
posed, at least reference to a specific date in the clause 
should be omitted.
1-1-63 Wilkins advised the National Office by phone that the 
agency had rejected the DOL-suggested savings clause and 
supported a clause providing that the proposal would 
become effective January 1,1964, unless, prior to January 2, 
1964, the Secretary found that the proposal failed to meet 
federal law requirements.
1-4-63 Wilkins transmitted to Norwood the South Dakota 
legislative proposal together with other bills that had been in 
troduced.
1-28-63 Memorandum from Bureau Director Goodwin to 
Secretary of Labor Willard Wirtz informed him "of the 
background and present status of an issue which may even 
tually present a question for your determination concerning 
the conformity of the South Dakota Employment Security 
Law, as it is expected to be amended, with requirements of 
the Internal Revenue Code and the Social Security Act."
2-5-63 National Office memorandum informed Wilkins that 
Commerce Clearing House (CCH) reported that the pro-
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posal had been introduced as Senate Bill 89, and that the 
CCH version of the bill contained erroneous citations to the 
federal provisions.
3-7-63 Wilkins informed Norwood that Senate Bill 89 had 
passed both Houses of the state legislature and that Gover 
nor Archie Gubbrud was expected to approve it.
3-25-63 Regional office forwarded certification, made 
March 14, 1963, by the South Dakota Secretary of State, 
that the attached document was a true, correct and examined 
copy of Senate Bill 89, as approved by the Governor, March 
13, 1963. The bill as enacted included a savings clause which 
provided that the amendment would become effective on 
January 15, 1964, unless the United States Secretary of 
Labor, prior to January 8, 1964, found that it failed to meet 
the requirements of federal law.
4-29-63 Submittal prepared for Secretary of Labor, with the 
Solicitor©s Office participation, included summations of 
both state and Bureau arguments, a chronology of develop 
ment, and a proposed letter to the Governor.
6-13-63 Letter from Goodwin to Maloney advised that the 
Bureau©s recommendations were being prepared for the 
Secretary©s consideration and that a copy of the statement 
would be furnished the agency July 1, 1963. The letter re 
quested the agency to furnish a statement of its position by 
July 22 so that an informal hearing could be scheduled dur 
ing the week of July 29.
6-26-63 Yaukey letter to Wilkins described the Governor©s 
recent speech at a state meeting of the American Legion in 
which he used as his principal theme federal encroachment 
on states© rights. Almost 10 minutes of the 25-minute talk 
was devoted to the conflict over Senate Bill 89. The letter at 
tached an article from a Huron, South Dakota newspaper 
describing the provision and the issue.
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7-7-65 Letter from Goodwin to South Dakota Governor 
Gubbrud advised that an informal hearing would be schedul 
ed during the week of July 29. The letter enclosed a copy of 
the Bureau recommendation to the Secretary, "for your in 
formation."
7-12-63 Letter from Governor Gubbrud to Secretary Wirtz 
transmitted a brief on the state©s position and requested ad 
vice on the date of the hearing.
7-26-63 Letter to Secretary of Labor Wirtz from Cliff W. 
Shrader, President, South Dakota State Federation of 
Labor, submitted a brief urging a finding of nonconformity.
7-29-63 Letter to Secretary from U.S. Senator George 
McGovern of South Dakota indicated receipt of State 
Federation of Labor brief, urged that it be given full con 
sideration, and requested to be informed of the determina 
tion.
8-1-63 "Informal" hearing in Washington between DOL©s 
Administrative Assistant Secretary, Leo R. Werts, as the 
Secretary©s representative and South Dakota agency of 
ficials.
8-7-63 Goodwin letter to President Shrader, South Dakota 
State Federation of Labor, acknowledged receipt of brief.
8-9-63 Letter from Secretary to Senator McGovern indicated 
that all expressions of opinion would be taken into con 
sideration, including the State Federation of Labor©s brief.
8-13-63 Letter from Goodwin to Ben H. Radcliffe, Presi 
dent, South Dakota Farmers Union, responded to 7-31-63 
inquiry and advised that Secretary would consider views 
from all interested parties.
9-3-63 Letter to Secretary Wirtz from Nelson H. 
Cruikshank, Director, Department of Social Security, AFL-
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CIO, transmitted the AFL-CIO©s detailed views on the issue, 
urging a finding of noncomformity.
9-11-63 Secretary©s letter to U.S. Senator Karl R. Mundt of 
South Dakota responded to the Senator©s letter of August 
29, 1963, which questioned the propriety of DOL©s con 
sideration of the state law©s conformity with federal law re 
quirements. The Secretary©s response described the savings 
clause which prompted the state agency to request a finding 
from the Secretary.
9-11-63 Letter, Jeremiah D. Murphy to Leo Werts, submit 
ted a brief on behalf of the Greater South Dakota Associa 
tion in support of the position taken by the state. Letter con 
tained the assumption that formal hearings on the conformi 
ty issue would be held if Werts found that the provision was 
inconsistent with federal law.
9-25-63 Maloney to Werts transmitted final summary of the 
state©s arguments.
10-8-63 Letter, Werts to Murphy, advised that the certifica 
tion of the state law for tax credit and administrative grants 
was not at issue since Senate Bill 89 provided that if the 
Secretary found that the provision did not meet federal law 
requirements, the provision would become inoperative and 
not part of the state law. Since state law certification was not 
at issue, there was no provision in federal law for a hearing, 
although the state had already been given a full opportunity 
to present its views. Accordingly, no further hearing would 
be held.
1-3-64 Letter from Secretary Wirtz to Governor Gubbrud 
advised that "After careful consideration, I have concluded 
that Senate Bill 89 is not consistent with the requirements of 
the Social Security Act and the Federal Unemployment Tax 
Act." The basis for the conclusion included legislative 
history showing that Congress intended unemployment, not
Administration of Federal Standards 159
need or lack of need, to be the test of a worker©s eligibility 
for benefits; that although details such as the length of 
waiting periods were to be left to the states, they must be 
consistent with "the fundamental concepts of unemploy 
ment insurance and in the context of the cooperative 
Federal-State system." It argued that the state provision 
constituted a needs test and that other states© provisions for 
weighted benefit schedules and dependents© allowances were 
distinguishable from the South Dakota bill.
1-6-64 A summary of the Secretary©s decision was mailed to 
all UIS Regional Directors.
1-17-64 Memorandum from Ralph Altman, Director, UIS 
Office of Program Policies and Legislation, to Norwood 
reported on telephone conversations with Wilkins on 
developments in South Dakota. Wilkins advised Altman that 
the State Attorney General was considering a memorandum 
opinion that Senate Bill 89 was not inoperative because the 
Secretary had not provided a hearing to South Dakota. 
Wilkins had advised Yaukey that the state law had already 
been certified for 1963 tax credits but that the next ad 
ministrative grant could be affected. The Secretary could 
either proceed to the grants question alone (which then re 
quired no hearing) or proceed to the FUTA question which 
did require a hearing.
1-20-64 Memorandum, Wilkins to Miller, Deputy Director 
of the Unemployment Insurance Service, summarized 
developments in the state following issuance of Secretary©s 
1-3-64 decision and identified parties interested in pursuing 
the issue and those ready to accept the Secretary©s decision.
1-17-64 Senator Mundt advised Secretary Wirtz of being in 
formed by Mr. Goodwin that the 8-1-63 meeting between 
Leo Werts and the South Dakota agency officials was not a 
hearing of record, but rather a preliminary hearing, and that 
no finding by the Secretary would be forthcoming before a
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hearing of record. He questioned why a finding of noncon 
formity had been issued without adherence to the statutory 
provision calling for a formal hearing and why a promise 
from Mr. Goodwin, that there would be a hearing of record 
before any final action was taken, had been violated.
1-22-64 Letter from Senator Mundt to the Secretary 
acknowledged receipt of Secretary©s January 17 notification 
to him of the nonconformity of the South Dakota provision 
with federal law. He reiterated his understanding, from talk 
ing with Mr. Goodwin, that the August 1 meeting was only 
informal.
1-28-64 Memorandum to the Secretary from Charles 
Donahue, Solicitor of Labor, concluded (1) that the South 
Dakota "savings clause" is not an unconstitutional delega 
tion of legislative power to the Secretary, and (2) that South 
Dakota could not complain of the lack of notice and hearing 
provided for in the FUTA since the state had declared a clear 
legislative intent to establish a streamlined procedure to take 
place prior to and outside the procedures prescribed in the 
federal statute.
1-28-64 Letter, Goodwin to the Secretary, advised that a bill 
(Senate Bill 179) pending in the state legislature would make 
inoperative the provisions of Senate Bill 89 until June 30, 
1964, and operative thereafter unless the Governor certifies 
otherwise:
WHEREAS, in order to demonstrate the good 
faith of the people of the Sovereign State of South 
Dakota, it is hereby declared the policy of the 
legislature of the State of South Dakota to make 
the provisions of Chapter 125 of the Session Laws 
of 1963 inoperative for a limited period of time in 
order to give the Secretary of Labor an opportunity 
to follow the applicable federal statutes relating to 
the conformity of State acts, thereby preserving
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comity between the Sovereign State of South 
Dakota and the United States Government.
1-30-64 Wilkins called and reported to Norwood that the 
South Dakota Attorney General had ruled against the 
Secretary©s decision because a hearing was not held.
2-3-64 Memorandum from Wilkins to Miller forwarded 
copies of Senate Bills 179 and 180 (a seasonally provision) as 
well as other bills and a news item which described State At 
torney General©s opinion that Secretary©s "finding" was not 
valid since no notice was given and no hearing held. The 
legislature was authorized to last 30 legislative days begin 
ning 1-7-64. More than 20 days had elapsed.
2-4-64 Altman reported to Norwood that the Regional office 
indicated that Senate Bills 179 and 180 had passed the State 
Senate, were reported favorably by the House Committee, 
and were expected to pass February 6. Senate Bill 180 was 
the seasonally provision, which provided that benefits 
would be paid a claimant in a calendar quarter only to the ex 
tent they could be based on the claimant©s employment in the 
corresponding quarter of the base period. There would be no 
benefits paid to a claimant in the first quarter of 1964, for 
example, if the claimant had not worked in the first quarter 
of 1963. The bill would allegedly adversely affect over 40 
percent of the claimants. The legislature was expected to ad 
journ in a few days.
2-13-64 Governor approved Senate Bill 179 providing that 
previously enacted Senate Bill 89, at issue, would become in 
operative through June 30, 1964, but would become 
operative on and after July 1, 1964,
. . . unless the Governor of the State of South 
Dakota on or before December 31, 1964, declares 
the same to be inoperative by certifying such 
declaration to the Secretary of State and the Com 
missioner and Counsel of Employment Security.
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[Available record not clear as to the action at this time on 
Senate Bill 180. It appears, on the basis of subsequent 
events, that the bill was indeed enacted but never became ef 
fective because of labor©s successful referendum drive and 
the bill©s subsequent defeat at the polls, as noted in entry for 
11-4-64.]
3-10-64 Governor requested Secretary, at his early conve 
nience, to afford the state reasonable notice and opportunity 
to be heard, as provided in federal law.
3-30-64 Memorandum to the Secretary from Charles 
Donahue and Robert C. Goodwin advised that although 
conformity proceedings could begin before July 1, 1964 no 
finding could be made unless and until Senate Bill 89 should 
become operative. Until then the Secretary could not legally 
find that the state has amended its law so that it no longer 
contains the provisions required by the FUTA.
3-30-64 Separate letter from Goodwin to Secretary pointed 
out that Goodwin accepted the judgment of the Solicitor©s 
Office that a finding could not be made prior to July 1. He 
indicated, however, that he was hopeful of at least a hearing 
before then since the Governor clearly is seeking early ac 
tion; delay could cause the hearing and decision to occur 
during state and national political party conventions and the 
finding could become a campaign issue; it will be difficult to 
hold a hearing after July 1 and issue a decision prior to Oc 
tober 1, which would be necessary in order for it to become 
effective December 31, as required by the FUTA.
4-7-64 Memorandum from Wilkins to Miller attached copy 
of letter dated 4-6-64 from Yaukey to Wilkins which advised 
that the state law permits new laws passed by the state 
legislature to be considered by the voters at the election, pro 
vided appropriate petitions are filed by May 15. Letter in 
cluded article from the Aberdeen American News which 
quoted Cliff Shrader, President of the South Dakota Federa-
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tion of Labor, as saying that petitions to get Senate Bill 180 
(seasonality provision) referred in the general election in 
November would be circulated throughout South Dakota.
4-29-64 Letter from the Secretary to the Governor pointed 
out that under federal law it would be premature to proceed 
with the conformity matter prior to July 1. However, as a 
preliminary step to a hearing, and as required by the FUTA, 
he notified the Governor that he had reason to believe that 
the state may not be certifiable for taxable year 1964.
5-12-64 Memo from Wilkins to Miller advised that the South 
Dakota State Federation of Labor, AFL-CIO, succeeded in 
getting 19,701 names on petitions although only 12,500 
minimum were needed. Accordingly, Senate Bill 180 will not 
go into effect after June 30, irrespective of any action taken 
by the Governor on Senate Bill 179. The fate of Senate Bill 
180 would be decided by the voters in November.
5-22-64 Internal UIS staff memo indicated it would require a 
minimum of 650 man-hours to research the following items 
in DOL files: conformity, dependents© allowances, seasonal 
employment, waiting period, legislation, rules and regula 
tions.
6-9-64 Secretary letters to Governor and Maloney enclosed a 
notice of hearing for 10:00 a.m. on July 7, 1964 in the main 
labor building in Washington. Clifford P. Grant, a hearing 
examiner, was designated to preside over the hearing.
6-11-64 Letters from Goodwin to Congressmen Reifel and 
Berry of South Dakota and Senators Mundt and McGovern 
advised them of the notice of hearing.
6-12-64 Letter from Norwood to Maloney requested infor 
mation on the number of covered workers who earned 
$6,000 or more over a recent 12-month period broken down 
by major industry groupings.
6-13-64 Notice of hearing published in the Federal Register.
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7-6-64 Memorandum from Norwood to Goodwin advised 
that Georgia, Texas and Virginia had indicated their inten 
tion to send representatives to appear at the hearing, that 
Jeremiah Murphy will appear on behalf of the Greater South 
Dakota Employers© Association and that there will be a 
spokesman for the AFL-CIO as well as the South Dakota 
Federation of Labor.
7-7-64 Memorandum, Miller to all Regional Directors, 
enclosed a summary of the arguments presented at the hear 
ing.
The Department argued:
(1) The provision would deny benefits on a basis other 
than claimants© unemployment.
(2) The basis for the denial is an income test, similar to 
those used in programs for the needy.
(3) Dependents© allowances do not involve a means test 
since they do not condition payment on base-period 
earnings, nor is dependency the basis for qualifying.
(4) The average claimant who earned over $6,000 would 
not have received any benefits for his first spell of 
unemployment since the disqualification period (7-13 
weeks) is longer than the average spell of unemploy 
ment.
(5) As the claimant©s earnings increased from $6,000 to 
$9,000 or more the disqualification would increase from 
7 to 13 weeks and wipe out many compensated weeks in 
later spells of unemployment.
(6) A South Dakota agency study made in June 1964 at 
DOL©s request shows that 81,560 workers would have 
met the qualifying wage requirements of the state law. 
The new amendment could have adversely affected the 
benefit rights of 16,800 or 21 percent of these workers 
since their earnings were $6,000 or more.
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South Dakota argued:
(1) Since the Secretary had already issued an adverse 
finding, they did not really expect the Hearing Examiner 
to reverse the Secretary©s findings.
(2) The state has a right to impose a delay period upon 
claimants following their separation from employment. 
States have wide latitude to adopt programs to their 
own circumstances.
(3) There is no specific federal requirement that benefits 
should be paid as a matter of right and not on a needs 
basis.
(4) Compliance with federal statutes need be only of a 
general nature, and minor specific points should be 
resolved in favor of the states.
(5) Many state laws treat groups of claimants differently 
without raising conformity issues.
(6) There is no authority for holding the South Dakota 
provision inconsistent on the basis of a requirement not 
expressly contained in federal laws but which is merely 
derived by "necessary implication" from such 
language. An administrator cannot enlarge by inter 
pretation the regulatory power spelled out in the statute.
(7) The provision in question is not a prohibited means 
test because:
(a) It does not require an examination of a claim 
ant©s present income or other resources.
(b) It applies not more of a means test than does 
the program itself, which is based on the presumed 
need of the unemployed as a class.
(c) It is no different in principle than dependents© 
allowances, or weighted benefit schedules, which 
vary benefit amounts according to earnings or 
presumed needs of recipients.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the parties of record agreed 
to file initial briefs within 14 days and reply briefs within 7
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days thereafter. Other interested parties had a 21-day period 
prescribed for filing briefs in the Notice of Hearing.
7-20-64 Brief of the State of South Dakota argued that 
federal law requires only that money be withdrawn solely in 
the payment of unemployment compensation, and that the 
South Dakota amendment meets this requirement. The 
money is paid only for unemployment benefits and not for 
anything else. However, "because the South Dakota amend 
ment does not square with the concepts of social thinkers in 
the Bureau, this ©paraphrased law,© with the aid of a strained 
interpretation of ©compensation,© sprinkled with a goodly 
amount of poetic license and academic reasoning, threatens 
to become a ©compliance club© held over the head of a 
Sovereign State."
A second point was that, like other states© provisions, the 
South Dakota amendment recognized "that for certain 
groups, presumed needs on the average were different from 
those of other groups and there could be a certain tailoring 
of the unemployment insurance theory and procedures to 
meet those varying presumed needs."
A third point was that the state provision did not deal with 
individual need, and that is all that the federal law prohibits.
7-27-64 Georgia brief©s main thrust was that DOL had no 
statutory or judicial authority to interpret federal law 
beyond the specific terms of the Acts and that a "necessary 
implication" can arise only when there can be no other 
reasonable interpretation. The administrative interpretation 
relating to the South Dakota provision had no basis in the 
Act.
8-4-64 The Department of Labor©s Reply Brief transmitted 
to Maloney by Solicitor©s Office Counsel for Unemployment 
Compensation, Louise Freeman, argued that although South 
Dakota and the other states acknowledged that a means test
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is prohibited by federal law as inconsistent with basic 
unemployment insurance principles, they nevertheless argue 
that as long as money withdrawn from the fund is paid for 
the relief of unemployment, there can be no conflict with 
federal law. According to the Department, if the withdrawal 
standard was interpreted as permitting use of fund moneys 
for any program in relief of the unemployed, as urged by the 
states, it could not then be said that the federal law pro 
hibited either a means or an income test even though the 
states had agreed that it did contain such a prohibition.
8-13-64 Stanley Rector, writing in the Advisor (a periodical 
published by an organization, headed by Rector, that pro 
vided UI advice to business) disagreed with DOL and argued 
that the South Dakota decision (and an earlier decision con 
cerning a New Hampshire provision) would provide the 
necessary momentum for a Judicial Review Bill. "There is 
now no semblance of due process in the procedure in which 
the Department of Labor is judge, jury, and executioner."
8-24-64 Recommended decision of Hearing Examiner Clif 
ford P. Grant held that under the South Dakota provision, 
eligibility for benefits would be premised upon not exceeding 
a specified amount of income from earnings in the base 
period, "a condition of entitlement unrelated to the fact or 
cause of unemployment and therefore inconsistent with the 
stated requirements of the Federal law. It is difficult to 
understand, by any stretch of the imagination, how this con 
tributes to the goals of economic stability and the relief of 
the unemployed."
If the language of the Federal law is not in itself 
sufficiently plain to preclude the application to the 
income-from-earnings test as a condition of entitle 
ment unrelated to the fact or cause of unemploy 
ment, one need look only to the intent of Congress 
and its mandate for ©genuine unemployment com-
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pensation laws© for the principle that unemploy 
ment compensation is to be paid as a matter of 
right without any test of means or other condition 
of entitlement not reasonably related to the in 
surance program or to the insured risk, involuntary 
unemployment.
9-1-64 South Dakota©s exception to the recommended deci 
sion of the Hearing Examiner argued that the law con 
templated that the states were to be given wide latitude as 
long as they did not examine the poverty or need of the in 
dividual claimant or violate the few other limitations in the 
federal law; that other state provisions deviated from the 
principle that benefits must be based solely on unemploy 
ment in that they grouped claimants (Great Lakes seamen in 
Ohio, interstate claimants in Alaska, women, students and 
claimants with dependents) for reasons wholly unrelated to 
their unemployment and treat them differently. In each case, 
the specified category is singled out for special treatment: 
Great Lakes seamen were subject to a special seasonality 
provision in Ohio; interstate claimants received lower 
benefits than intrastate claimants under Alaska law; 
claimants with dependents receive special allowances in some 
states; women are the subject of special pregnancy and leav 
ing work disqualifications; and students are subject to 
special restrictions.
9-4-64 Record of proceedings certified to Secretary of Labor 
by Clifford Grant.
9-25-64 Secretary©s letter to Governor of South Dakota 
enclosed copy of Secretary©s decision in which the Secretary 
concurred in and adopted the findings and conclusions con 
tained in the recommended decision of the Hearing Ex 
aminer. This decision
. . . finds that the South Dakota Employment 
Security Law, as amended by Chapter 125 of the
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Session Laws of 1963, no longer contains the provi 
sions specified in Section 3304(a)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1954 and Section 303(a)(5) of the 
Social Security Act.
10-2-64 Unemployment Insurance Program Letter 787 
distributed decision to all state Employment Security agen 
cies.
11-4-64 Wilkins advised Miller that agency officials planned 
to meet with Governor during the week of November 16. 
Also, with one-half the returns counted, the referendum on 
Senate Bill 180 was defeated and the seasonality provision 
would not go into effect. South Dakota AFL-CIO had 
distributed 20,000 copies of "Questions and Answers on 
Senate Bill No. 180" throughout the state in the ten days to 
two weeks preceding the election and had put newspaper ads 
in the six leading state papers in the October 24, 27 and 31 
issues.
11-16-64 Wilkins advised Miller that the Governor had 
declared Senate Bill 179 inoperative as of November 16, 
1964.
12-11-64 Letter from Secretary acknowledged receipt of cer 
tified copy of Governor©s action and advised that it con 
stituted the necessary remedial action so that the finding of 
nonconformity would not be a basis for noncertification of 
tax credit or denial of administrative grants.
NOTES
1. This, of course, is true only of the regular unemployment insurance 
system. It does not apply to the two federal unemployment compensa 
tion programs for ex-servicepersons (UCX) and federal employees 
(UCFE). In those cases federal legislation is implemented not through 
state legislation, but through agreement with the states to act as agents 
for the federal government.
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2. Where the weekly benefit amount is computed as a fraction of high 
quarter earnings and base-period wages must equal a multiple of the 
weekly benefit amount, an increase in the maximum benefit amount 
could result in some individuals with substantial high quarter earnings 
failing to meet the base-period requirements unless the state has a 
"stepdown" provision. For discussion of other benefit formula inter 
relationships, see U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment 
Security, Unemployment Insurance Legislative Policy, Recommenda 
tions for State Legislation 1962, BES No. U-212A, October 1962, pp. 
44-50, particularly.
3. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
4. Ibid.
5. See, for example, discussion of the "Knowland Amendment" in 
William Haber and Merrill G. Murray, Unemployment Insurance in the 
American Economy (Homewood, IL: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1966), p. 
450.
6. See discussion of New Hampshire case (1980) under Coverage Issues 
in chapter 5.
7. This chronology was compiled from an examination of cor 
respondence in the Department of Labor©s South Dakota conformity 
files, Washington, DC.
Chapter 5
Major Federal-State Conformity 
and Court Cases
This nation©s system of unemployment insurance would 
simply not survive without continuing cooperation between 
the federal and state partners. Mutual respect, understand 
ing, and appreciation for each other©s responsibilities are key 
factors in keeping the system going. But the day-to-day 
demonstrations of these qualities are buried and taken for 
granted. Rather, it is the occasional conflict that produces 
the drama, attention, and sometimes significant change in 
the program©s direction.
The foregoing chapters identified two categories of con 
flicts. First are those that are almost constantly erupting and 
are not subject to permanent or complete resolution. They 
are the inevitable result of the division of responsibilities be 
tween two levels of government. They would not exist under 
either a wholly federal or a wholly state program, but they 
are more than offset by the advantages of the hybrid system. 
The other category includes conflicts over the meaning of 
federal law actually over the meaning of unemployment in 
surance. These conflicts are usually resolved through 
negotiation and the informal means described in chapter 4.
The issues not so settled are decided in either of two ways. 
Increasingly, issues are resolved by federal imposition of 
program standards. As chapter 3 pointed out, this approach
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is often incompatible with a program grounded on in 
tergovernmental cooperation. Federal program standards 
have not only produced resentment and disruption, but in 
most cases their adoption has been either unnecessary or 
undesirable.
The other way issues have been resolved is through confor 
mity hearings and litigation. This is not to say that conformi 
ty hearings are alternative means of settling the same issues. 
Federal standards create new law while conformity pro 
ceedings merely test interpretations of existing law. Still, 
both are means of settling issues and coping with problems.
Standards adopted in recent years have provoked resent 
ment, undermined confidence in federal judgment, 
generated administrative problems and, most important, 
weakened the balance of power, the key to the program©s 
success. In contrast, conformity hearings have proved to be a 
successful means of renewing the program. They too are ac 
companied by the heat of conflict. Disputes have been 
serious, highly controversial and often volatile struggles over 
basic principles. But by providing an arena for full expres 
sion of opposing views, the conformity process reveals 
weaknesses to be corrected. It provokes continual reex- 
amination of original principles, and it satisfies the need of 
the states for their "day in court" and a fair hearing and 
determination of their grievance.
Every past major federal-state conflict over the meaning 
of federal law which went to formal hearing is described in 
this chapter. Aside from the 1963-1964 South Dakota case 
first discussed and described in chapter 4 to illustrate the 
process, these conflicts are grouped for convenience into 
four subject categories by the nature of the issues involved: 
administrative; coverage; experience rating and benefit 
charging; and labor standards. The final section in this 
chapter deals with fair hearing and promptness issues which
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were not raised in conformity actions by the federal govern 
ment. They were instead brought by claimants against states 
and pursued through the courts. Their actions have pro 
foundly affected the federal-state system.
South Dakota (1963-64) Issues
The South Dakota case was the most important of all con 
formity cases so far and one of the few that involved more 
than a single issue. There were four. The most prominent 
was whether the state©s variable waiting period keyed to the 
level of base-period wage earnings constituted a prohibited 
income test. The problem with the state provision was that, 
among otherwise equally eligible claimants, payment or 
denial would be conditioned on a factor (variation in base- 
period earnings) bearing absolutely no relationship to 
unemployment. This violated one of the most significant in 
terpretations of two federal provisions: that money 
withdrawn from the fund may be used only for unemploy 
ment compensation, and that "compensation" means 
benefits payable to individuals with respect to their 
unemployment. The decision was that the federal law provi 
sions preclude not only a clear-cut needs test as a condition 
for benefits, but also an income test of the type enacted by 
South Dakota.
The second issue concerned the extent of federal authority 
to interpret federal laws. The state had argued that only re 
quirements expressly contained in the statutes were binding 
and DOL had no statutory or judicial authority to interpret 
beyond the specific terms of the Acts. DOL could only draw 
necessary implications, and these arise only when there can 
be no other reasonable interpretation. A decision in favor of 
the state on this issue would have resulted in a substantial 
realignment of federal-state authority. Many conformity 
issues, particularly experience rating issues, are provoked by
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interpretations considerably more fragile than DOL©s con 
struction of the federal requirement that money withdrawn 
from the fund must be used only for unemployment compen 
sation. The issue was not really joined at the hearing except 
that once the state had acknowledged, as it did, that an in 
dividual needs test was inconsistent with federal law, DOL 
pointed out that since the law did not contain an explicit pro 
hibition, the state©s conclusion, with which it agreed, could 
be reached only by reasonable interpretation.
The third issue was also raised in two subsequent confor 
mity cases. The states involved contended that federal law 
did not contemplate application of the awesome sanctions 
(total loss of federal tax credit and administrative grants) for 
minor violations. It was wholly unreasonable, they argued, 
for a provision affecting a relatively small handful of 
claimants to incur a penalty threatening the continued ex 
istence of the state©s program. It was enough for a state to 
conform substantially with the federal requirements.
However, the language of the law is in absolute terms. It 
requires, as a condition for tax credit and administrative 
grants, that the state law "shall provide," with no allowance 
for deviation. Acceptance of the state argument would, in 
addition, invite endless debate over the meaning of 
"substantial" in individual cases, and it is for this reason 
that DOL has consistently rejected the de minimus argu 
ment. The South Dakota hearing was no exception.
The last issue concerned the fairness of the proceeding. 
The states had argued that they were disadvantaged by a pro 
cess under which only the Department of Labor challenges 
and judges the conformity of the state law, and because the 
hearing is held in Washington, before an administrative law 
judge appointed by the Secretary of Labor, with the issue 
finally determined by the same Secretary of Labor. The 
Department did not answer these allegations at the hearing,
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but it did not object to a provision, included in the 1970 
amendments (P.L. 91-373), establishing a state©s right to 
judicial review of an adverse Secretary©s decision.
Administrative Issues
The first two issues in this category concerned violation of 
an explicit federal provision (payment only through public 
employment offices or such other agencies as the Board may 
approve), and interpretation of the requirement that ad 
ministrative grants may be used only for purposes found by 
the Secretary to be necessary for proper and efficient ad 
ministration. The third concerned interpretation of the 
"methods of administration" requirement and the provision 
restricting the use of money withdrawn from the fund to 
unemployment compensation purposes. This case, suspend 
ed indefinitely, demonstrated that there are limits to inter 
pretation, even of the most ambiguous (methods of ad 
ministration) federal requirements.
South Dakota (1939)
In early 1939, the state legislature adjourned without ap 
propriating any funds to match (as was then required by the 
Wagner-Peyser Act) federal grants for the employment ser 
vices. The state proposed to pay UI benefits through the 
state welfare offices instead of employment offices. Provi 
sions of the FUTA and the Social Security Act require state 
laws to provide payment of benefits only through public 
employment offices or such other agencies as the Social 
Security Board (now Secretary of Labor) may approve. 1 The 
Board had not approved welfare offices for this purpose and 
therefore federal UI administrative grants were withheld. 
Subsequently, the state provided the necessary money and 
public employment offices were reopened in September 
when grants were resumed. By the time of year-end certifica-
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tion for the federal tax credit, the state program was in con 
formity.
Arizona (1941)
In January 1941, the Arizona Unemployment Compensa 
tion Commission abolished the position of Executive Direc 
tor, which was included in the state©s merit system, and 
discharged its incumbent. On June 2, 1941, the state 
Supreme Court held that the incumbent had been illegally 
released by the Commission and ordered him reinstated with 
back pay. He was reinstated June 5, 1941 and held his posi 
tion until June 15, 1941, when an amendment to the state UI 
law designating the Director of the state Employment Service 
as Executive Director of the entire agency became effective, 
thus legally removing the previous director.
The issue was whether administrative grants could be used 
to pay the salary of the former Executive Director during the 
period he rendered no service to the agency. 2 The Social 
Security Board concluded that the Commission had not 
acted in good faith and, therefore, the salary payments could 
not be considered necessary for proper and efficient ad 
ministration.
New Hampshire (1964)
The issue in this case concerned a state practice in which, 
on request by the attorney who represented a claimant in a 
successful court appeal on the claimant©s right to benefits, 
the agency sent the claimant©s benefit checks to the attorney. 
The agency considered this tantamount to delivery to the 
claimant. The question was whether the state law, as so inter 
preted by the agency, violated provisions of the FUTA and 
Social Security Act3 which require that all money withdrawn 
from the state©s unemployment fund may be used only for 
payment of unemployment compensation. Another question
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was whether the practice violated the Social Security Act re 
quirement4 that the state law provide methods of administra 
tion reasonably calculated to ensure full payment of benefits 
when due.
At a conformity hearing held by DOL in May 1964, six 
other states appeared or filed briefs indicating that they too 
mailed checks to persons other than the beneficiary under 
certain circumstances. In July 1964, the Secretary of Labor 
dismissed the proceedings and directed the Department©s 
Bureau of Employment Security to review various state prac 
tices and recommend an appropriate standard. No standard 
was ever issued because of the failure of the Bureau and the 
Office of the Solicitor to agree on its content, and the prac 
tice continues.
Coverage Issues
State law coverage of certain employing units was made a 
matter of conformity for the first time in 1970 by the 
employment security amendments enacted that year (P.L. 
91-373). All coverage prior to that time, and some coverage 
since, was effected by making specified services subject to 
the federal tax. States invariably extended coverage to the 
same services in order to permit the newly covered employers 
to enjoy the credit against the federal tax, to ensure that the 
bulk of the employers© unemployment insurance taxes would 
be paid to the state, and to extend the protection of the pro 
gram to those performing the newly covered services. A state 
that did not provide coverage at least as extensive as under 
the federal law would forfeit these advantages with respect to 
the specific employers and workers, but such failure would 
not present an issue of conformity with federal law. The 
1970 amendments, however, required, as a condition for tax 
credit for all a state©s employers, that state law cover certain 
nonprofit organizations and state hospitals and institutions
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of higher education. This approach was taken because these 
employers were not subject to the federal UI tax and 
therefore were not affected by loss of tax offset for failure to 
cover them. Required coverage was similarly extended by the 
1976 amendments to most services performed by employees 
for state and local governments. All the coverage issues to 
date arise under either the 1970 or 1976 amendments.
New York (1974)
The 1970 amendments added a provision in the FUTA5 to 
require state coverage of employment by nonprofit organiza 
tions and state hospitals and institutions of higher education. 
The FUTA was also amended to prohibit the Secretary of 
Labor from certifying any state he finds,
. . . after reasonable notice and opportunity for 
hearing . . . has failed to amend its law so that it 
contains each of the provisions required by reason 
of the enactment of the Employment Security 
Amendments of 1970 to be included therein, or 
has . . . failed to comply substantially with any 
such provision. 6
The State of New York, in amending its law to effect the 
necessary coverage, deliberately retained the following exclu 
sions from the definition of "employment":
(1) golf caddies;
(2) students in elementary or secondary schools who 
work part-time during the school year or regular 
vacation periods;
(3) minors engaged in casual labor consisting of yard 
work and household chores not involving the use of 
power driven machinery;
(4) all employment performed by persons under 14 years 
of age.
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However, there were no comparable exclusions in the federal 
law definition of "employment" contained in the FUTA. 7 
Nor were the services among those specified in the FUTA 
that a state was permitted to exclude from the otherwise re 
quired coverage. 8 The New York law was challenged and a 
hearing was held on August 7, 1974. The Administrative 
Law Judge issued a Recommended Decision on November 
11, 1974, and the Secretary of Labor issued his decision on 
June 6, 1975 holding the law out of conformity.
New York offered two arguments. First, it pointed out 
that the exclusions from the state©s definition of "employ 
ment" apply equally to profit, nonprofit, and state institu 
tions. It then argued that the 1970 provision added to the 
FUTA required only that coverage for service performed for 
nonprofit organizations, state hospitals and state institutions 
of higher education be co-extensive with the coverage the 
state requires for service performed for all other employers. 
This conclusion was based on the following "equal treat 
ment" requirement of the FUTA provision that state laws 
provide that:
. . . compensation is payable on the basis of service 
to which Section 3309(a)(l) applies [nonprofits and 
State hospitals and institutions of high education] 
in the same amount, on the same terms, and subject 
to the same conditions as compensation payable on 
the basis of other service subject to such law. . . . 9
Since profit making enterprises, the state©s institutions, and 
nonprofit organizations were all subject to the New York ex 
clusions, the state argued that such even-handedness 
satisfied the "equal treatment" requirement and, according 
ly, the coverage requirement. In other words, New York in 
terpreted the federal law as permitting certain services per 
formed for nonprofits and state institutions to be exempt
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from coverage, if the same services are also excluded when 
performed for profit making employers.
The argument was rejected on the grounds that the "equal 
treatment" requirement merely describes the manner in 
which benefits are to be administratively dispensed. Accord 
ing to the Secretary©s decision,
It does not follow that a provision which deals with 
terms and conditions of compensation can be cited 
as justification for eliminating categories of 
coverage. . . . 10
On the contrary,
The whole thrust of Congressional intent was the 
extension of coverage, and the limitation of excep 
tions to the new coverage. . . . The only exceptions 
to coverage which may properly be applied, and the 
only persons (or categories of persons) who may 
properly be excluded from coverage, are those 
which are set forth in the Federal statute. To allow 
otherwise is to fly in the face of the 1970 Amend 
ments. Congress can hardly be deemed to have 
engaged in a self-defeating exercise by, on the one 
hand, providing for the extension of coverage, and, 
on the other hand, allowing the States to carve out 
exceptions to the new coverage as the States see 
fit. 11
New York©s second argument concerned the nature of the 
exclusions in question. The state argued that since few or 
none of the excluded individuals work for nonprofit 
organizations or state hospitals or institutions of higher 
education, the whole affair was de minimus. Substantial 
compliance of its legislation with the 1970 Amendments was 
really all that is required. Minor deviations should be per 
missible. This argument also was rejected:
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Statutorily, there is no provision allowing mere 
©substantial compliance© of the State law with 
PUT A requirements placed upon the law, itself. 
Substantive compliance is relevant only to the 
operation of the State under its law. Nor is 
©substantial compliance© in the operation of its law 
some sort of substitute for conformity of the State 
law with the Federal statutory mandate. If the State 
law has not been amended to contain each of the 
provisions required by reason of the 1970 Amend 
ments, it cannot, by terms of 26 U.S.C. 3304(c), be 
certified by the Secretary. 12
The issue was important, particularly in light of the later 
substantive extensions of required coverage under the 1976 
Amendments. If New York had prevailed on the basis of its 
first argument, there would have been doubt as to the extent 
of DOL©s authority to require coverage of any category of 
state, local or nonprofit occupation, if the state excluded 
corresponding occupations in the private-for-profit sector. If 
the de minimus argument had prevailed, DOL would have 
faced the difficult task of establishing reliable criteria for 
determining when a violation was too minor to pursue.
Pennsylvania (1979)
A conformity hearing was held with Pennsylvania August 
21, 1979 on three separate issues. One is discussed below as 
an experience rating issue. The remaining two issues involved 
provisions of the 1976 Amendments extending coverage to 
school employees. Under these amendments, the federal law 
prohibits states from paying benefits, based on services per 
formed in an instructional, research or principal ad 
ministrative capacity for an educational institution during 
the period between school terms if the individual performed 
such services during the first term and had a reasonable 
assurance of performing similar services during the sue-
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ceeding term. 13 States had the option of applying the same 
between-terms denial provisions to nonprofessional primary 
and secondary school employees. Aside from this exception, 
federal law required states to provide governmental and non 
profit employees the same treatment as applied to other 
covered workers.
Pennsylvania had adopted the option of applying the 
between-terms denial provisions to nonprofessional 
employees, but it included a unique provision. An in 
dividual, denied benefits during the summer school break 
because of a reasonable assurance of reemployment the 
following term, could collect benefits for the summer period 
retroactively,
... if upon presenting himself for work at the end 
of such period between academic years or terms, 
the individual is not permitted to resume work of 
the same capacity, or resumes it for less than twen 
ty working days. . . , 14
Pennsylvania argued that its law could be denied certifica 
tion only if it plainly conflicts with the FUTA. Also, it ques 
tioned DOL©s authority to impose on a state its interpreta 
tion of the FUTA as a matter of conformity. The Secretary 
of Labor rejected both contentions and ruled on October 31, 
1979 in support of the Administrative Law Judge©s conclu 
sion that the retroactive provision conflicted with the FUTA. 
The basis for that conclusion was that federal law prohibited 
payment between terms to an individual who had bona fide 
reasonable assurance of returning to work, regardless of 
whether the job actually materialized. The provision also 
violated the "equal treatment" requirement since no other 
category of workers was offered the opportunity for retroac 
tive benefits. Finally, the Department pointed out that in 
enacting the 1976 Amendments providing for the coverage of 
primary and secondary school employees and the benefit
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restrictions, Congress rejected an amendment providing a 
retroactive benefit provision similar to Pennsylvania©s.
The second issue also involved the between-terms denial 
provisions, which apply to persons performing specified ser 
vices "for an educational institution" or persons performing 
such services, "in an educational institution while in the 
employ of an educational service agency." Educational ser 
vice agencies are defined as "a governmental agency or 
governmental entity which is established and operated ex 
clusively for the purpose of providing such services to one or 
more educational institutions. . . , 15 Pennsylvania inter 
preted its law to apply the between-terms denial to school 
crossing guards and others who are not employed directly by 
either an educational institution or an educational service 
agency, but who perform services for schools and whose 
employment is tied to the academic calendar. The Depart 
ment argued that the phrase "for an educational institution" 
was intended to mean only individuals actually employed by 
a school, or an educational service agency, not school cross 
ing guards if employed by the police department or other 
agency. It pointed out that the Congress evidently shared 
that view because, prior to the specific amendment, 16 not 
even employees of educational service agencies were con 
sidered within the scope of the between-terms denial. If the 
phrase "for an educational institution" had been intended to 
apply to individuals other than actual school employees, the 
later amendment would not have been necessary. The 
between-terms denial was intended to be a limited exception 
to the equal treatment requirement. The Department argued 
that in extending the denial to nonemployees of schools (or 
educational service agencies), Pennsylvania violated the 
equal treatment requirement.
Pennsylvania argued that the between-terms denial provi 
sion as it applies to nonemployees of schools should be 
disregarded, since under another section of the Pennsylvania
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law municipal employees such as school crossing guards are 
denied benefits anyway, as not available for suitable work. 
The Administrative Law Judge rejected this argument and 
held that what the state©s availability requirement provides 
was irrelevant and that the Pennsylvania between-terms pro 
vision, as interpreted by the agency, was inconsistent with 
federal law. The Secretary adopted this position.
New Hampshire (1980)
In 1978, the New Hampshire legislature passed legislation 
intended to meet the coverage and the requirements of P.L. 
94-566, the 1976 amendment. The bill was vetoed by Gover 
nor Meldrim Thomson. The Governor and the state agency 
argued that the federal law requirements represented an im 
proper intrusion upon the state©s sovereignty and were thus 
unconstitutional:
Is there not to be some time, some place, some one 
who will say that the sovereign rights reserved to 
this state by our Founding Fathers are an integral 
part of our constitutional fabric and cannot be rip 
ped asunder by a power-crazed Federal Govern 
ment. 17
On October 30, 1978, after a conformity hearing, the 
Secretary of Labor found that the New Hampshire law failed 
to conform to FUTA requirements for certification. The ac 
tual withdrawal of certification was held in abeyance pend 
ing outcome of the state©s appeal to the courts. Of the 
following six issues, the most important involves the state©s 
failure to extend coverage to the extent required by the 
FUTA as a condition for certification.
(1) The state law excluded service performed for political 
subdivisions from coverage as well as service performed 
for the state by individuals not on the state classified ser-
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vice and not employees of state hospitals and institutions 
of higher education.
(2) The state also excluded employees of nonprofit 
elementary and secondary schools.
(3) No provision was included permitting governmental 
entities to elect either the tax or reimbursement method of 
financing benefit costs.
(4) The state©s language concerning the denial of benefits 
to uncertified aliens differed considerably from the FUTA 
requirement.
(5) Similarly, the state©s language concerning denial of 
benefits during the off-season to professional athletes also 
differed from the corresponding FUTA requirement.
(6) The state©s between-terms denial provisions applied to 
nonprofessional employees of colleges and universities, in 
consistently with the FUTA.
At the conformity hearing held in September 1978, the 
New Hampshire agency contended that the federal statute is 
not phrased in absolute terms and that substantive com 
pliance with federal law is sufficient to avoid withholding of 
certification. The agency argued also that because of New 
Hampshire©s unique base period and benefit year, 18 no 
benefits based on 1978 wages would be payable before April 
1, 1979, so the hearing was premature. The Secretary re 
jected both contentions on the grounds that the FUTA pro 
hibits certification under either of two conditions: either the 
state law fails to contain certain required provisions, or the 
state has failed to comply substantially with any such provi 
sion during the 12-month period. 19 The first condition re 
quires strict conformity between the state law and the 
FUTA. Substantive compliance assumes the existence of 
conforming state law provisions and is aimed at their ad 
ministration. All the issues involved the conformity of the
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state law, not the manner of its administration. Accordingly, 
the concept of substantial compliance was not at issue, and 
the fact that no New Hampshire claimant may yet have been 
deprived of benefits was immaterial. The state also raised 
constitutional issues concerning the FUTA requirement for 
state coverage of services performed for the state and its 
political subdivisions. Neither the Administrative Law Judge 
nor the Secretary ruled on the constitutionality of the federal 
statute.
The Secretary©s 1978 decision was appealed by New 
Hampshire to the United States Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit, which stayed the Secretary©s decision pending 
outcome of the appeal.
While the 1978 case was pending before the Court of Ap 
peals, newly elected Governor Hugh Gallen who took office 
in January 1979 requested later that year that the Court 
postpone issuing a decision pending a possible settlement of 
the case. The Court agreed. Efforts were made to develop a 
compromise under which the state would by statute, regula 
tions, and Attorney General opinion, effect conformity with 
the federal requirements, both prospectively and retrospec 
tively. However, the Commissioner of the State Department 
of Employment Security (DES), which had autonomous 
status independent of the Governor, and his counsel refused 
either to sign a consent decree to which the Departments of 
Labor and Justice and the State Attorney General had 
agreed or to take the administrative actions DOL believed 
necessary to correct the damage done by the failure of the 
state to conform. On February 20, 1980, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit decided in favor of DOL on all 
issues/20
The state filed a further appeal in May 1980 to the U.S. 
Supreme Court. The Court, treating the appeal as a petition 
for certiorari, denied further review on October 6, 1980. On
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October 28, 1980, Secretary Marshall advised Governor 
Gallen that,
I believe at this point that there is no alternative 
under the law other than to withhold the certifica 
tions which would result in the loss by New Hamp 
shire employers of the credits taken tentatively by 
them for taxable year 1978 under Section 3302 of 
the Code, and to recoup the administrative grants 
provided for that year. If you have any information 
that may be pertinent to the decision I feel I must 
make, please let me know as soon as possible.
A response dated the following day from Governor Gallen 
requested that the Secretary meet with the Governor and the 
State Attorney General before actually decertifying the state 
and sending notification of that action to the Treasury 
Department. The Governor pointed out that although his ad 
ministration, the Attorney General, the state legislature and 
the business community believed the state should have con 
formed to the federal law, this was prevented by Governor 
Thomson©s 1978 veto and the DBS Commissioner©s steadfast 
refusal to settle the lawsuit. The Governor explained that 
since the U.S. Supreme Court decision, he had issued an 
Executive Order transferring all of the agency©s attorneys to 
the Office of the Attorney General and that he believed that 
he now had adequate authority to bring the state into confor 
mity.
On December 18, 1980, Governor Gallen wrote to the 
Secretary advising him of his understanding, from the 
Justice Department©s Tax Division and from a Congres 
sional Research Service legal memorandum, that the 
Secretary has authority under the law to certify New Hamp 
shire retroactively for 1978 and to decline to impose any 
sanctions. The Governor argued that the disastrous conse 
quences to the New Hampshire community of imposing the
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sanctions far outweighed the effect they would have of deter 
ring other states from availing themselves of judicial review.
The sanctions themselves are not graded in any way 
to take into account the intent or the actions of the 
State that suffers them. Beyond that, as you know, 
they are imposed on members of the private 
business community who are not parties to con 
troversies such as this, whose decisions could not 
have affected the outcome, and who are innocent 
of any wrongdoing. In this case we have lost at 
every stage of the administrative and judicial pro 
ceedings, we have taken steps to conform our law 
in every material respect for 1978, and have stood 
willing for weeks now to do anything else which 
may be required to meet both in law and in fact 
your standard of conformity. I do not see how our 
experience could conceivably encourage any other 
jurisdiction to take the same course. Under these 
circumstances your interest in deterrence has been 
more than adequately served.
On January 19, 1981, Secretary Marshall advised Governor 
Gallen of his decision to certify the State of New Hampshire 
for the 12-month period ending October 31, 1978, condition 
ed upon the state©s compliance with an agreement signed the 
same day by both parties. First, the state (whose law was cer 
tified for 1980 after including necessary rules, regulations 
and Attorney General©s opinions) was to apply the conform 
ing provisions retroactively to January 1, 1978, to ac 
complish substantial compliance with respect to the six issues 
in question. The state was required also to make certain 
reports concerning its compliance action. In addition, the 
state was to repay in six installments to the Department of 
Labor $3.3 million representing the grant to the state for ad 
ministration of its unemployment insurance program in 
1978. If, however, the Secretary determined that the state
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had taken all required action on or before October 31, 1981, 
he would reduce the amount due to $500,000 payable on or 
before December 31, 1981. It is not clear how this figure was 
determined. It may represent one of the six installments. 
When the amount due DOL had been paid, the state©s cer 
tification would become final. If the state legislature failed 
to appropriate the money for the payment due, the certifica 
tion for 1979 would be withheld.
There were also conformity issues raised formally with 
respect to the state©s 1979 law. New Hampshire amended its 
unemployment compensation law in June 1979 to meet the 
federal requirements of the 1976 amendments. It did so 
reluctantly: "Wherefor, the legislature having no alternative 
but to accede to this federal intrusion of its State sovereign 
ty, acting under duress and for no other reason enacts this 
Chapter." 21 However, DOL advised the state that the 
amendments did not resolve all the issues and initiated a new 
conformity proceeding to determine certification of the state 
for the 12 months ending October 31, 1979. A hearing was 
held on September 6 and 7, 1979. On October 15, 1979, the 
Administrative Law Judge issued a recommended decision 
finding the state law not in conformity or substantial com 
pliance with respect to seven issues. These were not 
significantly different from the 1978 issues. This decision 
was adopted by Secretary Marshall October 31, 1979.
This 1979 decision, which the state had appealed to the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit but which was 
held in abeyance pending possible settlement by the parties, 
was settled in early January 1981, by a consent judgment, 
subject to approval by the Court. That settlement included 
retroactive application of the conforming provisions to 
January 1, 1978, as described above. The state was directed 
to redetermine the claims of all individuals denied benefits 
under nonconforming law, including not only claimants 
determined ineligible under prior law but also all individuals
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who would have been eligible except for such law. The Court 
entered the consent judgment January 26, 1981. On April 6, 
1981, Secretary of Labor Donovan certified the State of New 
Hampshire for the 12-month period ending October 31, 
1979.
The importance of the New Hampshire case lies more in its 
implications for the conformity and judicial review processes 
than in the nature of the specific issues. These conformity 
and judicial review issues are discussed below in connection 
with the County of Los Angeles case. The questions the New 
Hampshire case raise include whether a stay of a Secretary©s 
decision pending judicial review is equitable to those affected 
adversely by the state provision in question; whether fear of 
the consequences of a negative decision by the Courts (and 
consequent imposition of sanctions) will deter states from 
seeking judicial review; whether the sanction imposed on 
New Hampsire ($500,000 instead of the possible $35445 
million loss the state would have incurred if the tax credit 
and administrative grants for 1978 had been denied) will en 
courage more states to try the conformity route rather than 
attempt settlement through negotiation; whether the 
availability of a "lesser sanction" will incline DOL to move 
toward hearings more quickly and on more issues than 
before instead of pressing for settlement through negotia 
tion. It does not seem appropriate to speculate here on these 
issues, but it is pertinent to point out that the New Hamp 
shire case could change significantly the way conformity 
issues are handled and, consequently, the climate of future 
federal-state relations.
Constitutionality Challenge: The County 
of Los Angeles Case (1980)
After the 1976 federal employment security amendments 
were enacted, but before state implementation was required, 
the Executive Committee of the National Institute of
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Municipal Law Officers (NIMLO) sent a memorandum 
(March 22, 1977) to its member attorneys, in which it pro 
posed a lawsuit attacking the constitutionality of the new 
coverage requirements that applied to employment by state 
and local governments. The Executive Committee of 
NIMLO described the impact of the resulting unemployment 
insurance costs that the new required coverage would have 
on state and local governments, contending that the ensuing 
financial drain would necessitate the reduction of public ser 
vices, additional taxes and, most ironically, the separation of 
workers. The Executive Committee explained that the pro 
posed action would not be brought in NIMLO©s name but 
rather would be a multiparty suit, naming as plaintiffs 
"those state and local governments which decide to par 
ticipate in and finance the costs of this litigation." The suit 
would seek relief only for plaintiffs named in the complaint 
and "only those state and local governments willing to help 
bear the costs of this litigation will be named as Plaintiffs."
Hope for success was based largely on the June 24, 1976 
decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in National League of 
Cities, et al. v. Usery, Secretary of Labor. 22 This case involv 
ed a 1974 amendment extending application of the Fair 
Labor Standards Act©s minimum wage and maximum hour 
provisions to almost all employees of states and their 
political subdivisions. According to Justice Rehnquist, 
writing for a 5-4 majority, both the minimum wage and the 
maximum hour provisions "will impermissibly interfere with 
the integral governmental functions of these bodies." The 
basis for this opinion was the anticipated massive impact of 
the requirements on the states, in terms of increased costs 
and reduced control over the conditions of employment of 
their workers. Estimates by a number of states and cities 
convinced the Court that "Judged solely in terms of increas 
ed costs in dollars, these allegations show a significant im 
pact on the functioning of the governmental bodies
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involved." The same legal firm that successfully represented 
local governments in National League of Cities was hired for 
the County of Los Angeles suit.
Optimism also rested on a legal opinion obtained from a 
Wisconsin law firm, as requested by the National Associa 
tion of Counties. The opinion concluded that the state and 
local government UI coverage requirement constituted an 
"unconstitutional condition imposed upon the several States 
by Congress." The states have no realistic choice in enacting 
required legislation; no federal funds are provided so state 
and local taxes must be raised; the interest of the states with 
respect to the necessary funding needed to comply, together 
with the resulting disruption of traditional state and local 
employment practices, transcends the national interest 
presented. According to the opinion, any court battle over 
constitutionality would be won or lost on the basis of suffi 
cient statistics showing (1) the impact of the cost of coverage 
(allegedly $500 million annually) to the states and local units 
of government, and (2) the measures necessary to meet the 
costs, which would result in "a marked disruption" in the 
employment practices of local government.
The time appears to be appropriate to test to what 
degree Congress may wield its spending power to 
impinge upon the operation of State and local 
government. Based upon the balancing test applied 
by the Court in the National League of Cities case, 
we are inclined to believe that the scales would be 
tipped by the present Supreme Court in the direc 
tion of protecting the employment interests of State 
and local government. 23
In August 1977, members of the International Personnel 
Management Association received a letter from the law firm 
retained by NIMLO requesting data showing the impact of
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the coverage requirements. According to the law firm, the 
case could be won
. . . only upon a compelling presentation of the 
facts demonstrating the grossly burdensome and 
disruptive impact of the 1976 FUTA Amendments 
upon each Plaintiff Government. 24
During 1977 most states enacted legislation designed to con 
form with the 1976 Amendments. Almost half the states in 
cluded "self-destruct5 © provisions nullifying the extensions 
of coverage to states and local government workers if, in 
some states, the requirement was stayed by a U.S. Court or, 
in others, was declared constitutionally invalid in a final ad 
judication.
By the time the suit was heard (December 1977), the plain 
tiffs included the States of Alaska, South Carolina, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, and 
Utah, and 1,750 localities in 44 states. The plaintiffs, iden 
tified as the County of Los Angeles, et al., first moved for a 
preliminary injunction in 1977 before the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia. The purpose 
alleged by the plaintiffs was to delay implementation of the 
coverage requirements so as to prevent the need for some 
states and localities (with constitutional or statutory limits 
on new debts and taxes) to curtail government services or fire 
employees in order to raise money for unemployment in 
surance costs.
District Judge Charles R. Richey denied the motion for in 
junction in an opinion issued December 29, 1977. He advised 
first that the Anti-Injunction Act appeared to bar the suit:
No suit for the purpose of restraining the assess 
ment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in 
any court by any person, whether or not such per-
194 Conformity and Court Cases
son is the person against whom such tax was assess 
ed. 25
According to Judge Richey, since the refusal of a state to 
enact the conforming legislation would result in denial of a 
credit to private employers against their federal tax, the 
plaintiffs© suit to prevent this denial "is in essence a suit to 
restrain the assessment of a tax." Although having found it 
unlikely that the Court even has jurisdiction, Judge Richey 
went on to discuss the four factors a Court must consider in 
deciding whether to issue any injunction:
. . . has the plaintiff made a strong showing that it 
is likely to prevail on the merits; would the denial 
of the injunction cause irreparable injury to the 
plaintiff; would the granting of the injunction 
cause irreparable injury to the other parties; and 
where does the public interest lie. 26
With regard to the first factor, the Court found it unlikely 
that the plaintiffs would prevail on the merits. Noting that 
the plaintiffs placed chief reliance on the 1977 National 
League of Cities case decision, Judge Richey pointed out 
that the regulations there concerning wage and hour stan 
dards were mandatory. The only discretion left to the states 
in that instance was how to raise the additional revenue. 
Citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 27 the Court stated that 
the imposition of an unemployment insurance scheme is at 
the option of the state. By allowing the states a choice, it is 
actually supportive of the Tenth Amendment. Referring to 
the plaintiffs© contention that Steward was distinguishable 
because the Supreme Court there stated that the states did 
not complain of coercion, the Judge pointed out that the fact 
that a state chooses to voice objection rather than remain 
silent while a private employer voices objection, as in 
Steward, should not be determinative of the outcome. The 
same signs of coercion that were alleged in Steward exist
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here. At the time that case was decided, 35 of the 43 states 
that had enacted conforming legislation included the same 
kind of self-destruct clauses that several states had recently 
enacted. "This was not enough to prove coercion in Steward 
and it is not enough now."
Concerning the second factor cited by Richey, the Court 
found also that the plaintiffs could avoid any alleged ir 
reparable injury by not enacting the conforming legislation. 
Even if the sanctions were imposed, the state would not have 
to fire anyone or curtail any services. The states face no im 
minent injury. Judicial review of a Secretary©s decision is 
available.
As for the last two factors cited, the Court held that the is 
suance of an injunction would, however, deny benefits to 
public employees and would thereby "cause a substantial ir 
reparable injury to the defendants© interest and the public in 
terest."
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit was issued March 19, 1980, almost a 
year after the appeal had been argued before the Court. The 
Court ruled that it had awaited the February 20, 1980 deci 
sion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the 
New Hampshire case, since the same constitutional challenge 
had been made by that state©s Department of Employment 
Security: "in the interest of inter-circuit comity and the con 
comitant husbanding of scarce judicial resources. ..."
In addition to sustaining the Secretary©s decertifica 
tion of New Hampshire as not conforming in cer 
tain respects with FUTA, the First Circuit address 
ed the Tenth Amendment contention and conclud 
ed that it was unavailing. We agree with the con 
stitutional determination so made by the First Cir 
cuit, and adopt its reasoning as fully applicable to 
the consolidated appeals before us. 28
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The Court briefly reiterated the mandatory versus voluntary 
distinctions drawn between the National League of Cities 
and the Steward Machine Co. cases. The District Court©s 
dismissal of the case was affirmed. On October 6, 1980, the 
U.S. Supreme Court let stand the lower Court©s decision.
The decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit in the New Hampshire case was thus controlling also 
in the County of Los Angeles case. For this reason it is useful 
to review the New Hampshire case. The First Circuit Court 
ruled on both conformity and constitutional issues. In each 
of the six issues, the Court found the state law contrary to 
the federal law requirements and the Secretary©s determina 
tion of nonconformity correct. 29 The constitutional issue 
boiled down to:
... do the 1976 amendments to FUTA violate the 
sovereign integrity of the states and impair their 
ability to function effectively under the federal 
system as guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment.
The Court first distinguished the case from the National 
League of Cities case in which the issue was whether man 
dated application of the minimum wage and maximum hour 
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act constituted coer 
cion of the states in contravention of the Tenth Amendment. 
The Act required all states to pay the majority of their 
workers the minimum wage rates determined by Congress. It 
provided for both civil and criminal penalties in the event of 
a violation.
The unemployment insurance amendments, based on the 
taxing power rather than the commerce clause, offered the 
states a choice of conforming or not. The petitioners argued 
that the option not to conform is illusory, since the severe 
financial consequences that would follow negate any real 
choice. According to the Court, however,
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We do not agree that the carrot has become a club 
because rewards for conforming have increased. It 
is not the size of the stakes that controls, but the 
rules of the game.
In a footnote the Court noted that New Hampshire was the 
only state that had opted not to conform, and that it 
repeatedly stressed in its brief the burden on the state©s 
employers if the Act is held constitutional. According to the 
Court, "We observe that it is easy to gamble for high stakes 
when the money on the table comes from someone else©s 
pocket."
The Court noted that the basic design and mechanism of 
the federal unemployment insurance laws have not changed 
since 1935; coverage has been extended but the percentage of 
tax credit remains essentially the same. Moreover, the con 
cept that unemployment is a national program that must be 
dealt with on a national basis has been woven into the fabric 
of our society since 1935. Accordingly, the Court ruled that 
the arguments of coercion that had prevailed in the National 
League of Cities case were not applicable to the 1976 amend 
ments.
The next issue concerned the degree, if any, to which the 
amendments impaired New Hampshire©s sovereignty, due to 
the cost of extending coverage to public employees. The 
Court noted substantial differences between the estimates of 
costs of the state©s expert ($1.1 million) and by DOL©s expert 
($227,585 for fiscal 1978, $288,935 for fiscal 1979). In the 
National League of Cities case the Supreme Court found 
that application to states and their political subdivisions of 
the Fair Labor Standards Act would significantly alter or 
displace the ability of those governments to structure 
employer-employee relationships. The First Circuit Court 
concluded that extending UI coverage to the employees of
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New Hampshire and its political subdivisions would not pro 
duce the same result:
FUTA does not set the wage rates or affect hours 
worked. All it does is insure unemployment 
benefits for State employees. Its administration is 
entirely within the control of the State.
The Court held that the 1976 amendments do not impair 
New Hampshire©s sovereignty and have not been rendered 
unconstitutional by reason of National League of Cities.
Alabama, Nevada (1981)
One of the most contentious issues arising from the 1976 
amendments concerning coverage involved a question of 
congressional intent. Nothing in the legislative history of 
those amendments indicated whether, in extending coverage 
to employees of nonprofit primary and secondary schools, 
Congress intended also to cover church-related schools. The 
intent was ambiguous because of the manner in which 
coverage was affected. Prior to 1976, the FUTA included the 
following services performed for nonprofit organizations 
among those that states were permitted to exclude without 
jeopardizing tax credit:
(1) in the employ of (A) a church or convention or 
association of churches, or (B) an organization 
which is operated primarily for religious purposes 
and which is operated, supervised, controlled or 
principally supported by a church or convention or 
association of churches;
(2) by a duly ordained, commissioned or licensed 
minister of a church in the exercise of his ministry 
or by a member of a religious order in the exercise 
of duties required by such order;
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(3) in the employ of a school which is not an in 
stitution of higher education. 30
The 1976 amendments deleted paragraph (3). DOL took the 
position that by deleting the school exclusion, Congress in 
tended to extend coverage to all such schools, including 
church-related primary and secondary schools. In following 
DOL©s ruling, Alabama attempted to provide coverage of 
such schools, but was enjoined by suits filed by Baptist and 
Methodist churches and later enjoined permanently on 
January 29, 1979, by a state circuit court in a suit filed by 
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church. 31 The state voluntarily 
ceased its efforts to cover church-related schools.
The issue arose in Nevada because the state determined 
that Roman Catholic elementary and secondary schools were 
exempt under the state law in that services in those schools 
were performed in the employ of a church or a church- 
controlled organization operated primarily for religious pur 
poses. Alabama and Nevada were not alone. Conformity 
proceedings were started by DOL against four additional 
states Michigan, Tennessee, Texas and Washington. 
Following contentions by the four states that they had not 
had sufficient time to prepare for a hearing, the Secretary of 
Labor offered all six states certification of their laws for tax 
credit for 1979 and renewal of proceedings before certifica 
tion was due for 1980. Alabama and Nevada alone decided 
to pursue the issue without further delay.
Following a conformity hearing on the Alabama and 
Nevada positions, held on September 26, 1979, the Ad 
ministrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued his findings on October 
11, 1979, recommending that the Secretary hold Alabama 
and Nevada in compliance with the FUTA. The ALJ agreed 
with the states that
. . . church schools, being an integral part of the 
governing church and fundamentally religious in
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character, are exempt from coverage under the 
plain language of Section 3309(b)(l)(A) and/or (B).
The ALJ found persuasive three lower court decisions32 
which rejected the DOL position as "contrary to the plain 
meaning of the statute, unsupported by the legislative history 
and constitutionally impermissible." He disagreed with the 
DOL interpretation of the language "in the employ of a 
church" as meaning in the employ of a house of worship, 
performing religious duties, and with the Department©s re 
jection of the contention that church-schools were "operated 
primarily for religious purposes," rather than educational 
purposes.
In a decision issued October 31, 1979, Secretary of Labor 
Marshall rejected the ALJ©s recommendation and found that 
the Alabama and Nevada laws failed to conform with the 
FUTA. The Secretary©s decision referred to the fact that 
since the original enactment of the program, "Congress has 
followed an unbroken path towards expansions of 
unemployment insurance coverage." In extending coverage 
to nonprofit organizations in 1970, Congress excluded 
employees of primary and secondary schools, but clearly re 
quired coverage of employees of nonprofit colleges and 
universities, including church-related institutions of higher 
education, except seminaries and novitiates. In enacting the 
Special Unemployment Assistance Program (SUA) in 197433 
Congress provided emergency benefit protection to 
unemployed workers not otherwise covered under state UI 
laws, including employees of church-related schools. The 
1976 amendments were designed to "eliminate the tem 
porary Special Unemployment Assistance Program" and ex 
tend "permanent" coverage to "substantially all the 
workers . . . covered by SUA. 34 According to the Secretary, 
congressional intent was indicated in a Senate Report 
estimating the number of employees who would be covered 
by eliminating the primary and secondary school exclusion
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as 242,000. 35 The figure, supplied to Congress by DOL, 
represented the total number of employees in all nonprofit 
primary and secondary schools of which church-related 
school employees represent more than half. Finally, the 
Secretary©s decision argued that coverage of these schools 
did not create excessive governmental entanglement with 
religion and was within the limits of government regulation 
provided by the Constitution.
Alabama and Nevada appealed the Secretary©s decision to 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. In 
September 1980, the Court reversed the Secretary©s deter 
mination that the two states© laws conflicted with the FUTA. 
The Court supported the states© argument that church- 
related schools are within the statute©s meaning of 
"church":
. . . many of the church schools have no separate 
legal existence from their church; the school 
employees are hired, controlled, disciplined, and 
fired by church representatives and officials; school 
buildings are owned by the church; and school 
employees are paid with funds drawn from the 
church accounts. 36
According to the Court, the exemption is contingent upon 
whether the workers are employed by a "church," not the 
kind of work they perform. The plain meaning of "church" 
includes something greater than the physical building of wor 
ship and encompasses the legal entity commonly referred to 
as a church. The Secretary©s definition is too narrow. If Con 
gress wishes to amend the law clearly to change the exemp 
tion of church-related school employees, it can do so.
But, it is not the responsibility or function of the 
court to perform linguistic gymnastics in order to 
upset the plain language of Congress as it exists to 
day. 37
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This decision represented the end of the road for the 
Alabama and Nevada cases since appeal by DOL to the U.S. 
Supreme Court was held in abeyance (and ultimately never 
pursued) because of a case pending before that Court involv 
ing the same issue: South Dakota©s coverage of church- 
related schools. This case had reached the U.S. Supreme 
Court on the constitutional grounds that such coverage 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. When South 
Dakota, following DOL lead, prepared to tax church-related 
schools, two of them appealed. The two schools were not 
separate legal entities. They were part of the churches that 
ran them. An appeals referee found them subject to tax. The 
decision was reversed by a County Circuit Court. The South 
Dakota Supreme Court, by a divided vote, in turn reversed 
the judgment of the Circuit Court. The case then went to the 
U.S. Supreme Court.
On May 26, 1981, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled,
From our reading of the legislation and of its 
history, we conclude that the only reasonable con 
struction of 26 U.S.C. section 3309(b)(l) is one that 
exempts petitioners© church-run schools, and 
others similarly operated, from mandatory state 
coverage. 38
The Court argued that Congress drew a distinction be 
tween employees "of a church or convention or association 
of churches" on the one hand and employees of "separately 
incorporated" organizations on the other. The former would 
be excluded from coverage under the explicit exclusion of 
employment for a church, while the latter would be eligible 
for exclusion under the exclusion relating to employment for 
an organization operated primarily for religious purposes, 
but only when the organization is "operated, supervised, 
controlled, or principally supported by a church or conven 
tion or association of churches." The Court found that the
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individuals performing services for the schools in question 
were employees of the church and, therefore, exempt. It ex 
pressly rejected the DOL interpretation of the term 
"church" as meaning only the actual house of worship used 
by a congregation. The Court held instead that "church" 
refers to the church authorities who conduct the hiring, 
discharging and directing of church employees.
In a footnote, the Court observed:
Our holding today concerns only schools that have 
no legal identity separate from a church. To 
establish exemption from FUTA, a separately in 
corporated church school (or other organization) 
must satisfy the requirements of section 
3309(b)(l)(B): (1) that the organization "is 
operated primarily for religious purposes" and 
(2) that it is "operated, supervised, controlled, or 
principally supported by a church or convention or 
association of churches."
Because we hold petitioners exempt under section 
3309(b)(l)(A), we leave the issue of coverage under 
section 3309(b)(l)(B) for the future. 39
Although the Court left open the question of coverage of 
schools with a legal identity separate from a church, no 
issues have been presented. This is because unofficial DOL 
policy has permitted exemption of schools that are "af 
filiated" with a church, regardless of their separate legal 
identity. It is not clear what is meant by "affiliated," but in 
any event, DOL has followed the practice of not objecting to 
coverage exemptions if the school can demonstrate any af 
filiation at all with a church, however tenuous or vague the 
connection.
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Experience Rating and Benefit Charging Issues
Before the 1970 Amendments, experience rating issues, 
often involving questions of how benefits are charged or not 
charged to employers, constituted the main source of confor 
mity conflicts. The requirement in FUTA for additional tax 
credit40 is so broad and ambiguous as to require many inter 
pretations, and these were regularly challenged:
(1) No reduced rate of contributions . . . is permit 
ted to a person . . . except on the basis of 
his ... experience with respect to unemployment 
or other factors bearing a direct relation to 
unemployment risk. 41
The following conformity cases illustrate the various kinds 
of questions raised under this provision.
Minnesota (1947)
In 1947 Minnesota amended its law to permit employers to 
make voluntary contributions, in excess of what their tax 
rates required, for the purpose of building up their reserve 
accounts and thereby qualifying for tax rate brackets lower 
than the rates warranted by their actual experience. The con 
tributions could be made subsequent to the close of a rate 
year, but still affect the rates for that year. The amendment 
was challenged as running counter to the federal standard on 
experience rating.
After a conformity hearing on June 10, 1947, the Acting 
Commissioner of the Social Security Board held that under 
the federal requirement, any voluntary contributions must 
be paid no later than the due date for the first quarter con 
tributions in the rate year. This is usually April 30, approx 
imately the 120th day of the new year. Accordingly, the Min 
nesota provision was ruled out of conformity with the
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FUTA. A month later an amendment to the federal law was 
enacted providing that,
A State law may, without being deemed to violate 
the standards set forth in subsection (a), permit 
voluntary contributions to be used in the computa 
tion of reduced rates if such contributions are paid 
prior to the expiration of 120 days after the begin 
ning of the year for which such rates are effective. 42
Alabama (1953)
A bill passed by the Alabama legislature in 1953 provided 
relief from charges for benefits paid their workers who 
became unemployed because a natural disaster destroyed the 
employer©s business. The Department of Labor took the 
position that under the bill employers© reduced rates would 
be determined by a factor a natural disaster other than 
their unemployment experience (as measured by benefit 
charges) and would thus be inconsistent with the federal re 
quirement.
The Administrator of the state agency secured an amend 
ment to the bill providing that the noncharging would not 
become effective if the Federal Bureau of Employment 
Security or the Secretary of Labor decided that the bill was 
not in conformity with federal requirements. The Secretary 
so decided and the Administrator declared that the bill was 
not part of the state©s unemployment insurance law. The 
DOL interpretation was changed in 1972 after Pennsylvania 
and a number of other states sought relief for employers 
whose businesses were damaged by a severe flood. Under the 
new interpretation, noncharging is permitted, but only in 
jurisdictions declared disaster areas by the President pur 
suant to the Disaster Relief Act. 43
206 Conformity and Court Cases
Michigan (1957)
In 1957 Michigan amended its law covering the cancella 
tion of negative balances. Under the reserve ratio system of 
experience rating, when all past charges against an 
employer©s account exceed all past contributions credited to 
the account, his account is considered to have a negative 
balance. He is usually assigned the highest rates under the 
state law, which continue until the account balance becomes 
positive. The accounts of employers who have had only a 
single year of very heavy unemployment may take a long 
time to recover. For this reason, many states permit 
" negative balance employers" the option of having their 
record wiped clean. If this is permitted, however, the federal 
experience rating standard (for additional tax credit) was in 
terpreted to require that the employer whose negative 
balance was cancelled be considered in the position of a new 
employer. Accordingly, after cancellation, he should serve at 
least three years before he could qualify for a "reduced 
rate," a rate below the standard rate of 2.7 percent. 
Although the federal law was changed in 1954 to permit 
states to assign new employers reduced rates on the basis of 
as little as one year©s experience, the experience rating re 
quirement was interpreted as requiring three years after 
cancellation before former negative balance employers could 
qualify for a rate below 2.7 percent.
The state©s Attorney General, in Opinion No. 3109, inter 
preted the Michigan amendment to mean that employers 
whose balances were cancelled in 1955, 1956 and 1957 were 
not required after rate year 1958 to pay the standard 2.7 per 
cent rate or more. In other words, an employer whose 
negative balance had been cancelled would be permitted a 
reduced rate before he had three years of experience follow 
ing the cancellation. This interpretation conflicted with the 
existing federal policy on the matter and the law was 
challenged.
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The conformity hearing was held October 22, 1957, and 
was adjourned October 26, 1957 at the request of the state 
agency. The Michigan law was amended to require a con 
tribution rate of at least 2.7 percent for three years after the 
last cancellation of negative balances. On October 31, 1957, 
the Secretary of Labor signed an order dismissing the pro 
ceedings.
Oregon (1976)
In 1973 Oregon amended its law to allow a small group of 
food processors (those who ship 75 percent or more of their 
annual production in interstate or foreign commerce) to be 
relieved of some or all charges for benefits paid their 
workers. The proportion noncharged, determined by a 
special formula, varied from 10 to 100 percent. All other 
Oregon employers continued to be charged in accordance 
with the state©s experience rating formula under which 
benefits paid a worker were charged to his base-period 
employers in the same proportion to total benefits as the 
wages paid the worker by the employer were to the worker©s 
total base-period wages. The new noncharging provision 
took effect on July 1, 1974, and first affected the contribu 
tion rates of Oregon employers for the tax year beginning 
January 1, 1976.
Following enactment of the provision, the Oregon agency 
requested a finding of conformity by the Secretary of Labor. 
By letter, dated June 6,1974, the Secretary advised the agen 
cy of his finding that the noncharging provision was incon 
sistent with the requirements of the experience rating stan 
dard in the FUTA. At the agency©s request, a hearing was 
held on June 24, 1976 in Washington.
In a decision issued October 26, 1976, Secretary Usery 
pointed out that
The test for acceptability of noncharging provi 
sions consistently used by the Department to assure
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that all employers are charged by the same rule over 
the same period of time, is one of reasonableness in 
the measurement of each employer©s experience in 
relation to other employers and to the purposes of 
experience rating.
He concluded that the Oregon law, in singling out food pro 
cessors for special treatment, violated "this aforementioned 
principle of reasonableness." Accordingly, the state law was 
not in conformity with the federal law.
The main objection to the Oregon provision was basically 
that employers in a specified group with unfavorable ex 
perience could qualify for lower tax rates than employers 
outside the group with better experience, at least as measured 
by the factor of benefit charges. That result was the reverse 
of what was intended by the requirement.
Delaware, New Jersey, New York, 
Pennsylvania (1979)
FUTA requires states to offer nonprofit organizations and 
state and local governments the option of financing benefit 
costs either by paying contributions, as other employers, or 
permit them to
. . . elect, for such minimum period and at such 
time as may be provided by State law, to pay (in 
lieu of such contributions) into the State unemploy 
ment fund amounts equal to the amounts of com 
pensation attributable under the State law to such 
service.©44
The provision, part of the 1970 amendments, was interpreted 
by DOL as prohibiting any noncharging of benefits to 
employers electing the reimbursement method. The reason 
was that "as self-insurers, they are fully liable for every 
dollar of benefits paid their employees and wholly immune
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from any other costs. " 4S DOL pointed out that if a reimburs 
ing employer were relieved of benefit charges, liability for 
the noncharged benefits would fall to contributing 
employers in the form of "pooled costs," from which reim 
bursing employers are exempt. In the aftermath of the 1976 
amendments, which added substantially more employing 
units eligible for the reimbursement option, DOL found it 
necessary to reiterate its interpretation. The language of the 
federal provision requires reimbursers to pay amounts 
"equal" to the benefits based on service with them. Any 
noncharging, according to DOL, would result in the 
employer paying an amount less than that equal to the 
benefits. The Department went so far as to insist on full 
reimbursement even when the benefits were paid erroneously 
on the basis of an error made by the state agency. Only if 
overpaid benefits were recovered may the employer be reliev 
ed from liability by refunding to him the recovered funds. In 
many instances, of course, such erroneously paid benefits 
are not recovered. 46
Delaware, New Jersey and New York maintained that the 
language of the statute requiring reimbursing employers to 
pay for unemployment compensation "attributable under the 
state law to such service" meant that the state has the right to 
determine whether or not benefits under particular situations 
are attributable to service with the employer, or to other fac 
tors. DOL rejected this argument, holding that "attributable 
under the state law" merely meant whether or not the 
benefits would normally be the employer©s responsibility, 
given the system and order of benefit charging set forth in 
the state law. A conformity hearing on the issue was held on 
August 8, 1979 with these states.
A separate hearing was held August 21, 1979 with Penn 
sylvania on the same issue as well as two other unrelated 
issues (described earlier in this chapter under Coverage 
Issues). In both cases, the Administrative Law Judges re-
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jected the DOL argument concerning noncharging and con 
cluded, in their recommended decisions, that the Secretary 
of Labor should find the states© practices (of relieving reim 
bursing employers of charges under certain circumstances 
such as erroneous payments) consistent with the federal pro 
vision on reimbursement. The Department had argued that 
benefits paid to ineligible claimants were compensation 
because all money withdrawn from a state©s unemployment 
fund must be used only for compensation (and certain 
refunds), pursuant to federal provisions governing the 
withdrawal of funds. If these are not benefits, then funds are 
being withdrawn in violation of the withdrawal standards. 
Pennsylvania©s position was that the withdrawal standards 
were not controlling or even relevant. The question was 
whether the employer should be charged, not whether money 
was properly withdrawn from the unemployment fund. The 
state argued that the FUTA requires that reimbursing 
employers pay only "amounts of compensation attributable 
under state law to ... service" in their employ. The terms 
"attributable" and "service" are not defined. Benefits paid 
to ineligible claimants are not attributable to service in the 
employ of any employer, but are attributable to ad 
ministrative errors by the state agency.
The Administrative Law Judge found that since the FUTA 
relates compensation to service attributable "under state 
law" to an employer, state law should be controlling:
Absent some indication of Congressional intent 
that the reimbursing employer should be liable for 
costs incurred through errors, which it does not 
cause, over which it has no control, and no oppor 
tunity to prevent, I cannot accept the Department 
of Labor©s argument. 47
The only legislative history produced by DOL to support its 
position was a 1966 Senate Report referring to the reim 
bursement method as "a form of self-insurance." 48 As
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Pennsylvania pointed out, however, the reimbursing 
employer is far different from that of a true self-insurer. 
Benefits are not paid directly to the employer but are dispers 
ed from public funds for a public purpose, not to discharge 
an obligation or liability of a particular employer. Moreover, 
although Congress intended for employers to weigh the risks 
in deciding whether to elect the reimbursement option, it did 
not intend to include risks such as erroneous payments which 
no employer could prevent, indirectly recover, or estimate.
The Secretary of Labor found on October 31, 1979 that 
whether compensation paid out is attributable to service with 
a reimbursing employer is determined by state law. As long 
as determinations that certain benefits are not attributable 
under the state law to service with a reimbursing employer 
are reasonable, such benefits may be noncharged consistent 
ly with federal law. 49
Labor Standards Issues
The labor standards, part of the original Social Security 
Act, set limits on the states© freedom to establish penalties 
for refusing a job. 30 They were aimed as much at protecting 
existing work standards as they were intended to keep 
claimants from having to accept substandard jobs. They pro 
hibit a state from denying benefits for refusal of new work if 
the work is vacant due to a labor dispute, if the job interferes 
with the claimant©s freedom to join a union of his choice, or 
if the wages, hours or working conditions are less favorable 
than those prevailing for similar work in the locality.
Although most labor standards issues in recent years had 
concerned the prevailing wage requirement, the conformity 
confrontations in the early years were over the requirement 
prohibiting benefit denial for refusing a job vacant due to a 
labor dispute. Also involved was (and is) the concept of 
"new work" within the meaning of the labor standards.
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Oregon (1938)
The first conformity hearing of the unemployment in 
surance program involved an issue arising from the labor 
standards provisions of the Social Security Act. The stan 
dards prohibit, as a condition for tax credit, denial of 
benefits to an otherwise eligible individual for refusing to ac 
cept new work "if the position offered is vacant due directly 
to a strike, lockout or other labor dispute." 51
In 1938 Oregon voters approved a statutory initiative 
"regulating picketing and boycotting by labor groups and 
organizations." Effective December 1, 1938, the approved 
law defined the term "labor dispute" as follows:
Whenever in any statute or other law of this state 
the term ©labor dispute© is used, such term is hereby 
defined for all purposes to mean and include an ac 
tual bona fide controversy in which the disputants 
stand in proximate relation of employer and the 
majority of his or its employees and which directly 
concerns matters directly pertaining to wages, 
hours, or working conditions of the employees of 
the particular employer directly involved in such 
controversy. Disputes between organizations or 
groups of employees as to which shall act for the 
employees in dealing with the employer shall not be 
classed as labor disputes, and the refusal of an 
employer to deal with either party to any such 
jurisdictional controversy shall not operate to make 
the dispute a labor dispute within the meaning of 
this Act. 52
By eliminating jurisdictional disputes, the bill resulted in a 
definition of "labor dispute" that was narrower than the 
federal law definition. In other words, under the amended 
state law an individual could be disqualified for refusing a 
job vacant because of a jurisdictional dispute. A jurisdic-
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tional dispute constituted a labor dispute under the federal 
law. The state law, so amended, was challenged.
After a hearing held December 19, 1938, the Social Securi 
ty Board found the Oregon law out of conformity. On 
January 26, 1939, the Oregon legislature rescinded the provi 
sion in question, effective back to the date of its enactment. 
In its decision of January 28, 1939, the Social Security Board 
found that as of December 31, 1938 the state law included 
the appropriate federal law labor standards and that the state 
law was eligible for certification to the Secretary of the 
Treasury for the taxable year 1938.
California and Washington (1949)
In 1948 West Coast maritime unions were engaged in a 
labor dispute. In the State of Washington there was also a 
dispute involving members of a carpenters© union. Some of 
the workers who were members of the unions engaged in the 
labor disputes had become unemployed before the disputes 
for reasons not connected with the disputes, and some were 
receiving benefits prior to the disputes. All union members, 
including these workers, were disqualified in California and 
Washington after the disputes began.
The Federal Bureau of Employment Security advised the 
two states that the disqualification of those union members 
unemployed prior to the labor disputes was inconsistent with 
one of the labor standards provisions of FUTA. That provi 
sion prohibits denial of benefits solely on the ground that the 
worker has refused new work vacant because of the strike, 
lockout or other labor dispute. The Bureau argued that the 
struck work was "new work" for those workers unemployed 
prior to the dispute.
Following a conformity hearing held for both states in 
December 1949, Secretary of Labor Tobin found that the 
State of Washington©s action violated the federal standard.
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Washington brought itself into conformity before the end of 
the year by changing the interpretation of the law. California 
agreed to reconsider its decision during the hearing, and the 
case was dropped. This case provoked the Knowland 
Amendment (discussed under Labor Standards in chapter 2) 
enacted in 1950, which provides, in part, that no hearing can 
be called by the Secretary as long as further administrative or 
judicial review of the matter is available to the parties under 
the state law.
California (1955)
This case involved California©s reconsideration of the 
same issue that precipitated the 1949 hearing. The California 
Supreme Court in 1955 affirmed the reimposed disqualifica 
tion of the claimants under the labor dispute disqualification 
provision on the grounds that all of the work for seamen on 
the waterfront was "their work," not "new work," because 
of their union©s agreements with the employer association.
Following a formal hearing, the federal hearing officer ap 
pointed by the Secretary of Labor observed that all members 
of the unions registered at the hiring halls had a group at 
tachment to and shared equally in all available work for 
seamen on the waterfront and that when a work stoppage oc 
curred, all registered workers had left "their work" because 
of the labor dispute. However, claimants were free to 
negotiate individually for continued employment with the 
same employer. It could be argued, therefore, that their 
prior contract had terminated and their old jobs were now 
"new work." In any event, upon the advice of an informal 
panel of legal authorities, appointed by the Secretary to 
review the findings of the hearing officer, the Secretary 
found that the state had not violated the federal standard. 53
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Fair Hearing and Promptness Issues
On April 26, 1971, a unanimous Supreme Court decided 
one of the most important UI cases to reach the courts. It in 
volved interpretation of the phrase "when due" in the Social 
Security Act provision requiring states to provide such 
methods of administration as are found by the Secretary of 
Labor to be reasonably calculated to insure full payment of 
benefits "when due." 54 The Court concluded that the word 
"due" means "the time when payments are first ad 
ministratively allowed as a result of a hearing of which both 
parties have notice and are permitted to present their respec 
tive positions. . . ," 55 This decision resulted in amendments 
to every state UI law and dramatic changes in the prompt 
ness and quality of UI appeals proceedings and in the 
promptness of benefit payments to eligible claimants.
The Java Case (1971)
Unlike all other issues discussed in this chapter, the Java 
case was not a federal-state confrontation, although it was 
later the cause of considerable intergovernmental conflict 
and cooperation. It has not been uncommon for UI issues to 
be raised by individuals or groups of claimants or employers, 
with the states and DOL being the common adversary. 
Usually these are state court cases and a federal-state conflict 
arises when a state court interprets a state UI law provision 
in such a way as to violate federal requirements. In recent 
years more UI cases (e.g., County of Los Angeles) have ap 
peared in federal courts. The Java case has been one of the 
most important.
The case involved two California claimants, Carroll H. 
Hudson and Judith Java, who were awarded benefits follow 
ing an eligibility interview at which the employer did not ap 
pear. Payments began immediately. The employer, who is 
given ten days to appeal, challenged eligibility in each case.
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Pursuant to the California law, payments were automatically 
stopped pending decision on the employer©s appeal. The me 
dian delay in resuming payments after an employer filed an 
appeal, assuming that the claimant©s eligibility is upheld, was 
about seven weeks. The claimants appealed the state©s stop 
page of payments to the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of California. 56 The claimants argued first that the 
intent of the state UI program, to stave off extreme personal 
hardship as well as society-wide depression in terms of in 
creasing unemployment, is clearly thwarted when a claimant 
must wait some 50 days for payments to resume. Second, 
they argued that the state law violates the provision of the 
Social Security Act which requires state laws to provide 
methods of administration "reasonably calculated to insure 
full payment of unemployment compensation when due." 
Third, they argued that the denial of benefits, without a 
prior hearing, to persons already found eligible violates their 
rights to due process of law under the Constitution. They 
cited a March 23, 1970 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court 
in Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), that a welfare 
claimant©s benefits not be terminated without first affording 
him an opportunity for a full evidentiary hearing. Consistent 
with that case, they argued that once UI benefits are allowed, 
they should continue until there is a hearing on the 
employer©s appeal and a decision favorable to the employer.
California argued that a decision in favor of the plaintiffs 
would adversely affect the UI program in California and 46 
other states. "A substantial alteration in processing claims 
of such magnitude would have a serious financial impact on 
the State of California and impose on it a crushing ad 
ministrative burden." More important, the state argued that 
the agency©s administrative determination that a claimant is 
entitled to benefits is not sufficient, standing alone, to justify 
payment until a determination is made on the employer©s ap 
peal. Prior to hearing on the employer©s appeal, no 
testimony is taken under oath: there is no right to confronta-
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tion or to call witnesses. Moreover, since employers were 
successful in 47 percent of their appeals, benefits paid out 
which were subsequently held to be valid would have 
amounted to $800,000 if the state had been required to pay 
benefits during the pendency of any employer appeal. These 
benefits would have been unrecoverable because of the state 
law provision requiring waiver of recoupment if benefits had 
been received without fault on the part of the recipient. Fur 
thermore, recovery would be against equity and good con 
science.
The state argued that its procedure balances ad 
ministrative prudence and claimants© rights, whereas if 
benefits were payable pending an employer©s appeal, the 
balance would be altered because claimants would then have 
incentive to delay hearings and decisions, thereby adding to 
the administrative burden and financial loss to the state. The 
state rejected the applicability of Goldberg v. Kelley. In that 
case, it was important that termination of welfare payments 
be undertaken only after a full evidentiary hearing, since 
withholding of these payments rendered those receiving 
welfare literally destitute. The state argued that UI claimants 
were in a different position from welfare recipients:
Plaintiffs (UI claimants) here have admittedly suf 
fered considerable inconvenience but they are, 
however, receiving welfare benefits. True these 
benefits are modest, but plaintiffs are only asked to 
maintain themselves on such a modest scale for ap 
proximately 30 to 45 days, during which a decision 
on the appeal is being made. 57
In other words, the UI claimants were not as destitute as the 
plaintiffs in Goldberg since they would receive welfare, as in 
fact they did at the time.
In its brief, 58 DOL argued in support of the California 
practice in that it was more reasonable than the alternative,
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urged by the plaintiffs, of paying benefits pursuant to an ini 
tial determination and until reversed by an appeals body. Ac 
cording to the brief, that procedure would create substantial 
overpayments, as seen retroactively, cause delay in hearings, 
and result in more close issues being decided initially against 
claimants to avoid overpayments. DOL argued that if the 
decision in Goldberg v. Kelley applied to UI (no termination 
except after a full hearing) the practical effect would be for 
states to deny benefits to every claimant until after a hearing 
and a decision by a referee that the claimant was eligible. 
DOL also pointed out that unlike welfare recipients, UI 
claimants are not usually destitute. Finally, the DOL brief 
argued that the California procedure (as well as that in 46 
other states) was consistent with the federal requirement of 
"payment of unemployment compensation when due." The 
original draft bills prepared by the Social Security Board to 
help states design their first UI laws so as to meet conformity 
requirements, contained suggested legislative language pro 
viding for withholding benefits pending an appeal. These 
provisions were in the Alabama law when the Supreme Court 
upheld its constitutionality in 1936. They also provided the 
model for the California provision.
In a short, eight page decision, the U.S. District Court rul 
ed the California provision defective on both constitutional 
and statutory grounds: 59
By not providing a pre-termination hearing, it runs 
counter to the principles enunciated in Goldberg v. 
Kelley, cit. supra. And by being applied so as to 
result in a median seven week delay in payments to 
claimants who have been found eligible for such 
payments, the California statute violates the direc 
tive of 42 U.S.C. 503(a)(l).
The Court found the present case "indistinguishable©© from 
Goldberg.
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As here, the defendants in Goldberg argued the 
State©s interest in protecting public funds. The 
Supreme Court, balancing this interest against the 
welfare recipient in having the necessities of life 
while the bureaucracy mulls over his continued 
eligibility, found the fiscal argument somewhat 
weak, and rejected it. Defendants herein suggest 
that the unemployed person is perhaps not in such 
dire straits as the recipient of public assistance, in 
that he can always go on welfare, and thus save 
himself from absolute destitution. It is scant com 
fort to the disaster stricken that there is someone, 
somewhere, worse off than he, and this Court finds 
that the situation of the unemployed person herein 
is every bit as lamentable as that of the welfare 
client. . . .
The most fundamental purpose of both the federal 
and the state unemployment compensation laws is 
©to prevent the burden of injured employees 
becoming charges upon society.© 60
On April 26, 1971, Chief Justice Burger delivered, for a 
unanimous Supreme Court, an opinion holding that the 
California provision violated Section 303(a)(l) of the Social 
Security Act. 61 That made it unnecessary to rule on the con 
stitutional issue involved in Goldberg on which the District 
Court relied. Specifically, it violated the requirement of that 
section that the state law provide such methods of ad 
ministration "as are found by the Secretary of Labor to be 
reasonably calculated to insure full payment of unemploy 
ment compensation when due."
Reviewing the history of the Social Security Act led the 
Court to:
. . . the conclusion that ©when due© was intended to 
mean at the earliest stage of unemployment that
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such payments were administratively feasible after 
giving both the worker and the employer an oppor 
tunity to be heard.
According to the Court,
Probably no program could be devised to make in 
surance payments available precisely on the nearest 
payday following the termination, but to the extent 
that this was administratively feasible this must be 
regarded as what Congress was trying to ac 
complish.
We conclude that the word ©due© in section 
303(a)(l), when construed in light of the purposes 
of the Act, means the time when payments are first 
administratively allowed as a result of a hearing of 
which both parties have notice and are permitted to 
present their respective positions; any other con 
struction would fail to meet the objective of early 
substitute compensation during unemployment.
Our reading of the statute imposes no hardship on 
either the State or the employer and gives effect to 
the congressional objective of getting money into 
the pocket of the unemployed worker at the earliest 
point that is administratively feasible. That is what 
the Unemployment Insurance Program was all 
about.
The Court found the California local office©s initial inter 
view an adequate pre-determination fact-finding proceeding 
in which the claims of both the employer and the employee 
can be heard.
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Although the eligibility interview is informal and 
does not contemplate taking evidence in the tradi 
tional judicial sense, it has adversary characteristics 
and the minimum obligation of an employer is to 
inform the interviewer and the claimant of any dis 
qualifying factors. So informed, the interviewer 
can direct the initial inquiry to identifying a 
frivolous or dilatory contention by either party.
Aftermath of Java
On June 14, 1971, DOL advised all state agencies of the 
implications of Java. " First, if benefits have been awarded a 
claimant pursuant to an initial determination, they may not 
be suspended pending an appeal period or pending, as in 
California, disposition of an employer©s appeal. That meant 
changes in 47 states© laws or interpretations. Second, states 
must provide reasonable notice to both the claimant and 
employer of the time and place of the pre-determination 
fact-finding hearing. This new step required changes, not in 
state laws, but in virtually every state©s procedures, since no 
state at that time provided such notices. Finally,
To keep to a minimum the impact of overpayments 
that may result from modifications or reversals of 
benefit determinations on appeals, attention needs 
to be given not only to quality at the determination 
level but also to expediting the processing of all ap 
peals.
The reduction of overpayments was one reason to focus 
on appeals promptness. The estimated magnitude of over 
payments, nationally, had the Java requirements been 
operative in fiscal year 1971, would have been about $7.5 
million. There were other reasons. During 1971, the states 
decided fewer than one-fourth of their benefit appeals within 
30 days and less than half within 45 days. In some states,
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practically no appeals were processed within 30 days and 
relatively few within 45 days. Over one-fourth of all ap 
pellants waited more than 75 days for a decision.
In 1971, over a dozen suits were filed in federal courts 
which either directly or collaterally sought relief from the 
delays of the benefit appeals process. In December 1971, a 
Federal District Court concluded that even Vermont©s 
average five to six week delay (then among the shortest in the 
nation) was unreasonable. On April 14, 1972, a complaint 
was filed in a Federal District Court charging that Georgia©s 
failure to conduct hearings promptly (it averaged 3 percent 
of decisions issues within 30 days) was violative of the Four 
teenth Amendment and Section 303(a)(l) of the Social 
Security Act.
In 1973 Connecticut©s informal determination procedure 
was challenged. A U.S. District Court had enjoined the Con 
necticut agency from denying claimants benefits under its ex 
isting eligibility determination procedure without first pro 
viding a constitutionally sufficient hearing. The District 
Court was persuaded of the need for a full hearing at the ini 
tial determination level because Connecticut©s record in 
hearing appeals was the slowest in the nation. The state ap 
pealed this ruling. In a decision issued January 14, 1975, 63 
the U.S. Supreme Court made it clear that unless appeals 
decisions are issued promptly, states would face the costly 
prospect of making the initial determination process more 
like a full "due process" hearing. The Supreme Court held,
In this context, the possible length of wrongful 
deprivation of unemployment benefits is an impor 
tant factor in assessing the impact of official action 
on the private interests. . . . Prompt and adequate 
administrative review provides an opportunity for 
correction of errors made in initial eligibility deter 
minations. Thus the rapidity of administrative
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review is a significant factor in assessing the suffi 
ciency of the entire process.
The Supreme Court vacated the District Court©s judgment 
and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the fact 
that while the case was pending, Connecticut completely 
revised its appeals structure in order to accelerate the pro 
cess.
DOL advised the states:
The Court©s decision makes crucial the need for all 
States to meet and maintain at least the levels of ap 
peals performance prescribed in the Secretary©s Ap 
peals Promptness Standard. 64
The Appeals Performance Standard, described in the section 
on Administration in chapter 2, was the product of Java and 
specifically a commitment by DOL in its brief to the Court:
The Secretary of Labor is cognizant of the need for 
increased promptness and, insofar as it is possible 
to shorten the delay without denying a fair hearing 
to the participants, he intends to effectuate im 
provements. (Footnote: The Secretary is presently 
considering the wisdom and feasibility of pro 
mulgating a specific federal standard of the time 
within which each State must complete its pro 
cedures for determining whether benefits are due.)65
An Appeals Promptness Project, generated by the penden 
cy of Java and organized to implement the Secretary©s com 
mitment, issued a comprehensive report July 1972. It iden 
tified a number of contributing factors to the states© poor 
promptness record, including inadequate staffing, ineffec 
tive management, outmoded processing systems and inflexi 
ble budgeting. The root cause was simply stated:
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The basic problem is the failure at State and na 
tional levels to insist on promptness and on doing 
those things which would produce promptness. 66
The Report included a number of recommendations, in 
cluding a performance standard.
Java©s influence was not limited to the appeals area. 
DOL©s failure to insist on promptness was not confined to 
states© appeals performance. It had similarly failed to require 
a reasonable degree of promptness in paying benefits. First 
payment time lapse (the speed with which a state agency 
makes its first payment of benefits) performance was was 
abysmal as appeals time lapse. DOL had established sug 
gested criteria for reasonable time lapse calling for 86 per 
cent of intrastate claims to be paid within 14 days beginning 
with the week ending date of the first compensable week, 
and 67 percent of interstate claims. From 1971 through 1975 
there were never more than 22 states that met the intrastate 
criterion in any given calendar quarter, and never more than 
15 states met the interstate criterion.
As happened in the appeals area, by 1975, poor perfor 
mance of promptness of first payments resulted in court 
cases in Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland and 
Virginia. A Federal District Court in Illinois, appalled by the 
long time lapse of that state, concluded that the state agency 
did not adhere to the requirements of Section 303(a)(l) of the 
Social Security Act. Although it did not determine that DOL 
had improperly certified the state for granted funds, it did 
determine that the state was not making payments "when 
due." The Court concluded that the "when due" require 
ment meant that the state agency must mail checks out 
within 14 days from the end of the first compensable week of 
unemployment in all cases in which the claimant has provid 
ed all necessary information, and external factors beyond the 
agency©s control do not intervene. The agency must mail
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checks for all subsequent valid claims within 14 days from 
the end of the last compensable week of each bi-weekly claim 
period. 67
It became obvious that unless DOL developed a prompt 
ness standard (rather than merely guidelines) the courts 
would do so. And different courts may well develop dif 
ferent standards. On March 5, 1976, a proposed Standard 
for Benefit Payment Promptness was published in the 
Federal Register:
. . . responsive to the overriding concern of the 
United States Supreme Court in ... Java . . .and 
that of other courts with delays in the payment of 
unemployment compensation to eligibile in 
dividuals. 68
The proposed Standard was adopted July 23, 1976. It was 
later revised to be less stringent, effective August 28, 1978.
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Chapter 6 
Summary, Trends, Conclusions
The Conceptual and Legislative Framework
As envisioned by President Roosevelt©s Committee on 
Economic Security, unemployment insurance, like the 
American system of federalism, was to operate as a hybrid, 
with federal and state governments each having principal 
jurisdiction over particular aspects of the program and both 
sharing responsibility for others. As described in chapter 1, 
the immediate federal role to inspire states to enact UI pro 
grams was to be accomplished through a federal payroll 
tax and a provision allowing employers credit against most 
of that tax for the taxes they paid under a state UI program 
that met federal requirements.
A second federal responsibility involved management of 
the funds collected under the program. All taxes collected, 
state and federal, were required to be deposited in the Na 
tional Treasury. State deposits remained state property, but 
any money withdrawn could be used only for the purpose of 
paying unemployment compensation.
The third major federal responsibility was to establish na 
tional standards in areas where uniformity was absolutely 
essential. The two devices or sanctions available for insuring 
state conformity were denial of employers© credit against the 
federal tax and withholding of federal grants for administra 
tion.
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The states were to be responsible for enacting complete, 
self-contained unemployment insurance laws that conform 
ed to federal standards. The states would have almost com 
plete freedom to establish qualifying conditions for benefits, 
weekly amount and duration of benefits, eligibility and dis 
qualification conditions, and employer tax systems. Ad 
ministrative responsibilities were to be shared by both levels 
of government. Primary responsibility for administering 
their laws fell to the states, but the federal partner would 
have control over allocation of all funds for administrative 
expenses, authority to insure that administrative grants were 
used by the states only for proper purposes, and an obliga 
tion to provide technical assistance to the states.
As described in chapter 2, with a few exceptions, the 1935 
Social Security Act embodied the recommendations of the 
Committee on Economic Security. Through the federal 
unemployment tax and tax credit device, the unemployment 
insurance titles of the Act provided the impetus for quick 
enactment of UI laws in every state. They established the 
basic division of responsibilities between federal and state 
governments. Federal powers were spelled out explicitly, and 
as with the U.S. Constitution, those powers not expressly 
delegated to the federal partner or those that could not 
reasonably be implied as federal, were reserved to the states. 
Unlike the Constitution, the Social Security Act could be 
amended or abolished by Congress alone. Unemployment in 
surance would be a federal-state system only as long as that 
arrangement appeared to Congress to provide advantages.
Experience
Checks and Balances
A legislative framework under which authority and 
responsibilities for a program are divided between two part 
ners will soon collapse unless there are means to restrain
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either partner from encroaching on the authority of the 
other. The U.S. Constitution provides for an elaborate 
system of checks and balances among the three branches of 
the federal government as well as between the federal and 
state governments. The Social Security Act provides some 
checks and balances. The American political system provides 
others. Among them are the following:
  State authority to enact provisions contrary to federal 
requirements is checked by the consequences of denial 
of tax credit and loss of administrative grants;
  Federal authority to substitute a federal system for the 
federal-state system is checked by a state-oriented Con 
gress;
  State authority to enact conforming but extreme provi 
sions is checked by federal power to enact uniform stan 
dards;
  Federal authority to radically alter the system is offset 
by public acceptance of the basic provisions of 
unemployment insurance;
  State authority over the administration of its program is 
checked by federal control of administrative grants;
  Federal authority to impose sanctions on nonconform- 
ing states is checked by Congressional aversion to 
penalizing a state.
There are more. Until recent years, the result of these checks 
has been to restrain the actions of each partner so as to 
achieve something of a balance of power, with neither 
dominating in the control of the unemployment insurance 
system.
Conflicts
Since the beginning, the program has been characterized 
by two types of conflicts those caused by particular provi 
sions of law and others generated by friction between two
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levels of government having responsibilities for a single pro 
gram. Conflict over specific provisions is carried on almost 
every year within the 53 jurisdictions with UI laws between 
individuals and organizations with different views of the 
purposes of unemployment insurance. When debate between 
business and labor has been relatively even, the result has 
usually been beneficial to the program. Open fights over 
substantive program provisions are the source of the pro 
gram©s vitality. More than any other single factor, this con 
troversy has kept state programs flexible and responsive to 
local needs and attitudes.
The second type of conflict, intergovernmental, is in 
evitable in a program where responsibilities are divided, and 
federal and state governments have different perspectives. 
For example, state authorities with day-to-day responsibility 
for administration of their programs are bound to collide 
with federal officials who control the amount of money 
available for administration, set the priorities for the money, 
and may even dictate the "methods" the state must apply in 
carrying out administrative functions. These kinds of con 
flicts have not had a particularly beneficial impact on the 
program, but neither have they been harmful.
State and federal differences over the meaning of the 
federal law are more significant intergovernmental conflicts. 
As described in chapter 4, most have been settled through a 
variety of approaches. When negotiation has failed, the 
system provides a mechanism, the conformity process, 
whereby the issue may be resolved. It insures a state a fair 
hearing, a full opportunity to present its views and the op 
tion to seek judicial review of an adverse decision. As 
discussed in chapter 5, the most difficult and significant UI 
issues have been settled in this fashion. Interpretations are 
one means by which federal authority has been expanded to 
meet particular issues, and the conformity and judicial pro 
cesses have been testing grounds for the soundness of federal
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interpretations. The process has been used sparingly, basical 
ly because it involves much effort on the part of all parties to 
present and prepare support for positions. The availability 
of a fair hearing, if negotiation fails and one is needed, has 
had the same beneficial effect on the system as the fair hear 
ing opportunity available to claimants and employers.
Cooperation
Conflicts notwithstanding, the dominant pattern of in 
tergovernmental relations has been cooperative effort. This 
too has been the result of the division of responsibilities and 
the development of checks on authority. With each level of 
government restrained by statutory or practical obstacles, it 
quickly became clear that the program could operate only 
through cooperation. The interdependence of the two part 
ners was demonstrated at the outset.
As issues arose after the program was inaugurated in most 
states, interpretations were made of federal law, many with 
administrative implications. To be realistic and workable, it 
was necessary that interpretations and decisions affecting ad 
ministration be developed on the basis of state experience 
and capability. This required participation of state officials 
or, at the minimum, opportunity for state review and reac 
tion to proposed decisions and standards. This is an example 
of state participation in a predominantly federal function. 
Federal participation in essentially state matters has been 
discussed in the context of federal recommendations for 
amendments to state programs. These recommendations 
were particularly influential at the beginning of the program, 
as discussed in chapter 1. Over the years the recommenda 
tions diminished for the variety of reasons discussed in 
chapter 4.
Intergovernmental cooperation occurs at all ad 
ministrative levels and in all aspects of the program. It is the
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key, for example, to successful negotiation of conformity 
issues, as described in chapter 4.
Conflicts over the desirability of particular program provi 
sions, discord over the operation of the program, 
disagreements over the meaning of federal law, and over 
riding cooperative effort are the ingredients of federal-state 
relationships that have contributed to the success of 
unemployment insurance. The two sources of these 
characteristics are the federal-state division of respon 
sibilities originally spelled out in the Social Security Act, and 
the legislative, practical, and voluntary checks against ar 
bitrary expansion of authority by either partner. These are 
the elements that make possible debate in a state capitol over 
the level of the maximum weekly benefit amount; a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision upholding the constitutionality of a 
requirement that states cover state and local government 
workers as a condition for tax credit; a conformity hearing 
rejecting a state-imposed income test as a condition for 
benefits; resolution on an informal basis of a conflict with 
federal law caused by a state court decision; consideration by 
a state advisory council of recommendations prepared by the 
federal government for changes in the state©s qualifying re 
quirement.
Attitudes
The unemployment insurance program is significantly af 
fected by the attitudes of those who operate it and, indirect 
ly* by public attitudes about unemployed workers, 
claimants, employers, and unemployment insurance.
The system is a product of the 1930s depression when few 
Americans were without direct or close experience with 
unemployment. That experience showed that anyone could 
lose a job through no fault of his own and could remain 
unemployed despite all reasonable efforts to find work.
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Enactment of the UI provisions of the Social Security Act 
reflected general recognition of government©s obligation to 
provide some degree of protection against a hazard faced by 
everyone who works for another. These concepts represented 
radical departures from prevailing attitudes of preceding 
periods, that equated unemployment with shiftlessness, 
laziness or other weaknesses of character, and which rejected 
government support as gratuitous handouts likely only to en 
courage more idleness.
In the 1930s a number of idealistic individuals were at 
tracted to the new social insurance program at both the 
federal and state levels. Many developed strong personal 
commitments to relieving the hardship of unemployment. 
The system was thus built on the premise that most 
unemployed workers would rather work than draw benefits 
and was staffed in significant part by individuals dedicated 
to making unemployment insurance an effective means of 
meeting unemployed workers© needs.
The federal leadership established two overall objectives: 
adequacy and fairness. Recommendations of the Depart 
ment of Labor and its predecessors constantly stressed the 
need for adequate benefit amounts and duration, as describ 
ed in chapter 3. Three Democratic and one Republican ad 
ministrations supported federal benefit standards to ensure 
adequacy. States were regularly encouraged to assure that 
the great majority would be compensated for at least half 
their weekly wage loss if unemployed, and to establish the 
maximum weekly benefit amount as a percentage (preferably 
66-2/3 percent) of the statewide average weekly wage so that 
benefit levels would automatically keep pace with increases 
in wage levels. It was also recommended that the benefit 
duration allowed either be the same for all claimants 
(preferably 26 weeks), or be expressed as a maximum 
amount equal to a substantial fraction (preferably at least 
3/5 or 2/3 instead of the common 1/3 fraction) of the claim-
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ant©s base-period wages, up to no less than 26 times the 
claimant©s weekly benefit amount.
Fairness was stressed as much as adequacy. For example, 
although the amount of prior employment was the intended 
measure of labor force attachment, qualifying requirements 
in some states were expressed in terms of flat dollar amounts 
of base-period earnings. These tests were discouraged by 
federal policy recommendations because higher paid workers 
could meet them with less employment than others. Similar 
ly, states with disqualifications requiring that the claimant 
must be reemployed and earn a specified flat minimum 
amount before he can again become eligible for benefits were 
urged by the Department of Labor to require instead that the 
minimum amount of new earnings be stated as some specific 
multiple of the claimant©s weekly benefit amount. Low wage 
workers would thus not be disadvantaged in meeting the dis 
qualification. States with dependents© allowance provisions 
were urged not to require more of female claimants in quali 
fying for such allowances. Special disqualifications for par 
ticular categories of workers students, retirees, pregnant 
women were discouraged.
Beginning with the first Draft Bill developed by the Social 
Security Board in 1936, federal efforts to influence state 
legislation represented for a time the only leadership with 
regard to program policy issues. They provided focal points 
for discussion even in states with perspectives wholly dif 
ferent from the federal view. Federally organized legislative 
planning conferences, where recommendations were 
debated, brought federal and state officials together. The 
recommendations, somewhat predictable over time in their 
emphasis, also provided a certain stability to the program.
In time, as the states gained experience and confidence, 
many moved more independently concerning policy matters. 
Moreover, certain interest groups chiefly employers and
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labor acquired greater knowledge about UI and more skills 
in advancing their positions. The state side of the in 
tergovernmental relationship grew generally stronger as a 
result; a more equal federal-state balance evolved. While 
some on each side saw the other partner as too overbearing 
or too stubbornly independent, for the most part a 
reasonable climate developed that was favorable to a 
cooperative and creative relationship.
Recent Trends
Recent years have been marked by increasing federal 
dominance of the unemployment insurance system. The 
balance of power has been undermined by new federal stan 
dards, program objectives have shifted, and federal-state 
relations have undergone substantial change. Chapter 3 
described federal program standards enacted in these years. 
The 1980 and 1981 amendments which limit the conditions 
under which extended benefits may be paid remove from 
state jurisdiction almost all control over this aspect of 
unemployment insurance.
These and other recent restrictive program standards have 
been pressed primarily on the grounds of cost savings. This 
objective has become compelling rationale, given recent 
Congressional preoccupation with reducing the federal 
budget. In addition, cost-saving motivated standards have 
not been unwelcome in some states which are interested in 
avoiding tax increases otherwise necessary to keep benefits in 
step with inflation, to replenish their funds from the drains 
of recent recessions and to pay back moneys borrowed from 
the federal loan fund. 1
These trends toward increasing federal dominance and 
departure from long-standing program goals are products of 
dramatic economic and political developments in recent 
years.
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A major indirect contributor to the cost cutting trend was 
the inclusion of both federal and state UI tax receipts and UI 
expenditures in the federal unified budget. From 1936 
through 1967, state UI tax moneys were not included in the 
federal administrative budget, which was the basis for deter 
mining the size of the federal surplus or deficit. They were 
not included because they were reserved in trust funds ear 
marked for employment security purposes and not available 
for other activities. However, by 1967, total receipts of all 
U.S. Treasury trust funds (including Social Security©s) equal 
ed almost 40 percent of the total administrative budget from 
which they were excluded. Because of their size and impact 
on the economy, the UI and other trust funds, both their 
receipts and expenditures, were incorporated in a unified 
federal budget beginning in 1968. 2
The National Commission on Unemployment Compensa 
tion unanimously recommended removal of UI trust fund 
moneys from the federal budget. The Commission argued 
that the major portion of employer UI taxes is state moneys, 
not federal. State decisions affecting program matters are 
more important than federal decisions in their influence on 
UI revenues and expenditures. The basic reason for the 
Commission©s recommendation, however, was that, as part 
of the unified federal budget, trust funds have increasingly 
become the target of intensive efforts by both the executive 
and legislative branches to cut the expenditure side of the 
federal budget, frequently without much or any regard to the 
damage caused by the cuts in the programs involved. 3
A second source of current cost consciousness is the sud 
den and deep plunge of several states from solvency into 
debtor status. Until the 1970s, with few exceptions, states© 
reserves were generally adequate to cope with the regular 
fluctuations of the economy. During the severe recession of 
the mid-1970s, 25 states found it necessary to borrow from 
the federal loan fund. By 1977 and 1978, unemployment had
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declined, but the recovery was neither robust nor long 
enough to enable many states to reestablish adequate 
reserves. Thirteen states were still in debt at the end of 1979, 
by which time unemployment was again on the rise. It reach 
ed record post-Depression levels in 1982. By the end of that 
year, 23 states owed the loan fund $10.6 billion. The federal 
UI trust fund account for extended benefits was also in debt 
to the Treasury for about $7 billion, most of it for outstand 
ing costs of the Federal Supplemental Benefits program of 
the mid-1970s. 4
These economic shocks had enormous impact not only on 
state reserves, but on the direction the entire unemployment 
insurance system would take in the foreseeable future. With 
state as well as federal UI deficits reflected in the federal 
budget, state programs became subject to budget cutting ef 
forts by Congress and the Administration. The 1980 and 
1981 EB amendments described in chapter 3 are examples. 
The insolvency and potential insolvency of so many states in 
fluence the direction of the program also in another way. For 
these states, the primary consideration has become, first, 
how to keep the debt from growing, and later, how to repay 
the debt and rebuild the fund. The federal loan repayment 
requirements and the recently added requirement of interest 
to be paid on loans made after March 1982 have had signifi 
cant influence on state decisions. In addition to the interest, 
employers in a state that has not repaid its loan within about 
two years face an annual reduction in their federal tax offset 
credit until the debt is repaid. This translates into a uniform, 
progressive 0.3 percent increase in the federal unemployment 
tax rate each year the debt is outstanding. States have the op 
tion of paying an amount equivalent to the FUTA "repay 
ment tax" instead of the amount being collected through the 
uniform tax rate increases. Thus, states may choose to raise 
the amount needed through experience-rated taxes, or from 
any other source.
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In some states, regaining a sound financial footing may be 
accomplished by appropriate increases in the state UI tax 
rate, tax base, or both. In others it will require, in addition, 
changes in benefit provisions aimed at reducing expen 
ditures. 5 In any event, being preoccupied with regaining 
solvency means, in most cases, a moratorium on any 
liberalization of the benefit formula (even in states where 
benefit levels are inadequate), and a favorable reception to a 
wide range of cost cutting measures, from frozen maximum 
benefit amounts to stiffer disqualifications.
A third source of trends in the early 1980s is, of course, the 
election in 1980 of a President and Congress committed to 
reducing the cost of domestic programs generally, and the 
cost of so-called entitlement programs particularly. The im 
petus has been both a serious federal deficit as well as a 
predisposition by many Administration leaders to distrust 
the motives of those drawing unemployment insurance and 
other *© entitlements.©©
Testimony on behalf of new restrictive standards reveals 
an Administration attitude toward the program and 
unemployed workers quite different from that previously ex 
pressed concerning adequacy and fairness. In 1981, for ex 
ample, U.S. Secretary of Labor Raymond J. Donovan 
testified on behalf of one of a number of UI amendments 
proposed by the Reagan Administration. The proposal 
would require all states to disqualify claimants who, after 
three months of unemployment, refuse any job within their 
capabilities paying gross wages equal to the higher of the 
minimum wage or their weekly benefit amount. The pro 
posal, which was rejected, was similar to that enacted in 1980 
to apply to extended benefit claimants. 6 According to the 
Secretary, the proposal was needed because,
By allowing unemployed workers to draw up to six 
months of compensation unless jobs in their oc-
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cupations are available, the present unemployment 
compensation system discourages workers from 
seeking employment in new industries. . . . 7
A second Administration proposal (enacted) for elimina 
tion of the national trigger for extended benefits was describ 
ed by a DOL spokesman as necessary to remove
a disincentive for the unemployed to become quick 
ly reemployed in those States with low unemploy 
ment when the national trigger is on. 8
Another Administration proposal (enacted) was for amend 
ing the unemployment compensation program for ex-service 
persons (UCX) by requiring states to disqualify from 
benefits any individual who voluntarily leaves the armed 
forces after serving an enlistment period. In effect, the 
amendment provides that if the individual could have 
reenlisted, but chose instead to leave the service and reenter 
the civilian work force, he will be considered a voluntary quit 
and denied benefits if he is unemployed and files for UI. 9
These and other Reagan Administration proposals were 
recommended as a means of responding to what the DOL 
spokesman saw as a growing public image of beneficiaries,
. . . who are prepared to ride the system until all 
benefits are exhausted, and who only then look for 
work. 10
Implicit in the DOL testimony on behalf of reducing 
disincentives so as to encourage claimants to seek work was 
agreement with the image of claimants as preferring to draw 
benefits than accept jobs; a conviction that tests applied by 
state agencies of claimants© availability for work are inade 
quate; and a commitment to stricter eligibility and work 
search requirements rather than to making administration of 
existing requirements more effective and positive.
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A change in attitudes toward claimants from sympathy to 
impatience was also demonstrated abundantly by Congress 
in the 1980 debates on new extended benefit standards, par 
ticularly on the requirement that a state have a waiting week 
for regular claimants as a condition for payment of the 
federal share of the cost for the first week of extended 
benefits. It was asserted that the waiting week would 
somehow encourage workers to seek jobs instead of filing 
for benefits immediately. 11 A skeptical view of claimants© 
job search determination was evident also in the debate con 
cerning the deduction of retirement income from benefits. 
Such deduction, it was argued, was necessary to prevent 
retirees from draining the system. 12
Allegations of excessive benefit costs and the prevailing 
suspicion of claimant motivations also seem to draw support 
from new revelations by behaviorists and economists show 
ing that the average period of unemployment lengthens as 
benefit amounts or duration increase. 13 The implication is 
that as benefits become more "attractive" they lure more 
and more workers away from jobs. Many of these studies are 
solely statistical, without serious analysis of the implications 
of the figures or the validity of the samples used. If benefits 
are adequate, most unemployed workers are likely to spend a 
longer time trying to find the best job possible. Also, if 
benefits are adequate, more unemployed workers will file 
who ordinarily would delay because of embarrassment or 
unwillingness to become involved in the filing, registering, 
and reporting procedures. It is questionable, however, 
whether many individuals would deliberately forfeit a steady 
or even an uncertain job for benefits, amounting generally to 
half or less their regular weekly pay, for a period usually of 
half a year or less. The fact that most claimants do not ex 
haust their benefit entitlement even in hard times suggests 
the validity of the program©s premise that most people 
would rather work than draw benefits.
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Finally, cost considerations and a predisposition to 
distrust benefit recipients seem also to encourage a certain 
inventiveness in developing justifications for proposed 
changes. The entire package of restrictive, cost-cutting 1981 
Administration UI proposals, for example, was justified by 
Secretary of Labor Donovan in part on the grounds that 
their enactment "will strengthen this multi-billion dollar 
safety net for unemployed workers. . . . u
Conclusions
This paper has been supportive of the balanced federal- 
state system and negative about the drift toward greater 
federal control over the program in recent years. Reasons for 
this view are explained later, but in the interest of balance, 
some mention should be made of the advantages and disad 
vantages of a single nationwide program of increased federal 
dominance.
Arguments for Federal Control
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a single national pro 
gram is the opportunity it affords for equal treatment of 
claimants and employers throughout the country. In con 
trast, while state autonomy over program matters has per 
mitted experimentation and innovation, it has also produced 
some serious inequalities. Some states provide the same 
treatment for all claimants except for those categories 
singled out by federal law for special treatment. Other states 
discriminate against interstate claimants, women, students, 
seasonal workers and part-time workers. In some states, dis 
qualification provisions are so severe as to remove the of 
fender completely from any protection under the program 
for the foreseeable future. Some states have enacted benefit 
formulas that fall far short of meeting any reasonable test of 
adequacy, and taxing provisions that are wholly unrealistic
246 Summary, Trends, Conclusions
as means of ensuring solvency. State law differences, in 
many instances, result in claimants qualifying for wholly dif 
ferent UI benefits with identical base-period experience sim 
ply because they are in different states. Conversely, 
claimants with quite different work histories may qualify for 
identical benefit amounts and duration in different states. 
Divergent eligibility provisions produce situations in which a 
claimant in one state may be denied benefits for a certain act 
for six months or more, while in another state the same act 
may not be disqualifying at all. Employers with similar ex 
perience and payroll are regularly assigned wholly different 
tax rates in different states, depending on a great number of 
variables, and which may apply to different taxable wage 
bases as well.
Another advantage of a national system is financial. Na 
tionwide pooling of all unemployment insurance taxes would 
require the maintenance of smaller reserves than the ag 
gregate of 53 separate reserve funds. Such a system also has 
the potential to be a much more effective tool in controlling 
the economy. Federal domination should also lead to greater 
efficiency: The more uniformity throughout the country, the 
easier is the administrative burden. A national system also 
has the potential of unambiguous, united and effective 
leadership and direction, instead of 54 separate jurisdictions 
(53 "states" and one federal entity), each with authority 
over its own domain.
Nor is there any lack of support for a national or more 
federally dominated system. Both labor and, recently, 
business groups have supported greater federal control of the 
program. Organized labor has consistently favored benefit 
amount standards, as well as outright total federalization. It 
has also regularly looked to federal amendments to correct 
inadequacies and inequities of many states© programs. Labor 
representatives on the National Commission on Unemploy 
ment Compensation, for example, recommended that Con-
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gress consider adding federal benefit standards in the follow 
ing areas: the level of wage replacement represented by the 
weekly benefit amount, qualifying requirements, waiting 
periods, disqualifications, eligibility conditions for UI, ap 
peals requirements, benefits for partial unemployment, 
dependents© allowances, job search requirements and 
assistance, rules for availability for work and active search 
for work. 15
Business groups have only recently acquired a fondness 
for some federal standards. These former advocates of state 
autonomy supported the Reagan Administration©s 1981 pro 
posals for several new federal standards in the extended 
benefit area, and for a standard on a new suitable work 
definition for regular benefit claimants. The Chamber of 
Commerce, for example, recommended "swift enactment of 
the President©s Program for Economic Recovery, in its en 
tirety."
As federal budget restrictions, the proposed 
changes in the UC program (see Appendix A) will 
contribute to national economic recovery. Most im 
portantly, however, they are good for the UC pro 
gram and constitute a modest step toward long 
overdue reform of the federal unemployment com 
pensation laws. 16
Similarly, the National Association of Manufacturers, 
although it:
. . . philosophically opposes any imposition of 
federal standards on individual State UC pro 
grams, . . . urges you, the Congress, to respond to 
the Administration©s proposed unemployment 
compensation savings in a courageous manner by 
expeditiously enacting the legislative proposals be 
ing debated today. 17
248 Summary, Trends, Conclusions
Both of these statements of support were for Administration 
proposals that included the "imposition ... on individual 
State UC programs" of several new and sweeping federal 
standards. Traditional opposition by these organizations to 
enlarged federal control over the program apparently gives 
way in the face of opportunity for cost reduction and for a 
narrower definition of worker behavior acceptable as 
"deserving" of benefit support.
Disadvantages of Federal Dominance
A single national system that successfully provided 
uniformly fair and adequate UI provisions would be superior 
to the present federal-state system in the author©s opinion. 
Unfortunately, a national system with the potential for 
eliminating inequalities and inequities also has the capability 
of doing the opposite. The capability for producing ine 
qualities has been amply demonstrated. For example, state 
discriminatory provisions aimed at retirees, school 
employees, athletes, aliens, are federally mandated. That the 
federal government is as capable of inequities as any state is 
illustrated by the DOL-sponsored 1981 amendment and 1982 
amendments to the federal program of unemployment com 
pensation of ex-service persons (UCX) which required dis 
qualification, as a voluntary quit without good cause, of 
anyone who left the service when he could have reenlisted. 
This questionable provision was dropped in 1982, but in 
stead of reinstating the practice of treating veterans on an 
equal basis as other claimants, as was the case for over 20 
years, Congress imposed a four week waiting period as a 
condition for benefits (not required of other claimants by 
any state) and established a ceiling of 13 weeks of benefits, 
half the usual 26 week maximums for regular benefits 
available in all but one state and one-third the usual max 
imum duration in states with extended benefits triggered
on. 18
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The federal government is also no less capable than any 
state of absurdities, as illustrated by the 1982 requirement 
denying payment to any state of the federal share of the cost 
of extended benefits to the extent of "extra" benefit cost 
resulting from the state not rounding all the regular benefit 
amounts ending in other than full dollars, down to the next 
lower full dollar amount. There exists no viable means of ef 
fectively enforcing the provision. Finally, it should be noted 
that the federal government is as fully capable as any state of 
questionable judgment of the type illustrated by the severe 
1981 restrictions (elimination of the national trigger, increase 
of insured unemployment rate levels required to activate 
state triggers, elimination of EB claimants from the com 
putation of the trigger rates) imposed on the availability of 
extended benefits, at a time when record numbers of workers 
were losing their jobs only to turn around within months 
and enact a special emergency program to help the long term 
unemployed, including those dropped from unemployment 
insurance protection solely because of the earlier amend 
ments.
A 1978 General Accounting Office report of the UI system 
illustrates the dilemma, posed on the one hand by a hybrid 
federal-state system that produces inequalities but usually no 
nationwide blunders, and on the other hand by a national 
system (or a federally dominated partnership) that has the 
promise of equal treatment nationwide but also the potential 
for imposing provisions that are universally unfair or inade 
quate. In its report, the GAO recommended abolition of the 
extreme diversity of provisions it had discovered among the 
states:
We recommend that the Congress establish 
uniform eligibility standards and methods for 
determining benefit amounts so that all UI 
claimants are treated equally. 19
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We believe that the benefit to be derived from our 
recommendation would outweigh what might be 
perceived by some as an intrusion on the partner 
ship. 20
Differences in eligibility and benefit provisions 
among the jurisdictions have a significant impact 
on program costs. 21
The recommendation for greater uniformity "so that all UI 
claimants are treated equally" was not, however, accom 
panied by recommendations that would assure both unifor 
mity and equity. Instead, GAO was disturbed that some 
states had no waiting week requirement, some did not deduct 
retirement income from benefits, some paid dependents© 
allowances, some permitted disqualified claimants to 
become eligible after a specified number of weeks rather 
than requiring them to requalify by getting another job. Ac 
cording to GAO estimates, these provisions increase UI costs 
over $1.0 billion. 22
There was no discussion in the report of the merits of the 
provisions from the standpoint of program objectives or 
from any other standpoint than cost. The GAO completely 
ignored DOL©s rebuttal that the very provisions the report 
singled out and implied were too expensive were provisions 
(except for dependents© allowances) the Department had urg 
ed the states to adopt for over 40 years, on the grounds that 
they provided fair treatment of claimants and made UI a 
more effective buffer against the hardships of unemploy 
ment. The GAO recommendations would thus have ac 
complished greater uniformity and saved money, but the 
cost of such "reforms" would be borne entirely by claimants 
and would be substantial.
Perhaps more important than other disadvantages of a na 
tional system is its potential for manipulating people. The re 
cent amendments to the EB program, for example, seemed
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more aimed at forcing unemployed workers to seek any 
available job regardless of their skills, experience, former 
wage level or standard of living, than at providing mean 
ingful help to people suffering from loss of jobs, income, 
and self-confidence. The concerted attacks in recent years by 
Administration spokesmen and Congressmen on the motiva 
tions and character of those receiving UI and other public 
entitlement program benefits seem deliberately intended to 
instill a sense of shame, or at least embarrassment, in reci 
pients, and thereby to manipulate unemployed workers to 
forego or delay filing claims for benefits. Given the increas 
ingly common attitude toward claimants as parasites rather 
than involuntarily unemployed workers, a wholly centraliz 
ed, national program could become even more manipulative 
and oppressive.
Restoring a More Even Balance
The federal-state system has the disadvantages described 
earlier. But it does not have the same potential as a national 
system (or a federally dominated partnership) for manipula 
tion. It still permits experimentation on an individual state 
basis; and with a constantly changing economy, the chance 
to test new ideas in individual state laboratories is needed as 
much now as 50 years ago. Unlike the mistakes of a national 
administration and Congress, which have nationwide im 
plications and can be repealed only by another act of Con 
gress, state disasters are usually confined to individual state 
borders, while successes can be quickly picked up by other 
states.
The current federal-state division of responsibilities is a 
source of the debate, discussion, conflict and confrontations 
discussed throughout this paper. These are the factors that 
have produced a unique vitality in a 45-year old program and 
that provide the key to its flexibility and responsiveness to 
new problems.
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The means of retaining the advantages and preserving 
what is left of the federal-state balance lie in buttressing 
deterrents to federal takeover. The main reason for federal 
restraint in the past was widespread public acceptance and 
support of a system that seemed to work well and provided 
meaningful help to involuntarily unemployed workers. The 
general assumption was that the states maintained 
reasonably efficient, adequate programs at relatively low 
cost, and that benefits generally were paid only to workers 
unemployed through no fault of their own, most of whom 
were ready, willing and able to work. Given these assump 
tions (disturbed occasionally by a newspaper article or televi 
sion program focusing on UI fraud or implying fraud), there 
was a natural reluctance to change a successful organiza 
tional structure.
The heavy unemployment of the mid-1970s, enactments 
during that period extending benefit duration to as much as 
65 weeks, and the sudden and complete depletion of many 
states© reserves caused public reassessment not only of the 
capabilities of the states but also of the character of the UI 
claimant. The 1980 and 1981 federal invasions of state 
authority through a succession of program standards, 
motivated mostly by budget considerations, were made 
possible because of the erosion of public confidence in the 
system encouraged and articulated by congressional and 
administration advocates of restrictive federal standards.
Restoration of past positive attitudes requires shoring up 
the current system©s abilities to meet its basic responsibilities. 
First is the federal-state responsibility to ensure adequate 
financing of benefits.
The states must work their way back to solvency if public 
skepticism of their ability to manage their own UI programs 
is to be replaced by public confidence. States© heavy borrow 
ing in recent years from a federal loan fund that itself has
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had to borrow from general revenues, has been interpreted 
as a sign of irresponsibility and a signal for federal takeover 
of state responsibilities. Federally imposed cost-saving 
measures have been substituted for state decisionmaking. 
The trend toward increased federal influence will certainly 
continue as long as substantial numbers of states must bor 
row "federal" money. The paths individual states must take 
to regain solvency and independence are many and varied 
and not the appropriate subject for this paper.
Clearly, states must take appropriate steps, but given the 
uneven impact among the states of recent recessions and the 
severe economic shocks suffered by some, it is no longer 
reasonable to expect individual states to carry the entire 
burden of extraordinary benefit costs. In some states, the 
most prudent financing measures conceivable would not 
have prevented complete depletion of state reserves. Some 
form of catastrophic reinsurance is clearly needed so that no 
state©s reserves are so exhausted by a recession as to prevent 
it from recovering, through reasonable tax increases, within 
a relatively short period.
A second basic responsibility of the system is to ensure 
that benefits are paid only to those for whom the program is 
intended to help. If the public continues to believe that too 
many claimants would rather draw benefits than work, and 
that most states are either unable or unwilling to take 
necessary steps to limit benefits only to those genuinely eligi 
ble, more federal eligibility standards are likely to be forth 
coming. The emphasis will continue to be on "stimulating 
work incentives" by tightening eligibility requirements, 
lowering benefits, and making disqualifications more severe, 
and it is possible that efforts will also be made to amend the 
law so as to permit (or require) states to limit benefits only to 
those who meet needs or income tests.
The UI program has always been vulnerable to charges 
that it is easy for claimants to cheat by not reporting all earn-
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ings for a week, by false statements about their availability 
for work, by insincere and half-hearted searches for a job. 
Everyone seems to know someone who has collected benefits 
apparently without being ready, willing and able to work. 
There is no question that some of the alleged abuse is real. 
Application of the availability and work search tests is the 
weakest aspect of UI administration.
Recent national administrations have tended to view abuse 
and fraud as common if not prevailing practices rather than 
aberrations. Instead of concentrating on making UI a more 
effective protection for individuals and their families, and a 
more effective counter-recessionary tool, they have focused 
on reducing abuse and providing new incentives to return to 
work, such as increasing the penalties for turning down a 
suitable job; considering as suitable any job the claimant is 
physically able to perform if it pays more than either the 
minimum wage or the claimant©s weekly benefit amount; re 
quiring that claimants produce tangible evidence of their 
work search efforts.
The disregard of such factors as the claimant©s prior work 
experience, his skills and training and his past earnings levels 
only adds to employers© problems, since few individuals are 
likely to remain long in a job that is not compatible with 
their training and experience and out of line with their prior 
wage levels. It adds also to the problems of other 
unemployed individuals for whom the job, taken temporari 
ly by the "over qualified" claimant, is suitable. The tangible 
evidence of work search requirement results in the claimant 
making employer contacts solely for the purpose of meeting 
the requirement a futile effort by the claimant and a 
nuisance to employers.
A better approach, tried on an experimental basis from 
time to time, is a positive, thorough application of each 
state©s existing availability for work and work search re-
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quirements. Such an approach requires individualized treat 
ment of each claimant to the greatest feasible extent. It in 
volves joint employment service and UI evaluation of the 
claimant©s prospects for local reemployment in his usual oc 
cupation and his need and aptitude for acquiring new skills 
that are in demand. Most important, for claimants not ex 
pecting recall to their jobs, it requires the early cooperative 
development by the employment service and UI staff with 
the claimant of a plan representing the most realistic path to 
the claimant©s reemployment in suitable work; actual im 
plementation of the plan and adjustment of the plan when 
necessary; and a periodic evaluation of the claimant©s own 
pursuit of the plan and of his availability for work. 23 This 
approach is expensive, but it may be cost effective if all 
social as well as program costs are taken into account. It 
represents the most productive and realistic approach possi 
ble, from the standpoint of the claimant, the state agency, 
and employers.
The effective application of a thorough reemployment ser 
vice would also permit the early indentification of those in 
dividuals not really committed to working. Accordingly, this 
approach would seem to be the most effective means of 
reducing abuse of the program by claimants. It should also 
help in restoring public confidence in state ability to limit 
benefit payments only to those who genuinely meet the state 
eligibility conditions.
A third basic responsibility of the system is to provide ade 
quate benefits. A sure invitation to increased federal control 
of the program is for the states to continue to fall short of 
this goal. Federal benefit standards have received con 
siderable support in the past primarily because states 
neglected to prescribe reasonable benefit levels. Clearly such 
standards are not likely in the immediate future. However, 
the current federal emphasis on cutting costs will in time be 
replaced by a genuine concern for the plight of unemployed
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workers. It will be accompanied by a growing conviction that 
a state UI program should be expected to meet some 
reasonable benchmark of minimum benefit adequacy to 
qualify the state©s employers for credit against the federal 
tax. Unless the states do this voluntarily, it will be done for 
them.
A fourth basic responsibility is for the system to 
reestablish reasonable program objectives and goals. This 
means resumption by the federal partner of its responsibility 
for developing and recommending provisions for state con 
sideration based on criteria of fairness and adequacy, as well 
as cost. Resumption of its traditional advocacy role (by a 
DOL genuinely committed to strengthening UI) would pro 
vide a needed focus on program improvement, abandoned to 
cost considerations in recent years. It would represent a 
return by the federal partner to a role of leadership in 
establishing broad as well as specific program goals and in 
persuading states of the merits of its recommendations on 
the basis of reason, research and experience, rather than 
coercion.
If adopted, these four general recommendations should 
help renew public confidence in unemployment insurance. 
Their adoption should lead to greater support for the pro 
gram©s original objectives and a change in the current public 
image of the claimant as lazy, devious and undeserving. 
These changes in the public perceptions would seem to be 
prerequisite to restoring the traditional federal-state balance 
of power. In addition, if the old partnership is to be revived, 
it seems necessary that there also be greater public awareness 
of the hazards of centralized control and the values of a 
pluralistic system. Perhaps this monograph will contribute to 
that end.
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